OpenCloudOS-Kernel/include/linux/slab_def.h

121 lines
2.9 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H
#define _LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H
reciprocal_divide: update/correction of the algorithm Jakub Zawadzki noticed that some divisions by reciprocal_divide() were not correct [1][2], which he could also show with BPF code after divisions are transformed into reciprocal_value() for runtime invariance which can be passed to reciprocal_divide() later on; reverse in BPF dump ended up with a different, off-by-one K in some situations. This has been fixed by Eric Dumazet in commit aee636c4809fa5 ("bpf: do not use reciprocal divide"). This follow-up patch improves reciprocal_value() and reciprocal_divide() to work in all cases by using Granlund and Montgomery method, so that also future use is safe and without any non-obvious side-effects. Known problems with the old implementation were that division by 1 always returned 0 and some off-by-ones when the dividend and divisor where very large. This seemed to not be problematic with its current users, as far as we can tell. Eric Dumazet checked for the slab usage, we cannot surely say so in the case of flex_array. Still, in order to fix that, we propose an extension from the original implementation from commit 6a2d7a955d8d resp. [3][4], by using the algorithm proposed in "Division by Invariant Integers Using Multiplication" [5], Torbjörn Granlund and Peter L. Montgomery, that is, pseudocode for q = n/d where q, n, d is in u32 universe: 1) Initialization: int l = ceil(log_2 d) uword m' = floor((1<<32)*((1<<l)-d)/d)+1 int sh_1 = min(l,1) int sh_2 = max(l-1,0) 2) For q = n/d, all uword: uword t = (n*m')>>32 q = (t+((n-t)>>sh_1))>>sh_2 The assembler implementation from Agner Fog [6] also helped a lot while implementing. We have tested the implementation on x86_64, ppc64, i686, s390x; on x86_64/haswell we're still half the latency compared to normal divide. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. [1] http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/reciprocal-buggy.c [2] http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/set-and-dump-filter-k-bug.c [3] https://gmplib.org/~tege/division-paper.pdf [4] http://homepage.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/bcd/divide.html [5] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.2556 [6] http://www.agner.org/optimize/asmlib.zip Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com> Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-22 09:29:41 +08:00
#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
/*
* Definitions unique to the original Linux SLAB allocator.
*/
struct kmem_cache {
struct array_cache __percpu *cpu_cache;
/* 1) Cache tunables. Protected by slab_mutex */
unsigned int batchcount;
unsigned int limit;
unsigned int shared;
unsigned int size;
reciprocal_divide: update/correction of the algorithm Jakub Zawadzki noticed that some divisions by reciprocal_divide() were not correct [1][2], which he could also show with BPF code after divisions are transformed into reciprocal_value() for runtime invariance which can be passed to reciprocal_divide() later on; reverse in BPF dump ended up with a different, off-by-one K in some situations. This has been fixed by Eric Dumazet in commit aee636c4809fa5 ("bpf: do not use reciprocal divide"). This follow-up patch improves reciprocal_value() and reciprocal_divide() to work in all cases by using Granlund and Montgomery method, so that also future use is safe and without any non-obvious side-effects. Known problems with the old implementation were that division by 1 always returned 0 and some off-by-ones when the dividend and divisor where very large. This seemed to not be problematic with its current users, as far as we can tell. Eric Dumazet checked for the slab usage, we cannot surely say so in the case of flex_array. Still, in order to fix that, we propose an extension from the original implementation from commit 6a2d7a955d8d resp. [3][4], by using the algorithm proposed in "Division by Invariant Integers Using Multiplication" [5], Torbjörn Granlund and Peter L. Montgomery, that is, pseudocode for q = n/d where q, n, d is in u32 universe: 1) Initialization: int l = ceil(log_2 d) uword m' = floor((1<<32)*((1<<l)-d)/d)+1 int sh_1 = min(l,1) int sh_2 = max(l-1,0) 2) For q = n/d, all uword: uword t = (n*m')>>32 q = (t+((n-t)>>sh_1))>>sh_2 The assembler implementation from Agner Fog [6] also helped a lot while implementing. We have tested the implementation on x86_64, ppc64, i686, s390x; on x86_64/haswell we're still half the latency compared to normal divide. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. [1] http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/reciprocal-buggy.c [2] http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/set-and-dump-filter-k-bug.c [3] https://gmplib.org/~tege/division-paper.pdf [4] http://homepage.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/bcd/divide.html [5] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.2556 [6] http://www.agner.org/optimize/asmlib.zip Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com> Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-22 09:29:41 +08:00
struct reciprocal_value reciprocal_buffer_size;
/* 2) touched by every alloc & free from the backend */
slab_flags_t flags; /* constant flags */
unsigned int num; /* # of objs per slab */
/* 3) cache_grow/shrink */
/* order of pgs per slab (2^n) */
unsigned int gfporder;
/* force GFP flags, e.g. GFP_DMA */
gfp_t allocflags;
size_t colour; /* cache colouring range */
unsigned int colour_off; /* colour offset */
struct kmem_cache *freelist_cache;
unsigned int freelist_size;
/* constructor func */
void (*ctor)(void *obj);
/* 4) cache creation/removal */
const char *name;
struct list_head list;
int refcount;
int object_size;
int align;
/* 5) statistics */
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB
unsigned long num_active;
unsigned long num_allocations;
unsigned long high_mark;
unsigned long grown;
unsigned long reaped;
unsigned long errors;
unsigned long max_freeable;
unsigned long node_allocs;
unsigned long node_frees;
unsigned long node_overflow;
atomic_t allochit;
atomic_t allocmiss;
atomic_t freehit;
atomic_t freemiss;
/*
* If debugging is enabled, then the allocator can add additional
* fields and/or padding to every object. 'size' contains the total
* object size including these internal fields, while 'obj_offset'
* and 'object_size' contain the offset to the user object and its
* size.
*/
int obj_offset;
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB */
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
struct kasan_cache kasan_info;
#endif
mm: SLAB freelist randomization Provides an optional config (CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot for performance. Each kmem_cache has its own randomized freelist. Before pre-computed lists are available freelists are generated dynamically. This security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less stable. For example this attack against SLUB (also applicable against SLAB) would be affected: https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/09/10/linux-kernel-can-slub-overflow/ Also, since v4.6 the freelist was moved at the end of the SLAB. It means a controllable heap is opened to new attacks not yet publicly discussed. A kernel heap overflow can be transformed to multiple use-after-free. This feature makes this type of attack harder too. To generate entropy, we use get_random_bytes_arch because 0 bits of entropy is available in the boot stage. In the worse case this function will fallback to the get_random_bytes sub API. We also generate a shift random number to shift pre-computed freelist for each new set of pages. The config option name is not specific to the SLAB as this approach will be extended to other allocators like SLUB. Performance results highlighted no major changes: Hackbench (running 90 10 times): Before average: 0.0698 After average: 0.0663 (-5.01%) slab_test 1 run on boot. Difference only seen on the 2048 size test being the worse case scenario covered by freelist randomization. New slab pages are constantly being created on the 10000 allocations. Variance should be mainly due to getting new pages every few allocations. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 10000 times kmalloc(8) -> 99 cycles kfree -> 112 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16) -> 109 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32) -> 129 cycles kfree -> 137 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64) -> 141 cycles kfree -> 141 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128) -> 152 cycles kfree -> 148 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256) -> 195 cycles kfree -> 167 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512) -> 257 cycles kfree -> 199 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 393 cycles kfree -> 251 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 649 cycles kfree -> 228 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 806 cycles kfree -> 370 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192) -> 814 cycles kfree -> 411 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384) -> 892 cycles kfree -> 455 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 10000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 10000 times kmalloc(8) -> 130 cycles kfree -> 86 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 86 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32) -> 121 cycles kfree -> 85 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64) -> 176 cycles kfree -> 102 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128) -> 178 cycles kfree -> 100 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256) -> 205 cycles kfree -> 109 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512) -> 262 cycles kfree -> 136 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 342 cycles kfree -> 157 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 701 cycles kfree -> 238 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 803 cycles kfree -> 364 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192) -> 835 cycles kfree -> 404 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384) -> 896 cycles kfree -> 441 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 10000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 123 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 142 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles [akpm@linux-foundation.org: propagate gfp_t into cache_random_seq_create()] Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 08:10:37 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
mm: reorganize SLAB freelist randomization The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to control the following chunk overflowed. For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap: - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU) - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95) ***Problems that needed solving: - Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator. - Ensure good performance to encourage usage. - Get best entropy in early boot stage. ***Parts: - 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements with the SLUB implementation. - 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB. ***Performance data: slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall impact on the system is way lower. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles Kernbench, before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069) User Time 1045.22 (1.60447) System Time 88.969 (0.559195) Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279) Context Switches 189140 (2282.15) Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732) User Time 1045.3 (1.34263) System Time 88.311 (0.342554) Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444) Context Switches 189081 (2355.78) Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358) This patch (of 2): This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be shared to slab_common. The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation, now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better performance when specific arch instructions are not available. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-27 06:21:56 +08:00
unsigned int *random_seq;
mm: SLAB freelist randomization Provides an optional config (CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot for performance. Each kmem_cache has its own randomized freelist. Before pre-computed lists are available freelists are generated dynamically. This security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less stable. For example this attack against SLUB (also applicable against SLAB) would be affected: https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/09/10/linux-kernel-can-slub-overflow/ Also, since v4.6 the freelist was moved at the end of the SLAB. It means a controllable heap is opened to new attacks not yet publicly discussed. A kernel heap overflow can be transformed to multiple use-after-free. This feature makes this type of attack harder too. To generate entropy, we use get_random_bytes_arch because 0 bits of entropy is available in the boot stage. In the worse case this function will fallback to the get_random_bytes sub API. We also generate a shift random number to shift pre-computed freelist for each new set of pages. The config option name is not specific to the SLAB as this approach will be extended to other allocators like SLUB. Performance results highlighted no major changes: Hackbench (running 90 10 times): Before average: 0.0698 After average: 0.0663 (-5.01%) slab_test 1 run on boot. Difference only seen on the 2048 size test being the worse case scenario covered by freelist randomization. New slab pages are constantly being created on the 10000 allocations. Variance should be mainly due to getting new pages every few allocations. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 10000 times kmalloc(8) -> 99 cycles kfree -> 112 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16) -> 109 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32) -> 129 cycles kfree -> 137 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64) -> 141 cycles kfree -> 141 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128) -> 152 cycles kfree -> 148 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256) -> 195 cycles kfree -> 167 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512) -> 257 cycles kfree -> 199 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 393 cycles kfree -> 251 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 649 cycles kfree -> 228 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 806 cycles kfree -> 370 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192) -> 814 cycles kfree -> 411 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384) -> 892 cycles kfree -> 455 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 10000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 10000 times kmalloc(8) -> 130 cycles kfree -> 86 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 86 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32) -> 121 cycles kfree -> 85 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64) -> 176 cycles kfree -> 102 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128) -> 178 cycles kfree -> 100 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256) -> 205 cycles kfree -> 109 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512) -> 262 cycles kfree -> 136 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 342 cycles kfree -> 157 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 701 cycles kfree -> 238 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 803 cycles kfree -> 364 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192) -> 835 cycles kfree -> 404 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384) -> 896 cycles kfree -> 441 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 10000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 123 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 142 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 121 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles 10000 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles [akpm@linux-foundation.org: propagate gfp_t into cache_random_seq_create()] Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 08:10:37 +08:00
#endif
unsigned int useroffset; /* Usercopy region offset */
unsigned int usersize; /* Usercopy region size */
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2017-06-11 10:50:28 +08:00
struct kmem_cache_node *node[MAX_NUMNODES];
};
static inline void *nearest_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
void *x)
{
void *object = x - (x - page->s_mem) % cache->size;
void *last_object = page->s_mem + (cache->num - 1) * cache->size;
if (unlikely(object > last_object))
return last_object;
else
return object;
}
/*
* We want to avoid an expensive divide : (offset / cache->size)
* Using the fact that size is a constant for a particular cache,
* we can replace (offset / cache->size) by
* reciprocal_divide(offset, cache->reciprocal_buffer_size)
*/
static inline unsigned int obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
const struct page *page, void *obj)
{
u32 offset = (obj - page->s_mem);
return reciprocal_divide(offset, cache->reciprocal_buffer_size);
}
static inline int objs_per_slab_page(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
const struct page *page)
{
return cache->num;
}
#endif /* _LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H */