OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2005 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
* All Rights Reserved.
*/
#include "xfs.h"
#include "xfs_fs.h"
#include "xfs_shared.h"
#include "xfs_format.h"
#include "xfs_log_format.h"
#include "xfs_trans_resv.h"
#include "xfs_bit.h"
#include "xfs_sb.h"
#include "xfs_mount.h"
#include "xfs_ialloc.h"
#include "xfs_alloc.h"
#include "xfs_error.h"
#include "xfs_trans.h"
#include "xfs_buf_item.h"
#include "xfs_bmap_btree.h"
#include "xfs_alloc_btree.h"
xfs: validate metadata LSNs against log on v5 superblocks Since the onset of v5 superblocks, the LSN of the last modification has been included in a variety of on-disk data structures. This LSN is used to provide log recovery ordering guarantees (e.g., to ensure an older log recovery item is not replayed over a newer target data structure). While this works correctly from the point a filesystem is formatted and mounted, userspace tools have some problematic behaviors that defeat this mechanism. For example, xfs_repair historically zeroes out the log unconditionally (regardless of whether corruption is detected). If this occurs, the LSN of the filesystem is reset and the log is now in a problematic state with respect to on-disk metadata structures that might have a larger LSN. Until either the log catches up to the highest previously used metadata LSN or each affected data structure is modified and written out without incident (which resets the metadata LSN), log recovery is susceptible to filesystem corruption. This problem is ultimately addressed and repaired in the associated userspace tools. The kernel is still responsible to detect the problem and notify the user that something is wrong. Check the superblock LSN at mount time and fail the mount if it is invalid. From that point on, trigger verifier failure on any metadata I/O where an invalid LSN is detected. This results in a filesystem shutdown and guarantees that we do not log metadata changes with invalid LSNs on disk. Since this is a known issue with a known recovery path, present a warning to instruct the user how to recover. Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-10-12 12:59:25 +08:00
#include "xfs_log.h"
#include "xfs_rmap_btree.h"
#include "xfs_refcount_btree.h"
#include "xfs_da_format.h"
#include "xfs_health.h"
#include "xfs_ag.h"
xfs: make rextslog computation consistent with mkfs commit a6a38f309afc4a7ede01242b603f36c433997780 upstream. [backport: resolve merge conflicts due to refactoring rtbitmap/summary macros and accessors] There's a weird discrepancy in xfsprogs dating back to the creation of the Linux port -- if there are zero rt extents, mkfs will set sb_rextents and sb_rextslog both to zero: sbp->sb_rextslog = (uint8_t)(rtextents ? libxfs_highbit32((unsigned int)rtextents) : 0); However, that's not the check that xfs_repair uses for nonzero rtblocks: if (sb->sb_rextslog != libxfs_highbit32((unsigned int)sb->sb_rextents)) The difference here is that xfs_highbit32 returns -1 if its argument is zero. Unfortunately, this means that in the weird corner case of a realtime volume shorter than 1 rt extent, xfs_repair will immediately flag a freshly formatted filesystem as corrupt. Because mkfs has been writing ondisk artifacts like this for decades, we have to accept that as "correct". TBH, zero rextslog for zero rtextents makes more sense to me anyway. Regrettably, the superblock verifier checks created in commit copied xfs_repair even though mkfs has been writing out such filesystems for ages. Fix the superblock verifier to accept what mkfs spits out; the userspace version of this patch will have to fix xfs_repair as well. Note that the new helper leaves the zeroday bug where the upper 32 bits of sb_rextents is ripped off and fed to highbit32. This leads to a seriously undersized rt summary file, which immediately breaks mkfs: $ hugedisk.sh foo /dev/sdc $(( 0x100000080 * 4096))B $ /sbin/mkfs.xfs -f /dev/sda -m rmapbt=0,reflink=0 -r rtdev=/dev/mapper/foo meta-data=/dev/sda isize=512 agcount=4, agsize=1298176 blks = sectsz=512 attr=2, projid32bit=1 = crc=1 finobt=1, sparse=1, rmapbt=0 = reflink=0 bigtime=1 inobtcount=1 nrext64=1 data = bsize=4096 blocks=5192704, imaxpct=25 = sunit=0 swidth=0 blks naming =version 2 bsize=4096 ascii-ci=0, ftype=1 log =internal log bsize=4096 blocks=16384, version=2 = sectsz=512 sunit=0 blks, lazy-count=1 realtime =/dev/mapper/foo extsz=4096 blocks=4294967424, rtextents=4294967424 Discarding blocks...Done. mkfs.xfs: Error initializing the realtime space [117 - Structure needs cleaning] The next patch will drop support for rt volumes with fewer than 1 or more than 2^32-1 rt extents, since they've clearly been broken forever. Fixes: f8e566c0f5e1f ("xfs: validate the realtime geometry in xfs_validate_sb_common") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-27 08:12:17 +08:00
#include "xfs_rtbitmap.h"
/*
* Physical superblock buffer manipulations. Shared with libxfs in userspace.
*/
/*
* Check that all the V4 feature bits that the V5 filesystem format requires are
* correctly set.
*/
static bool
xfs_sb_validate_v5_features(
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
/* We must not have any unknown V4 feature bits set */
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & ~XFS_SB_VERSION_OKBITS)
return false;
/*
* The CRC bit is considered an invalid V4 flag, so we have to add it
* manually to the OKBITS mask.
*/
if (sbp->sb_features2 & ~(XFS_SB_VERSION2_OKBITS |
XFS_SB_VERSION2_CRCBIT))
return false;
/* Now check all the required V4 feature flags are set. */
#define V5_VERS_FLAGS (XFS_SB_VERSION_NLINKBIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION_ALIGNBIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION_LOGV2BIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION_EXTFLGBIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION_DIRV2BIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION_MOREBITSBIT)
#define V5_FEAT_FLAGS (XFS_SB_VERSION2_LAZYSBCOUNTBIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION2_ATTR2BIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION2_PROJID32BIT | \
XFS_SB_VERSION2_CRCBIT)
if ((sbp->sb_versionnum & V5_VERS_FLAGS) != V5_VERS_FLAGS)
return false;
if ((sbp->sb_features2 & V5_FEAT_FLAGS) != V5_FEAT_FLAGS)
return false;
return true;
}
/*
* We current support XFS v5 formats with known features and v4 superblocks with
* at least V2 directories.
*/
bool
xfs_sb_good_version(
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
/*
* All v5 filesystems are supported, but we must check that all the
* required v4 feature flags are enabled correctly as the code checks
* those flags and not for v5 support.
*/
if (xfs_sb_is_v5(sbp))
return xfs_sb_validate_v5_features(sbp);
/* versions prior to v4 are not supported */
if (XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) != XFS_SB_VERSION_4)
return false;
/* We must not have any unknown v4 feature bits set */
if ((sbp->sb_versionnum & ~XFS_SB_VERSION_OKBITS) ||
((sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_MOREBITSBIT) &&
(sbp->sb_features2 & ~XFS_SB_VERSION2_OKBITS)))
return false;
/* V4 filesystems need v2 directories and unwritten extents */
if (!(sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_DIRV2BIT))
return false;
if (!(sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_EXTFLGBIT))
return false;
/* It's a supported v4 filesystem */
return true;
}
uint64_t
xfs_sb_version_to_features(
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
uint64_t features = 0;
/* optional V4 features */
if (sbp->sb_rblocks > 0)
features |= XFS_FEAT_REALTIME;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_NLINKBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_NLINK;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_ATTRBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_ATTR;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_QUOTABIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_QUOTA;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_ALIGNBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_ALIGN;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_LOGV2BIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_LOGV2;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_DALIGNBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_DALIGN;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_EXTFLGBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_EXTFLG;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_SECTORBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_SECTOR;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_BORGBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_ASCIICI;
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_MOREBITSBIT) {
if (sbp->sb_features2 & XFS_SB_VERSION2_LAZYSBCOUNTBIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_LAZYSBCOUNT;
if (sbp->sb_features2 & XFS_SB_VERSION2_ATTR2BIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_ATTR2;
if (sbp->sb_features2 & XFS_SB_VERSION2_PROJID32BIT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_PROJID32;
if (sbp->sb_features2 & XFS_SB_VERSION2_FTYPE)
features |= XFS_FEAT_FTYPE;
}
if (!xfs_sb_is_v5(sbp))
return features;
/* Always on V5 features */
features |= XFS_FEAT_ALIGN | XFS_FEAT_LOGV2 | XFS_FEAT_EXTFLG |
XFS_FEAT_LAZYSBCOUNT | XFS_FEAT_ATTR2 | XFS_FEAT_PROJID32 |
XFS_FEAT_V3INODES | XFS_FEAT_CRC | XFS_FEAT_PQUOTINO;
/* Optional V5 features */
if (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_FINOBT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_FINOBT;
if (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_RMAPBT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_RMAPBT;
if (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_REFLINK)
features |= XFS_FEAT_REFLINK;
if (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_INOBTCNT)
features |= XFS_FEAT_INOBTCNT;
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_FTYPE)
features |= XFS_FEAT_FTYPE;
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_SPINODES)
features |= XFS_FEAT_SPINODES;
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_META_UUID)
features |= XFS_FEAT_META_UUID;
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_BIGTIME)
features |= XFS_FEAT_BIGTIME;
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_NEEDSREPAIR)
features |= XFS_FEAT_NEEDSREPAIR;
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_NREXT64)
features |= XFS_FEAT_NREXT64;
return features;
}
/* Check all the superblock fields we care about when reading one in. */
STATIC int
xfs_validate_sb_read(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
if (!xfs_sb_is_v5(sbp))
return 0;
/*
* Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations
* the kernel cannot support up front before checking anything else.
*/
if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Superblock has unknown compatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
(sbp->sb_features_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
xfs_warn(mp,
"Using a more recent kernel is recommended.");
}
if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"Superblock has unknown read-only compatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
(sbp->sb_features_ro_compat &
XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
if (!xfs_is_readonly(mp)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Attempted to mount read-only compatible filesystem read-write.");
xfs_warn(mp,
"Filesystem can only be safely mounted read only.");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Superblock has unknown incompatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
(sbp->sb_features_incompat &
XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN));
xfs_warn(mp,
"Filesystem cannot be safely mounted by this kernel.");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check all the superblock fields we care about when writing one out. */
STATIC int
xfs_validate_sb_write(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
/*
* Carry out additional sb summary counter sanity checks when we write
* the superblock. We skip this in the read validator because there
* could be newer superblocks in the log and if the values are garbage
* even after replay we'll recalculate them at the end of log mount.
*
* mkfs has traditionally written zeroed counters to inprogress and
* secondary superblocks, so allow this usage to continue because
* we never read counters from such superblocks.
*/
if (xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress &&
(sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks ||
!xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) ||
sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) {
xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (!xfs_sb_is_v5(sbp))
return 0;
/*
* Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations
* the kernel cannot support since we checked for unsupported bits in
* the read verifier, which means that memory is corrupt.
*/
if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Corruption detected in superblock compatible features (0x%x)!",
(sbp->sb_features_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (!xfs_is_readonly(mp) &&
xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"Corruption detected in superblock read-only compatible features (0x%x)!",
(sbp->sb_features_ro_compat &
XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Corruption detected in superblock incompatible features (0x%x)!",
(sbp->sb_features_incompat &
XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN));
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_log_feature(sbp,
XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_LOG_UNKNOWN)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Corruption detected in superblock incompatible log features (0x%x)!",
(sbp->sb_features_log_incompat &
XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_LOG_UNKNOWN));
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
/*
* We can't read verify the sb LSN because the read verifier is called
* before the log is allocated and processed. We know the log is set up
* before write verifier calls, so check it here.
*/
if (!xfs_log_check_lsn(mp, sbp->sb_lsn))
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
return 0;
}
/* Check the validity of the SB. */
STATIC int
xfs_validate_sb_common(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
struct xfs_dsb *dsb = bp->b_addr;
uint32_t agcount = 0;
uint32_t rem;
bool has_dalign;
if (!xfs_verify_magic(bp, dsb->sb_magicnum)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Superblock has bad magic number 0x%x. Not an XFS filesystem?",
be32_to_cpu(dsb->sb_magicnum));
return -EWRONGFS;
}
if (!xfs_sb_good_version(sbp)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Superblock has unknown features enabled or corrupted feature masks.");
return -EWRONGFS;
}
/*
* Validate feature flags and state
*/
if (xfs_sb_is_v5(sbp)) {
if (sbp->sb_blocksize < XFS_MIN_CRC_BLOCKSIZE) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"Block size (%u bytes) too small for Version 5 superblock (minimum %d bytes)",
sbp->sb_blocksize, XFS_MIN_CRC_BLOCKSIZE);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
/* V5 has a separate project quota inode */
if (sbp->sb_qflags & (XFS_OQUOTA_ENFD | XFS_OQUOTA_CHKD)) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"Version 5 of Super block has XFS_OQUOTA bits.");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
/*
* Full inode chunks must be aligned to inode chunk size when
* sparse inodes are enabled to support the sparse chunk
* allocation algorithm and prevent overlapping inode records.
*/
if (sbp->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_SPINODES) {
uint32_t align;
align = XFS_INODES_PER_CHUNK * sbp->sb_inodesize
>> sbp->sb_blocklog;
if (sbp->sb_inoalignmt != align) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"Inode block alignment (%u) must match chunk size (%u) for sparse inodes.",
sbp->sb_inoalignmt, align);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
} else if (sbp->sb_qflags & (XFS_PQUOTA_ENFD | XFS_GQUOTA_ENFD |
XFS_PQUOTA_CHKD | XFS_GQUOTA_CHKD)) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"Superblock earlier than Version 5 has XFS_{P|G}QUOTA_{ENFD|CHKD} bits.");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (unlikely(
sbp->sb_logstart == 0 && mp->m_logdev_targp == mp->m_ddev_targp)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"filesystem is marked as having an external log; "
"specify logdev on the mount command line.");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (unlikely(
sbp->sb_logstart != 0 && mp->m_logdev_targp != mp->m_ddev_targp)) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"filesystem is marked as having an internal log; "
"do not specify logdev on the mount command line.");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Compute agcount for this number of dblocks and agblocks */
if (sbp->sb_agblocks) {
agcount = div_u64_rem(sbp->sb_dblocks, sbp->sb_agblocks, &rem);
if (rem)
agcount++;
}
/*
* More sanity checking. Most of these were stolen directly from
* xfs_repair.
*/
if (unlikely(
sbp->sb_agcount <= 0 ||
sbp->sb_sectsize < XFS_MIN_SECTORSIZE ||
sbp->sb_sectsize > XFS_MAX_SECTORSIZE ||
sbp->sb_sectlog < XFS_MIN_SECTORSIZE_LOG ||
sbp->sb_sectlog > XFS_MAX_SECTORSIZE_LOG ||
sbp->sb_sectsize != (1 << sbp->sb_sectlog) ||
sbp->sb_blocksize < XFS_MIN_BLOCKSIZE ||
sbp->sb_blocksize > XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE ||
sbp->sb_blocklog < XFS_MIN_BLOCKSIZE_LOG ||
sbp->sb_blocklog > XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE_LOG ||
sbp->sb_blocksize != (1 << sbp->sb_blocklog) ||
sbp->sb_dirblklog + sbp->sb_blocklog > XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE_LOG ||
sbp->sb_inodesize < XFS_DINODE_MIN_SIZE ||
sbp->sb_inodesize > XFS_DINODE_MAX_SIZE ||
sbp->sb_inodelog < XFS_DINODE_MIN_LOG ||
sbp->sb_inodelog > XFS_DINODE_MAX_LOG ||
sbp->sb_inodesize != (1 << sbp->sb_inodelog) ||
sbp->sb_inopblock != howmany(sbp->sb_blocksize,sbp->sb_inodesize) ||
XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_agblocks) < XFS_MIN_AG_BYTES ||
XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_agblocks) > XFS_MAX_AG_BYTES ||
sbp->sb_agblklog != xfs_highbit32(sbp->sb_agblocks - 1) + 1 ||
agcount == 0 || agcount != sbp->sb_agcount ||
(sbp->sb_blocklog - sbp->sb_inodelog != sbp->sb_inopblog) ||
(sbp->sb_rextsize * sbp->sb_blocksize > XFS_MAX_RTEXTSIZE) ||
(sbp->sb_rextsize * sbp->sb_blocksize < XFS_MIN_RTEXTSIZE) ||
(sbp->sb_imax_pct > 100 /* zero sb_imax_pct is valid */) ||
sbp->sb_dblocks == 0 ||
sbp->sb_dblocks > XFS_MAX_DBLOCKS(sbp) ||
sbp->sb_dblocks < XFS_MIN_DBLOCKS(sbp) ||
sbp->sb_shared_vn != 0)) {
xfs_notice(mp, "SB sanity check failed");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
xfs: journal geometry is not properly bounds checked If the journal geometry results in a sector or log stripe unit validation problem, it indicates that we cannot set the log up to safely write to the the journal. In these cases, we must abort the mount because the corruption needs external intervention to resolve. Similarly, a journal that is too large cannot be written to safely, either, so we shouldn't allow those geometries to mount, either. If the log is too small, we risk having transaction reservations overruning the available log space and the system hanging waiting for space it can never provide. This is purely a runtime hang issue, not a corruption issue as per the first cases listed above. We abort mounts of the log is too small for V5 filesystems, but we must allow v4 filesystems to mount because, historically, there was no log size validity checking and so some systems may still be out there with undersized logs. The problem is that on V4 filesystems, when we discover a log geometry problem, we skip all the remaining checks and then allow the log to continue mounting. This mean that if one of the log size checks fails, we skip the log stripe unit check. i.e. we allow the mount because a "non-fatal" geometry is violated, and then fail to check the hard fail geometries that should fail the mount. Move all these fatal checks to the superblock verifier, and add a new check for the two log sector size geometry variables having the same values. This will prevent any attempt to mount a log that has invalid or inconsistent geometries long before we attempt to mount the log. However, for the minimum log size checks, we can only do that once we've setup up the log and calculated all the iclog sizes and roundoffs. Hence this needs to remain in the log mount code after the log has been initialised. It is also the only case where we should allow a v4 filesystem to continue running, so leave that handling in place, too. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
2023-06-29 02:04:33 +08:00
/*
* Logs that are too large are not supported at all. Reject them
* outright. Logs that are too small are tolerated on v4 filesystems,
* but we can only check that when mounting the log. Hence we skip
* those checks here.
*/
if (sbp->sb_logblocks > XFS_MAX_LOG_BLOCKS) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"Log size 0x%x blocks too large, maximum size is 0x%llx blocks",
sbp->sb_logblocks, XFS_MAX_LOG_BLOCKS);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_logblocks) > XFS_MAX_LOG_BYTES) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"log size 0x%llx bytes too large, maximum size is 0x%llx bytes",
XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_logblocks),
XFS_MAX_LOG_BYTES);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
/*
* Do not allow filesystems with corrupted log sector or stripe units to
* be mounted. We cannot safely size the iclogs or write to the log if
* the log stripe unit is not valid.
*/
if (sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_SECTORBIT) {
if (sbp->sb_logsectsize != (1U << sbp->sb_logsectlog)) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"log sector size in bytes/log2 (0x%x/0x%x) must match",
sbp->sb_logsectsize, 1U << sbp->sb_logsectlog);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
} else if (sbp->sb_logsectsize || sbp->sb_logsectlog) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"log sector size in bytes/log2 (0x%x/0x%x) are not zero",
sbp->sb_logsectsize, sbp->sb_logsectlog);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (sbp->sb_logsunit > 1) {
if (sbp->sb_logsunit % sbp->sb_blocksize) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"log stripe unit 0x%x bytes must be a multiple of block size",
sbp->sb_logsunit);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (sbp->sb_logsunit > XLOG_MAX_RECORD_BSIZE) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"log stripe unit 0x%x bytes over maximum size (0x%x bytes)",
sbp->sb_logsunit, XLOG_MAX_RECORD_BSIZE);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
}
/* Validate the realtime geometry; stolen from xfs_repair */
if (sbp->sb_rextsize * sbp->sb_blocksize > XFS_MAX_RTEXTSIZE ||
sbp->sb_rextsize * sbp->sb_blocksize < XFS_MIN_RTEXTSIZE) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"realtime extent sanity check failed");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (sbp->sb_rblocks == 0) {
if (sbp->sb_rextents != 0 || sbp->sb_rbmblocks != 0 ||
sbp->sb_rextslog != 0 || sbp->sb_frextents != 0) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"realtime zeroed geometry check failed");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
} else {
uint64_t rexts;
uint64_t rbmblocks;
rexts = div_u64(sbp->sb_rblocks, sbp->sb_rextsize);
rbmblocks = howmany_64(sbp->sb_rextents,
NBBY * sbp->sb_blocksize);
if (!xfs_validate_rtextents(rexts) ||
sbp->sb_rextents != rexts ||
xfs: make rextslog computation consistent with mkfs commit a6a38f309afc4a7ede01242b603f36c433997780 upstream. [backport: resolve merge conflicts due to refactoring rtbitmap/summary macros and accessors] There's a weird discrepancy in xfsprogs dating back to the creation of the Linux port -- if there are zero rt extents, mkfs will set sb_rextents and sb_rextslog both to zero: sbp->sb_rextslog = (uint8_t)(rtextents ? libxfs_highbit32((unsigned int)rtextents) : 0); However, that's not the check that xfs_repair uses for nonzero rtblocks: if (sb->sb_rextslog != libxfs_highbit32((unsigned int)sb->sb_rextents)) The difference here is that xfs_highbit32 returns -1 if its argument is zero. Unfortunately, this means that in the weird corner case of a realtime volume shorter than 1 rt extent, xfs_repair will immediately flag a freshly formatted filesystem as corrupt. Because mkfs has been writing ondisk artifacts like this for decades, we have to accept that as "correct". TBH, zero rextslog for zero rtextents makes more sense to me anyway. Regrettably, the superblock verifier checks created in commit copied xfs_repair even though mkfs has been writing out such filesystems for ages. Fix the superblock verifier to accept what mkfs spits out; the userspace version of this patch will have to fix xfs_repair as well. Note that the new helper leaves the zeroday bug where the upper 32 bits of sb_rextents is ripped off and fed to highbit32. This leads to a seriously undersized rt summary file, which immediately breaks mkfs: $ hugedisk.sh foo /dev/sdc $(( 0x100000080 * 4096))B $ /sbin/mkfs.xfs -f /dev/sda -m rmapbt=0,reflink=0 -r rtdev=/dev/mapper/foo meta-data=/dev/sda isize=512 agcount=4, agsize=1298176 blks = sectsz=512 attr=2, projid32bit=1 = crc=1 finobt=1, sparse=1, rmapbt=0 = reflink=0 bigtime=1 inobtcount=1 nrext64=1 data = bsize=4096 blocks=5192704, imaxpct=25 = sunit=0 swidth=0 blks naming =version 2 bsize=4096 ascii-ci=0, ftype=1 log =internal log bsize=4096 blocks=16384, version=2 = sectsz=512 sunit=0 blks, lazy-count=1 realtime =/dev/mapper/foo extsz=4096 blocks=4294967424, rtextents=4294967424 Discarding blocks...Done. mkfs.xfs: Error initializing the realtime space [117 - Structure needs cleaning] The next patch will drop support for rt volumes with fewer than 1 or more than 2^32-1 rt extents, since they've clearly been broken forever. Fixes: f8e566c0f5e1f ("xfs: validate the realtime geometry in xfs_validate_sb_common") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-27 08:12:17 +08:00
sbp->sb_rextslog != xfs_compute_rextslog(rexts) ||
sbp->sb_rbmblocks != rbmblocks) {
xfs_notice(mp,
"realtime geometry sanity check failed");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
}
/*
* Either (sb_unit and !hasdalign) or (!sb_unit and hasdalign)
* would imply the image is corrupted.
*/
has_dalign = sbp->sb_versionnum & XFS_SB_VERSION_DALIGNBIT;
if (!!sbp->sb_unit ^ has_dalign) {
xfs: catch bad stripe alignment configurations When stripe alignments are invalid, data alignment algorithms in the allocator may not work correctly. Ensure we catch superblocks with invalid stripe alignment setups at mount time. These data alignment mismatches are now detected at mount time like this: XFS (loop0): SB stripe unit sanity check failed XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_read_verify+0xab/0x110, xfs_sb block 0xffffffffffffffff XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 0000000091c2de02: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 XFSB............ 0000000023bff869: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000000cdd8c893: 17 32 37 15 ff ca 46 3d 9a 17 d3 33 04 b5 f1 a2 .27...F=...3.... 000000009fd2844f: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 d0 ................ 0000000088e9b0bb: 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 d1 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 d2 ................ 00000000ff233a20: 00 00 00 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000009db0ac8b: 00 00 03 60 e1 34 02 00 08 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 ...`.4.......... 00000000f7022460: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 0b 01 0c 00 00 19 ................ XFS (loop0): SB validate failed with error -117. And the mount fails. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
2018-06-06 01:06:16 +08:00
xfs_notice(mp, "SB stripe alignment sanity check failed");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (!xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(mp, XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_unit),
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_width), 0,
xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR, false))
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
xfs: catch bad stripe alignment configurations When stripe alignments are invalid, data alignment algorithms in the allocator may not work correctly. Ensure we catch superblocks with invalid stripe alignment setups at mount time. These data alignment mismatches are now detected at mount time like this: XFS (loop0): SB stripe unit sanity check failed XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_read_verify+0xab/0x110, xfs_sb block 0xffffffffffffffff XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 0000000091c2de02: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 XFSB............ 0000000023bff869: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000000cdd8c893: 17 32 37 15 ff ca 46 3d 9a 17 d3 33 04 b5 f1 a2 .27...F=...3.... 000000009fd2844f: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 d0 ................ 0000000088e9b0bb: 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 d1 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 d2 ................ 00000000ff233a20: 00 00 00 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 ................ 000000009db0ac8b: 00 00 03 60 e1 34 02 00 08 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 ...`.4.......... 00000000f7022460: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 0b 01 0c 00 00 19 ................ XFS (loop0): SB validate failed with error -117. And the mount fails. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
2018-06-06 01:06:16 +08:00
/*
* Currently only very few inode sizes are supported.
*/
switch (sbp->sb_inodesize) {
case 256:
case 512:
case 1024:
case 2048:
break;
default:
xfs_warn(mp, "inode size of %d bytes not supported",
sbp->sb_inodesize);
return -ENOSYS;
}
return 0;
}
void
xfs_sb_quota_from_disk(struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
/*
* older mkfs doesn't initialize quota inodes to NULLFSINO. This
* leads to in-core values having two different values for a quota
* inode to be invalid: 0 and NULLFSINO. Change it to a single value
* NULLFSINO.
*
* Note that this change affect only the in-core values. These
* values are not written back to disk unless any quota information
* is written to the disk. Even in that case, sb_pquotino field is
* not written to disk unless the superblock supports pquotino.
*/
if (sbp->sb_uquotino == 0)
sbp->sb_uquotino = NULLFSINO;
if (sbp->sb_gquotino == 0)
sbp->sb_gquotino = NULLFSINO;
if (sbp->sb_pquotino == 0)
sbp->sb_pquotino = NULLFSINO;
/*
* We need to do these manipilations only if we are working
* with an older version of on-disk superblock.
*/
if (xfs_sb_is_v5(sbp))
return;
if (sbp->sb_qflags & XFS_OQUOTA_ENFD)
sbp->sb_qflags |= (sbp->sb_qflags & XFS_PQUOTA_ACCT) ?
XFS_PQUOTA_ENFD : XFS_GQUOTA_ENFD;
if (sbp->sb_qflags & XFS_OQUOTA_CHKD)
sbp->sb_qflags |= (sbp->sb_qflags & XFS_PQUOTA_ACCT) ?
XFS_PQUOTA_CHKD : XFS_GQUOTA_CHKD;
sbp->sb_qflags &= ~(XFS_OQUOTA_ENFD | XFS_OQUOTA_CHKD);
if (sbp->sb_qflags & XFS_PQUOTA_ACCT &&
sbp->sb_gquotino != NULLFSINO) {
/*
* In older version of superblock, on-disk superblock only
* has sb_gquotino, and in-core superblock has both sb_gquotino
* and sb_pquotino. But, only one of them is supported at any
* point of time. So, if PQUOTA is set in disk superblock,
* copy over sb_gquotino to sb_pquotino. The NULLFSINO test
* above is to make sure we don't do this twice and wipe them
* both out!
*/
sbp->sb_pquotino = sbp->sb_gquotino;
sbp->sb_gquotino = NULLFSINO;
}
}
static void
__xfs_sb_from_disk(
struct xfs_sb *to,
struct xfs_dsb *from,
bool convert_xquota)
{
to->sb_magicnum = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_magicnum);
to->sb_blocksize = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_blocksize);
to->sb_dblocks = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_dblocks);
to->sb_rblocks = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_rblocks);
to->sb_rextents = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_rextents);
memcpy(&to->sb_uuid, &from->sb_uuid, sizeof(to->sb_uuid));
to->sb_logstart = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_logstart);
to->sb_rootino = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_rootino);
to->sb_rbmino = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_rbmino);
to->sb_rsumino = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_rsumino);
to->sb_rextsize = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_rextsize);
to->sb_agblocks = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_agblocks);
to->sb_agcount = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_agcount);
to->sb_rbmblocks = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_rbmblocks);
to->sb_logblocks = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_logblocks);
to->sb_versionnum = be16_to_cpu(from->sb_versionnum);
to->sb_sectsize = be16_to_cpu(from->sb_sectsize);
to->sb_inodesize = be16_to_cpu(from->sb_inodesize);
to->sb_inopblock = be16_to_cpu(from->sb_inopblock);
memcpy(&to->sb_fname, &from->sb_fname, sizeof(to->sb_fname));
to->sb_blocklog = from->sb_blocklog;
to->sb_sectlog = from->sb_sectlog;
to->sb_inodelog = from->sb_inodelog;
to->sb_inopblog = from->sb_inopblog;
to->sb_agblklog = from->sb_agblklog;
to->sb_rextslog = from->sb_rextslog;
to->sb_inprogress = from->sb_inprogress;
to->sb_imax_pct = from->sb_imax_pct;
to->sb_icount = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_icount);
to->sb_ifree = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_ifree);
to->sb_fdblocks = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_fdblocks);
to->sb_frextents = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_frextents);
to->sb_uquotino = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_uquotino);
to->sb_gquotino = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_gquotino);
to->sb_qflags = be16_to_cpu(from->sb_qflags);
to->sb_flags = from->sb_flags;
to->sb_shared_vn = from->sb_shared_vn;
to->sb_inoalignmt = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_inoalignmt);
to->sb_unit = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_unit);
to->sb_width = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_width);
to->sb_dirblklog = from->sb_dirblklog;
to->sb_logsectlog = from->sb_logsectlog;
to->sb_logsectsize = be16_to_cpu(from->sb_logsectsize);
to->sb_logsunit = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_logsunit);
to->sb_features2 = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_features2);
to->sb_bad_features2 = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_bad_features2);
to->sb_features_compat = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_features_compat);
to->sb_features_ro_compat = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_features_ro_compat);
to->sb_features_incompat = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_features_incompat);
to->sb_features_log_incompat =
be32_to_cpu(from->sb_features_log_incompat);
/* crc is only used on disk, not in memory; just init to 0 here. */
to->sb_crc = 0;
to->sb_spino_align = be32_to_cpu(from->sb_spino_align);
to->sb_pquotino = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_pquotino);
to->sb_lsn = be64_to_cpu(from->sb_lsn);
/*
* sb_meta_uuid is only on disk if it differs from sb_uuid and the
* feature flag is set; if not set we keep it only in memory.
*/
if (xfs_sb_is_v5(to) &&
(to->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_META_UUID))
uuid_copy(&to->sb_meta_uuid, &from->sb_meta_uuid);
else
uuid_copy(&to->sb_meta_uuid, &from->sb_uuid);
/* Convert on-disk flags to in-memory flags? */
if (convert_xquota)
xfs_sb_quota_from_disk(to);
}
void
xfs_sb_from_disk(
struct xfs_sb *to,
struct xfs_dsb *from)
{
__xfs_sb_from_disk(to, from, true);
}
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
static void
xfs_sb_quota_to_disk(
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
struct xfs_dsb *to,
struct xfs_sb *from)
{
uint16_t qflags = from->sb_qflags;
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
to->sb_uquotino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_uquotino);
/*
* The in-memory superblock quota state matches the v5 on-disk format so
* just write them out and return
*/
if (xfs_sb_is_v5(from)) {
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
to->sb_qflags = cpu_to_be16(from->sb_qflags);
to->sb_gquotino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_gquotino);
to->sb_pquotino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_pquotino);
return;
}
/*
* For older superblocks (v4), the in-core version of sb_qflags do not
* have XFS_OQUOTA_* flags, whereas the on-disk version does. So,
* convert incore XFS_{PG}QUOTA_* flags to on-disk XFS_OQUOTA_* flags.
*/
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
qflags &= ~(XFS_PQUOTA_ENFD | XFS_PQUOTA_CHKD |
XFS_GQUOTA_ENFD | XFS_GQUOTA_CHKD);
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
if (from->sb_qflags &
(XFS_PQUOTA_ENFD | XFS_GQUOTA_ENFD))
qflags |= XFS_OQUOTA_ENFD;
if (from->sb_qflags &
(XFS_PQUOTA_CHKD | XFS_GQUOTA_CHKD))
qflags |= XFS_OQUOTA_CHKD;
to->sb_qflags = cpu_to_be16(qflags);
/*
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
* GQUOTINO and PQUOTINO cannot be used together in versions
* of superblock that do not have pquotino. from->sb_flags
* tells us which quota is active and should be copied to
* disk. If neither are active, we should NULL the inode.
xfs: null unused quota inodes when quota is on When quota is on, it is expected that unused quota inodes have a value of NULLFSINO. The changes to support a separate project quota in 3.12 broken this rule for non-project quota inode enabled filesystem, as the code now refuses to write the group quota inode if neither group or project quotas are enabled. This regression was introduced by commit d892d58 ("xfs: Start using pquotaino from the superblock"). In this case, we should be writing NULLFSINO rather than nothing to ensure that we leave the group quota inode in a valid state while quotas are enabled. Failure to do so doesn't cause a current kernel to break - the separate project quota inodes introduced translation code to always treat a zero inode as NULLFSINO. This was introduced by commit 0102629 ("xfs: Initialize all quota inodes to be NULLFSINO") with is also in 3.12 but older kernels do not do this and hence taking a filesystem back to an older kernel can result in quotas failing initialisation at mount time. When that happens, we see this in dmesg: [ 1649.215390] XFS (sdb): Mounting Filesystem [ 1649.316894] XFS (sdb): Failed to initialize disk quotas. [ 1649.316902] XFS (sdb): Ending clean mount By ensuring that we write NULLFSINO to quota inodes that aren't active, we avoid this problem. We have to be really careful when determining if the quota inodes are active or not, because we don't want to write a NULLFSINO if the quota inodes are active and we simply aren't updating them. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2014-07-15 05:28:41 +08:00
*
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
* In all cases, the separate pquotino must remain 0 because it
* is beyond the "end" of the valid non-pquotino superblock.
*/
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
if (from->sb_qflags & XFS_GQUOTA_ACCT)
to->sb_gquotino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_gquotino);
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
else if (from->sb_qflags & XFS_PQUOTA_ACCT)
to->sb_gquotino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_pquotino);
xfs: null unused quota inodes when quota is on When quota is on, it is expected that unused quota inodes have a value of NULLFSINO. The changes to support a separate project quota in 3.12 broken this rule for non-project quota inode enabled filesystem, as the code now refuses to write the group quota inode if neither group or project quotas are enabled. This regression was introduced by commit d892d58 ("xfs: Start using pquotaino from the superblock"). In this case, we should be writing NULLFSINO rather than nothing to ensure that we leave the group quota inode in a valid state while quotas are enabled. Failure to do so doesn't cause a current kernel to break - the separate project quota inodes introduced translation code to always treat a zero inode as NULLFSINO. This was introduced by commit 0102629 ("xfs: Initialize all quota inodes to be NULLFSINO") with is also in 3.12 but older kernels do not do this and hence taking a filesystem back to an older kernel can result in quotas failing initialisation at mount time. When that happens, we see this in dmesg: [ 1649.215390] XFS (sdb): Mounting Filesystem [ 1649.316894] XFS (sdb): Failed to initialize disk quotas. [ 1649.316902] XFS (sdb): Ending clean mount By ensuring that we write NULLFSINO to quota inodes that aren't active, we avoid this problem. We have to be really careful when determining if the quota inodes are active or not, because we don't want to write a NULLFSINO if the quota inodes are active and we simply aren't updating them. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2014-07-15 05:28:41 +08:00
else {
/*
* We can't rely on just the fields being logged to tell us
* that it is safe to write NULLFSINO - we should only do that
* if quotas are not actually enabled. Hence only write
* NULLFSINO if both in-core quota inodes are NULL.
*/
if (from->sb_gquotino == NULLFSINO &&
from->sb_pquotino == NULLFSINO)
to->sb_gquotino = cpu_to_be64(NULLFSINO);
}
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
to->sb_pquotino = 0;
}
void
xfs_sb_to_disk(
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
struct xfs_dsb *to,
struct xfs_sb *from)
{
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
xfs_sb_quota_to_disk(to, from);
to->sb_magicnum = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_magicnum);
to->sb_blocksize = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_blocksize);
to->sb_dblocks = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_dblocks);
to->sb_rblocks = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_rblocks);
to->sb_rextents = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_rextents);
memcpy(&to->sb_uuid, &from->sb_uuid, sizeof(to->sb_uuid));
to->sb_logstart = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_logstart);
to->sb_rootino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_rootino);
to->sb_rbmino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_rbmino);
to->sb_rsumino = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_rsumino);
to->sb_rextsize = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_rextsize);
to->sb_agblocks = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_agblocks);
to->sb_agcount = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_agcount);
to->sb_rbmblocks = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_rbmblocks);
to->sb_logblocks = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_logblocks);
to->sb_versionnum = cpu_to_be16(from->sb_versionnum);
to->sb_sectsize = cpu_to_be16(from->sb_sectsize);
to->sb_inodesize = cpu_to_be16(from->sb_inodesize);
to->sb_inopblock = cpu_to_be16(from->sb_inopblock);
memcpy(&to->sb_fname, &from->sb_fname, sizeof(to->sb_fname));
to->sb_blocklog = from->sb_blocklog;
to->sb_sectlog = from->sb_sectlog;
to->sb_inodelog = from->sb_inodelog;
to->sb_inopblog = from->sb_inopblog;
to->sb_agblklog = from->sb_agblklog;
to->sb_rextslog = from->sb_rextslog;
to->sb_inprogress = from->sb_inprogress;
to->sb_imax_pct = from->sb_imax_pct;
to->sb_icount = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_icount);
to->sb_ifree = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_ifree);
to->sb_fdblocks = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_fdblocks);
to->sb_frextents = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_frextents);
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
to->sb_flags = from->sb_flags;
to->sb_shared_vn = from->sb_shared_vn;
to->sb_inoalignmt = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_inoalignmt);
to->sb_unit = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_unit);
to->sb_width = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_width);
to->sb_dirblklog = from->sb_dirblklog;
to->sb_logsectlog = from->sb_logsectlog;
to->sb_logsectsize = cpu_to_be16(from->sb_logsectsize);
to->sb_logsunit = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_logsunit);
/*
* We need to ensure that bad_features2 always matches features2.
* Hence we enforce that here rather than having to remember to do it
* everywhere else that updates features2.
*/
from->sb_bad_features2 = from->sb_features2;
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
to->sb_features2 = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_features2);
to->sb_bad_features2 = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_bad_features2);
if (!xfs_sb_is_v5(from))
return;
to->sb_features_compat = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_features_compat);
to->sb_features_ro_compat =
cpu_to_be32(from->sb_features_ro_compat);
to->sb_features_incompat =
cpu_to_be32(from->sb_features_incompat);
to->sb_features_log_incompat =
cpu_to_be32(from->sb_features_log_incompat);
to->sb_spino_align = cpu_to_be32(from->sb_spino_align);
to->sb_lsn = cpu_to_be64(from->sb_lsn);
if (from->sb_features_incompat & XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_META_UUID)
uuid_copy(&to->sb_meta_uuid, &from->sb_meta_uuid);
}
/*
* If the superblock has the CRC feature bit set or the CRC field is non-null,
* check that the CRC is valid. We check the CRC field is non-null because a
* single bit error could clear the feature bit and unused parts of the
* superblock are supposed to be zero. Hence a non-null crc field indicates that
* we've potentially lost a feature bit and we should check it anyway.
*
* However, past bugs (i.e. in growfs) left non-zeroed regions beyond the
* last field in V4 secondary superblocks. So for secondary superblocks,
* we are more forgiving, and ignore CRC failures if the primary doesn't
* indicate that the fs version is V5.
*/
static void
xfs_sb_read_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
struct xfs_sb sb;
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_mount;
struct xfs_dsb *dsb = bp->b_addr;
int error;
/*
* open code the version check to avoid needing to convert the entire
* superblock from disk order just to check the version number
*/
if (dsb->sb_magicnum == cpu_to_be32(XFS_SB_MAGIC) &&
(((be16_to_cpu(dsb->sb_versionnum) & XFS_SB_VERSION_NUMBITS) ==
XFS_SB_VERSION_5) ||
dsb->sb_crc != 0)) {
if (!xfs_buf_verify_cksum(bp, XFS_SB_CRC_OFF)) {
/* Only fail bad secondaries on a known V5 filesystem */
if (xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR ||
xfs_has_crc(mp)) {
error = -EFSBADCRC;
goto out_error;
}
}
}
/*
* Check all the superblock fields. Don't byteswap the xquota flags
* because _verify_common checks the on-disk values.
*/
__xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, dsb, false);
error = xfs_validate_sb_common(mp, bp, &sb);
if (error)
goto out_error;
error = xfs_validate_sb_read(mp, &sb);
out_error:
if (error == -EFSCORRUPTED || error == -EFSBADCRC)
xfs_verifier_error(bp, error, __this_address);
else if (error)
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, error);
}
/*
* We may be probed for a filesystem match, so we may not want to emit
* messages when the superblock buffer is not actually an XFS superblock.
* If we find an XFS superblock, then run a normal, noisy mount because we are
* really going to mount it and want to know about errors.
*/
static void
xfs_sb_quiet_read_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
struct xfs_dsb *dsb = bp->b_addr;
if (dsb->sb_magicnum == cpu_to_be32(XFS_SB_MAGIC)) {
/* XFS filesystem, verify noisily! */
xfs_sb_read_verify(bp);
return;
}
/* quietly fail */
xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, -EWRONGFS);
}
static void
xfs_sb_write_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
struct xfs_sb sb;
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_mount;
struct xfs_buf_log_item *bip = bp->b_log_item;
struct xfs_dsb *dsb = bp->b_addr;
int error;
/*
* Check all the superblock fields. Don't byteswap the xquota flags
* because _verify_common checks the on-disk values.
*/
__xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, dsb, false);
error = xfs_validate_sb_common(mp, bp, &sb);
if (error)
goto out_error;
error = xfs_validate_sb_write(mp, bp, &sb);
if (error)
goto out_error;
if (!xfs_sb_is_v5(&sb))
return;
if (bip)
dsb->sb_lsn = cpu_to_be64(bip->bli_item.li_lsn);
xfs_buf_update_cksum(bp, XFS_SB_CRC_OFF);
return;
out_error:
xfs_verifier_error(bp, error, __this_address);
}
const struct xfs_buf_ops xfs_sb_buf_ops = {
.name = "xfs_sb",
.magic = { cpu_to_be32(XFS_SB_MAGIC), cpu_to_be32(XFS_SB_MAGIC) },
.verify_read = xfs_sb_read_verify,
.verify_write = xfs_sb_write_verify,
};
const struct xfs_buf_ops xfs_sb_quiet_buf_ops = {
.name = "xfs_sb_quiet",
.magic = { cpu_to_be32(XFS_SB_MAGIC), cpu_to_be32(XFS_SB_MAGIC) },
.verify_read = xfs_sb_quiet_read_verify,
.verify_write = xfs_sb_write_verify,
};
/*
* xfs_mount_common
*
* Mount initialization code establishing various mount
* fields from the superblock associated with the given
* mount structure.
*
* Inode geometry are calculated in xfs_ialloc_setup_geometry.
*/
void
xfs_sb_mount_common(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
mp->m_agfrotor = 0;
atomic_set(&mp->m_agirotor, 0);
mp->m_maxagi = mp->m_sb.sb_agcount;
mp->m_blkbit_log = sbp->sb_blocklog + XFS_NBBYLOG;
mp->m_blkbb_log = sbp->sb_blocklog - BBSHIFT;
mp->m_sectbb_log = sbp->sb_sectlog - BBSHIFT;
mp->m_agno_log = xfs_highbit32(sbp->sb_agcount - 1) + 1;
mp->m_blockmask = sbp->sb_blocksize - 1;
mp->m_blockwsize = sbp->sb_blocksize >> XFS_WORDLOG;
mp->m_blockwmask = mp->m_blockwsize - 1;
mp->m_alloc_mxr[0] = xfs_allocbt_maxrecs(mp, sbp->sb_blocksize, 1);
mp->m_alloc_mxr[1] = xfs_allocbt_maxrecs(mp, sbp->sb_blocksize, 0);
mp->m_alloc_mnr[0] = mp->m_alloc_mxr[0] / 2;
mp->m_alloc_mnr[1] = mp->m_alloc_mxr[1] / 2;
mp->m_bmap_dmxr[0] = xfs_bmbt_maxrecs(mp, sbp->sb_blocksize, 1);
mp->m_bmap_dmxr[1] = xfs_bmbt_maxrecs(mp, sbp->sb_blocksize, 0);
mp->m_bmap_dmnr[0] = mp->m_bmap_dmxr[0] / 2;
mp->m_bmap_dmnr[1] = mp->m_bmap_dmxr[1] / 2;
mp->m_rmap_mxr[0] = xfs_rmapbt_maxrecs(sbp->sb_blocksize, 1);
mp->m_rmap_mxr[1] = xfs_rmapbt_maxrecs(sbp->sb_blocksize, 0);
mp->m_rmap_mnr[0] = mp->m_rmap_mxr[0] / 2;
mp->m_rmap_mnr[1] = mp->m_rmap_mxr[1] / 2;
mp->m_refc_mxr[0] = xfs_refcountbt_maxrecs(sbp->sb_blocksize, true);
mp->m_refc_mxr[1] = xfs_refcountbt_maxrecs(sbp->sb_blocksize, false);
mp->m_refc_mnr[0] = mp->m_refc_mxr[0] / 2;
mp->m_refc_mnr[1] = mp->m_refc_mxr[1] / 2;
mp->m_bsize = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, 1);
mp->m_alloc_set_aside = xfs_alloc_set_aside(mp);
mp->m_ag_max_usable = xfs_alloc_ag_max_usable(mp);
}
/*
* xfs_log_sb() can be used to copy arbitrary changes to the in-core superblock
* into the superblock buffer to be logged. It does not provide the higher
* level of locking that is needed to protect the in-core superblock from
* concurrent access.
*/
void
xfs_log_sb(
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
struct xfs_trans *tp)
{
xfs: remove bitfield based superblock updates When we log changes to the superblock, we first have to write them to the on-disk buffer, and then log that. Right now we have a complex bitfield based arrangement to only write the modified field to the buffer before we log it. This used to be necessary as a performance optimisation because we logged the superblock buffer in every extent or inode allocation or freeing, and so performance was extremely important. We haven't done this for years, however, ever since the lazy superblock counters pulled the superblock logging out of the transaction commit fast path. Hence we have a bunch of complexity that is not necessary that makes writing the in-core superblock to disk much more complex than it needs to be. We only need to log the superblock now during management operations (e.g. during mount, unmount or quota control operations) so it is not a performance critical path anymore. As such, remove the complex field based logging mechanism and replace it with a simple conversion function similar to what we use for all other on-disk structures. This means we always log the entirity of the superblock, but again because we rarely modify the superblock this is not an issue for log bandwidth or CPU time. Indeed, if we do log the superblock frequently, delayed logging will minimise the impact of this overhead. [Fixed gquota/pquota inode sharing regression noticed by bfoster.] Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-01-22 06:10:26 +08:00
struct xfs_mount *mp = tp->t_mountp;
struct xfs_buf *bp = xfs_trans_getsb(tp);
/*
* Lazy sb counters don't update the in-core superblock so do that now.
* If this is at unmount, the counters will be exactly correct, but at
* any other time they will only be ballpark correct because of
* reservations that have been taken out percpu counters. If we have an
* unclean shutdown, this will be corrected by log recovery rebuilding
* the counters from the AGF block counts.
*
* Do not update sb_frextents here because it is not part of the lazy
* sb counters, despite having a percpu counter. It is always kept
* consistent with the ondisk rtbitmap by xfs_trans_apply_sb_deltas()
* and hence we don't need have to update it here.
*/
if (xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp)) {
xfs: make sure sb_fdblocks is non-negative commit 58f880711f2ba53fd5e959875aff5b3bf6d5c32e upstream. A user with a completely full filesystem experienced an unexpected shutdown when the filesystem tried to write the superblock during runtime. kernel shows the following dmesg: [ 8.176281] XFS (dm-4): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify+0x60/0x120 [xfs], xfs_sb block 0x0 [ 8.177417] XFS (dm-4): Unmount and run xfs_repair [ 8.178016] XFS (dm-4): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: [ 8.178703] 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 01 90 00 00 XFSB............ [ 8.179487] 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 8.180312] 00000020: cf 12 dc 89 ca 26 45 29 92 e6 e3 8d 3b b8 a2 c3 .....&E)....;... [ 8.181150] 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 ................ [ 8.182003] 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82 ................ [ 8.182004] 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 64 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 .....d.......... [ 8.182004] 00000060: 00 00 64 00 b4 a5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 ..d............. [ 8.182005] 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 17 00 00 19 ................ [ 8.182008] XFS (dm-4): Corruption of in-memory data detected. Shutting down filesystem [ 8.182010] XFS (dm-4): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) When xfs_log_sb writes super block to disk, b_fdblocks is fetched from m_fdblocks without any lock. As m_fdblocks can experience a positive -> negative -> positive changing when the FS reaches fullness (see xfs_mod_fdblocks). So there is a chance that sb_fdblocks is negative, and because sb_fdblocks is type of unsigned long long, it reads super big. And sb_fdblocks being bigger than sb_dblocks is a problem during log recovery, xfs_validate_sb_write() complains. Fix: As sb_fdblocks will be re-calculated during mount when lazysbcount is enabled, We just need to make xfs_validate_sb_write() happy -- make sure sb_fdblocks is not nenative. This patch also takes care of other percpu counters in xfs_log_sb. Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-16 08:11:22 +08:00
mp->m_sb.sb_icount = percpu_counter_sum_positive(&mp->m_icount);
xfs: fix sb write verify for lazysbcount When lazysbcount is enabled, fsstress and loop mount/unmount test report the following problems: XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify+0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0 XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 XFSB.........(.. 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a i.|._.D..t....4Z 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 ..... .......... 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82 ................ 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19 ................ XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply +0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580). Shutting down filesystem. XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117 XFS (loop0): log mount failed This corruption will shutdown the file system and the file system will no longer be mountable. The following script can reproduce the problem, but it may take a long time. #!/bin/bash device=/dev/sda testdir=/mnt/test round=0 function fail() { echo "$*" exit 1 } mkdir -p $testdir while [ $round -lt 10000 ] do echo "******* round $round ********" mkfs.xfs -f $device mount $device $testdir || fail "mount failed!" fsstress -d $testdir -l 0 -n 10000 -p 4 >/dev/null & sleep 4 killall -w fsstress umount $testdir xfs_repair -e $device > /dev/null if [ $? -eq 2 ];then echo "ERR CODE 2: Dirty log exception during repair." exit 1 fi round=$(($round+1)) done With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other cpu modifies the m_ifree, this will make the m_ifree greater than m_icount. For example, consider the following sequence and ifreedelta is postive: CPU0 CPU1 xfs_log_sb xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb ---------- ------------------------------ percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount) percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount, idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH) percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_ifree, ifreedelta); percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree) After this, incorrect inode count (sb_ifree > sb_icount) will be writen to the log. In the subsequent writing of sb, incorrect inode count (sb_ifree > sb_icount) will fail to pass the boundary check in xfs_validate_sb_write() that cause the file system shutdown. When lazysbcount is enabled, we don't need to guarantee that Lazy sb counters are completely correct, but we do need to guarantee that sb_ifree <= sb_icount. On the other hand, the constraint that m_ifree <= m_icount must be satisfied any time that there /cannot/ be other threads allocating or freeing inode chunks. If the constraint is violated under these circumstances, sb_i{count,free} (the ondisk superblock inode counters) maybe incorrect and need to be marked sick at unmount, the count will be rebuilt on the next mount. Fixes: 8756a5af1819 ("libxfs: add more bounds checking to sb sanity checks") Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
2022-11-17 11:20:20 +08:00
mp->m_sb.sb_ifree = min_t(uint64_t,
xfs: make sure sb_fdblocks is non-negative commit 58f880711f2ba53fd5e959875aff5b3bf6d5c32e upstream. A user with a completely full filesystem experienced an unexpected shutdown when the filesystem tried to write the superblock during runtime. kernel shows the following dmesg: [ 8.176281] XFS (dm-4): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify+0x60/0x120 [xfs], xfs_sb block 0x0 [ 8.177417] XFS (dm-4): Unmount and run xfs_repair [ 8.178016] XFS (dm-4): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: [ 8.178703] 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 01 90 00 00 XFSB............ [ 8.179487] 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 8.180312] 00000020: cf 12 dc 89 ca 26 45 29 92 e6 e3 8d 3b b8 a2 c3 .....&E)....;... [ 8.181150] 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 ................ [ 8.182003] 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82 ................ [ 8.182004] 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 64 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 .....d.......... [ 8.182004] 00000060: 00 00 64 00 b4 a5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 ..d............. [ 8.182005] 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 17 00 00 19 ................ [ 8.182008] XFS (dm-4): Corruption of in-memory data detected. Shutting down filesystem [ 8.182010] XFS (dm-4): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) When xfs_log_sb writes super block to disk, b_fdblocks is fetched from m_fdblocks without any lock. As m_fdblocks can experience a positive -> negative -> positive changing when the FS reaches fullness (see xfs_mod_fdblocks). So there is a chance that sb_fdblocks is negative, and because sb_fdblocks is type of unsigned long long, it reads super big. And sb_fdblocks being bigger than sb_dblocks is a problem during log recovery, xfs_validate_sb_write() complains. Fix: As sb_fdblocks will be re-calculated during mount when lazysbcount is enabled, We just need to make xfs_validate_sb_write() happy -- make sure sb_fdblocks is not nenative. This patch also takes care of other percpu counters in xfs_log_sb. Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-16 08:11:22 +08:00
percpu_counter_sum_positive(&mp->m_ifree),
xfs: fix sb write verify for lazysbcount When lazysbcount is enabled, fsstress and loop mount/unmount test report the following problems: XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify+0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0 XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 XFSB.........(.. 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a i.|._.D..t....4Z 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 ..... .......... 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82 ................ 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19 ................ XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply +0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580). Shutting down filesystem. XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117 XFS (loop0): log mount failed This corruption will shutdown the file system and the file system will no longer be mountable. The following script can reproduce the problem, but it may take a long time. #!/bin/bash device=/dev/sda testdir=/mnt/test round=0 function fail() { echo "$*" exit 1 } mkdir -p $testdir while [ $round -lt 10000 ] do echo "******* round $round ********" mkfs.xfs -f $device mount $device $testdir || fail "mount failed!" fsstress -d $testdir -l 0 -n 10000 -p 4 >/dev/null & sleep 4 killall -w fsstress umount $testdir xfs_repair -e $device > /dev/null if [ $? -eq 2 ];then echo "ERR CODE 2: Dirty log exception during repair." exit 1 fi round=$(($round+1)) done With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other cpu modifies the m_ifree, this will make the m_ifree greater than m_icount. For example, consider the following sequence and ifreedelta is postive: CPU0 CPU1 xfs_log_sb xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb ---------- ------------------------------ percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount) percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount, idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH) percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_ifree, ifreedelta); percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree) After this, incorrect inode count (sb_ifree > sb_icount) will be writen to the log. In the subsequent writing of sb, incorrect inode count (sb_ifree > sb_icount) will fail to pass the boundary check in xfs_validate_sb_write() that cause the file system shutdown. When lazysbcount is enabled, we don't need to guarantee that Lazy sb counters are completely correct, but we do need to guarantee that sb_ifree <= sb_icount. On the other hand, the constraint that m_ifree <= m_icount must be satisfied any time that there /cannot/ be other threads allocating or freeing inode chunks. If the constraint is violated under these circumstances, sb_i{count,free} (the ondisk superblock inode counters) maybe incorrect and need to be marked sick at unmount, the count will be rebuilt on the next mount. Fixes: 8756a5af1819 ("libxfs: add more bounds checking to sb sanity checks") Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
2022-11-17 11:20:20 +08:00
mp->m_sb.sb_icount);
xfs: make sure sb_fdblocks is non-negative commit 58f880711f2ba53fd5e959875aff5b3bf6d5c32e upstream. A user with a completely full filesystem experienced an unexpected shutdown when the filesystem tried to write the superblock during runtime. kernel shows the following dmesg: [ 8.176281] XFS (dm-4): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify+0x60/0x120 [xfs], xfs_sb block 0x0 [ 8.177417] XFS (dm-4): Unmount and run xfs_repair [ 8.178016] XFS (dm-4): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: [ 8.178703] 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 01 90 00 00 XFSB............ [ 8.179487] 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 8.180312] 00000020: cf 12 dc 89 ca 26 45 29 92 e6 e3 8d 3b b8 a2 c3 .....&E)....;... [ 8.181150] 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 ................ [ 8.182003] 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82 ................ [ 8.182004] 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 64 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 .....d.......... [ 8.182004] 00000060: 00 00 64 00 b4 a5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 ..d............. [ 8.182005] 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 17 00 00 19 ................ [ 8.182008] XFS (dm-4): Corruption of in-memory data detected. Shutting down filesystem [ 8.182010] XFS (dm-4): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) When xfs_log_sb writes super block to disk, b_fdblocks is fetched from m_fdblocks without any lock. As m_fdblocks can experience a positive -> negative -> positive changing when the FS reaches fullness (see xfs_mod_fdblocks). So there is a chance that sb_fdblocks is negative, and because sb_fdblocks is type of unsigned long long, it reads super big. And sb_fdblocks being bigger than sb_dblocks is a problem during log recovery, xfs_validate_sb_write() complains. Fix: As sb_fdblocks will be re-calculated during mount when lazysbcount is enabled, We just need to make xfs_validate_sb_write() happy -- make sure sb_fdblocks is not nenative. This patch also takes care of other percpu counters in xfs_log_sb. Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-16 08:11:22 +08:00
mp->m_sb.sb_fdblocks =
percpu_counter_sum_positive(&mp->m_fdblocks);
}
xfs_sb_to_disk(bp->b_addr, &mp->m_sb);
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(tp, bp, XFS_BLFT_SB_BUF);
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, bp, 0, sizeof(struct xfs_dsb) - 1);
}
/*
* xfs_sync_sb
*
* Sync the superblock to disk.
*
* Note that the caller is responsible for checking the frozen state of the
* filesystem. This procedure uses the non-blocking transaction allocator and
* thus will allow modifications to a frozen fs. This is required because this
* code can be called during the process of freezing where use of the high-level
* allocator would deadlock.
*/
int
xfs_sync_sb(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
bool wait)
{
struct xfs_trans *tp;
int error;
error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_sb, 0, 0,
XFS_TRANS_NO_WRITECOUNT, &tp);
if (error)
return error;
xfs_log_sb(tp);
if (wait)
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
return xfs_trans_commit(tp);
}
/*
* Update all the secondary superblocks to match the new state of the primary.
* Because we are completely overwriting all the existing fields in the
* secondary superblock buffers, there is no need to read them in from disk.
* Just get a new buffer, stamp it and write it.
*
* The sb buffers need to be cached here so that we serialise against other
* operations that access the secondary superblocks, but we don't want to keep
* them in memory once it is written so we mark it as a one-shot buffer.
*/
int
xfs_update_secondary_sbs(
struct xfs_mount *mp)
{
struct xfs_perag *pag;
xfs_agnumber_t agno = 1;
int saved_error = 0;
int error = 0;
LIST_HEAD (buffer_list);
/* update secondary superblocks. */
for_each_perag_from(mp, agno, pag) {
struct xfs_buf *bp;
error = xfs_buf_get(mp->m_ddev_targp,
XFS_AG_DADDR(mp, pag->pag_agno, XFS_SB_DADDR),
XFS_FSS_TO_BB(mp, 1), &bp);
/*
* If we get an error reading or writing alternate superblocks,
* continue. xfs_repair chooses the "best" superblock based
* on most matches; if we break early, we'll leave more
* superblocks un-updated than updated, and xfs_repair may
* pick them over the properly-updated primary.
*/
if (error) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"error allocating secondary superblock for ag %d",
pag->pag_agno);
if (!saved_error)
saved_error = error;
continue;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_sb_buf_ops;
xfs_buf_oneshot(bp);
xfs_buf_zero(bp, 0, BBTOB(bp->b_length));
xfs_sb_to_disk(bp->b_addr, &mp->m_sb);
xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, &buffer_list);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
/* don't hold too many buffers at once */
if (agno % 16)
continue;
error = xfs_buf_delwri_submit(&buffer_list);
if (error) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"write error %d updating a secondary superblock near ag %d",
error, pag->pag_agno);
if (!saved_error)
saved_error = error;
continue;
}
}
error = xfs_buf_delwri_submit(&buffer_list);
if (error) {
xfs_warn(mp,
"write error %d updating a secondary superblock near ag %d",
error, agno);
}
return saved_error ? saved_error : error;
}
/*
* Same behavior as xfs_sync_sb, except that it is always synchronous and it
* also writes the superblock buffer to disk sector 0 immediately.
*/
int
xfs_sync_sb_buf(
struct xfs_mount *mp)
{
struct xfs_trans *tp;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_sb, 0, 0, 0, &tp);
if (error)
return error;
bp = xfs_trans_getsb(tp);
xfs_log_sb(tp);
xfs_trans_bhold(tp, bp);
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
error = xfs_trans_commit(tp);
if (error)
goto out;
/*
* write out the sb buffer to get the changes to disk
*/
error = xfs_bwrite(bp);
out:
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
return error;
}
void
xfs_fs_geometry(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_fsop_geom *geo,
int struct_version)
{
struct xfs_sb *sbp = &mp->m_sb;
memset(geo, 0, sizeof(struct xfs_fsop_geom));
geo->blocksize = sbp->sb_blocksize;
geo->rtextsize = sbp->sb_rextsize;
geo->agblocks = sbp->sb_agblocks;
geo->agcount = sbp->sb_agcount;
geo->logblocks = sbp->sb_logblocks;
geo->sectsize = sbp->sb_sectsize;
geo->inodesize = sbp->sb_inodesize;
geo->imaxpct = sbp->sb_imax_pct;
geo->datablocks = sbp->sb_dblocks;
geo->rtblocks = sbp->sb_rblocks;
geo->rtextents = sbp->sb_rextents;
geo->logstart = sbp->sb_logstart;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(geo->uuid) != sizeof(sbp->sb_uuid));
memcpy(geo->uuid, &sbp->sb_uuid, sizeof(sbp->sb_uuid));
if (struct_version < 2)
return;
geo->sunit = sbp->sb_unit;
geo->swidth = sbp->sb_width;
if (struct_version < 3)
return;
geo->version = XFS_FSOP_GEOM_VERSION;
geo->flags = XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_NLINK |
XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_DIRV2 |
XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_EXTFLG;
if (xfs_has_attr(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_ATTR;
if (xfs_has_quota(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_QUOTA;
if (xfs_has_align(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_IALIGN;
if (xfs_has_dalign(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_DALIGN;
if (xfs_has_asciici(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_DIRV2CI;
if (xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_LAZYSB;
if (xfs_has_attr2(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_ATTR2;
if (xfs_has_projid32(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_PROJID32;
if (xfs_has_crc(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_V5SB;
if (xfs_has_ftype(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_FTYPE;
if (xfs_has_finobt(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_FINOBT;
if (xfs_has_sparseinodes(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_SPINODES;
if (xfs_has_rmapbt(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_RMAPBT;
if (xfs_has_reflink(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_REFLINK;
if (xfs_has_bigtime(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_BIGTIME;
if (xfs_has_inobtcounts(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_INOBTCNT;
if (xfs_has_sector(mp)) {
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_SECTOR;
geo->logsectsize = sbp->sb_logsectsize;
} else {
geo->logsectsize = BBSIZE;
}
if (xfs_has_large_extent_counts(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_NREXT64;
geo->rtsectsize = sbp->sb_blocksize;
geo->dirblocksize = xfs_dir2_dirblock_bytes(sbp);
if (struct_version < 4)
return;
if (xfs_has_logv2(mp))
geo->flags |= XFS_FSOP_GEOM_FLAGS_LOGV2;
geo->logsunit = sbp->sb_logsunit;
if (struct_version < 5)
return;
geo->version = XFS_FSOP_GEOM_VERSION_V5;
}
/* Read a secondary superblock. */
int
xfs_sb_read_secondary(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_trans *tp,
xfs_agnumber_t agno,
struct xfs_buf **bpp)
{
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
ASSERT(agno != 0 && agno != NULLAGNUMBER);
error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, tp, mp->m_ddev_targp,
XFS_AG_DADDR(mp, agno, XFS_SB_BLOCK(mp)),
XFS_FSS_TO_BB(mp, 1), 0, &bp, &xfs_sb_buf_ops);
if (error)
return error;
xfs_buf_set_ref(bp, XFS_SSB_REF);
*bpp = bp;
return 0;
}
/* Get an uninitialised secondary superblock buffer. */
int
xfs_sb_get_secondary(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_trans *tp,
xfs_agnumber_t agno,
struct xfs_buf **bpp)
{
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
ASSERT(agno != 0 && agno != NULLAGNUMBER);
error = xfs_trans_get_buf(tp, mp->m_ddev_targp,
XFS_AG_DADDR(mp, agno, XFS_SB_BLOCK(mp)),
XFS_FSS_TO_BB(mp, 1), 0, &bp);
if (error)
return error;
bp->b_ops = &xfs_sb_buf_ops;
xfs_buf_oneshot(bp);
*bpp = bp;
return 0;
}
/*
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
* sunit, swidth, sectorsize(optional with 0) should be all in bytes, so users
* won't be confused by values in error messages. This function returns false
* if the stripe geometry is invalid and the caller is unable to repair the
* stripe configuration later in the mount process.
*/
bool
xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
__s64 sunit,
__s64 swidth,
int sectorsize,
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
bool may_repair,
bool silent)
{
if (swidth > INT_MAX) {
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"stripe width (%lld) is too large", swidth);
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
goto check_override;
}
if (sunit > swidth) {
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"stripe unit (%lld) is larger than the stripe width (%lld)", sunit, swidth);
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
goto check_override;
}
if (sectorsize && (int)sunit % sectorsize) {
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"stripe unit (%lld) must be a multiple of the sector size (%d)",
sunit, sectorsize);
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
goto check_override;
}
if (sunit && !swidth) {
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"invalid stripe unit (%lld) and stripe width of 0", sunit);
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
goto check_override;
}
if (!sunit && swidth) {
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"invalid stripe width (%lld) and stripe unit of 0", swidth);
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
goto check_override;
}
if (sunit && (int)swidth % (int)sunit) {
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"stripe width (%lld) must be a multiple of the stripe unit (%lld)",
swidth, sunit);
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
goto check_override;
}
return true;
xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream. If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk (e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline xfs_db surgery. This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db rewrite of the values. However, we parse the mount options long before we read the superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified will correct the issue. We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db hacks. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-18 07:03:53 +08:00
check_override:
if (!may_repair)
return false;
/*
* During mount, mp->m_dalign will not be set unless the sunit mount
* option was set. If it was set, ignore the bad stripe alignment values
* and allow the validation and overwrite later in the mount process to
* attempt to overwrite the bad stripe alignment values with the values
* supplied by mount options.
*/
if (!mp->m_dalign)
return false;
if (!silent)
xfs_notice(mp,
"Will try to correct with specified mount options sunit (%d) and swidth (%d)",
BBTOB(mp->m_dalign), BBTOB(mp->m_swidth));
return true;
}
xfs: remove conditional building of rt geometry validator functions commit 881f78f472556ed05588172d5b5676b48dc48240 upstream. [backport: resolve merge conflicts due to refactoring rtbitmap/summary macros and accessors] I mistakenly turned off CONFIG_XFS_RT in the Kconfig file for arm64 variant of the djwong-wtf git branch. Unfortunately, it took me a good hour to figure out that RT wasn't built because this is what got printed to dmesg: XFS (sda2): realtime geometry sanity check failed XFS (sda2): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_read_verify+0x170/0x190 [xfs], xfs_sb block 0x0 Whereas I would have expected: XFS (sda2): Not built with CONFIG_XFS_RT XFS (sda2): RT mount failed The root cause of these problems is the conditional compilation of the new functions xfs_validate_rtextents and xfs_compute_rextslog that I introduced in the two commits listed below. The !RT versions of these functions return false and 0, respectively, which causes primary superblock validation to fail, which explains the first message. Move the two functions to other parts of libxfs that are not conditionally defined by CONFIG_XFS_RT and remove the broken stubs so that validation works again. Fixes: e14293803f4e ("xfs: don't allow overly small or large realtime volumes") Fixes: a6a38f309afc ("xfs: make rextslog computation consistent with mkfs") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-27 08:12:33 +08:00
/*
* Compute the maximum level number of the realtime summary file, as defined by
* mkfs. The historic use of highbit32 on a 64-bit quantity prohibited correct
* use of rt volumes with more than 2^32 extents.
*/
uint8_t
xfs_compute_rextslog(
xfs_rtbxlen_t rtextents)
{
if (!rtextents)
return 0;
return xfs_highbit64(rtextents);
}