OpenCloudOS-Kernel/net/rds/tcp_connect.c

226 lines
6.1 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Copyright (c) 2006, 2017 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
* licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
* General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
* COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
* OpenIB.org BSD license below:
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
* without modification, are permitted provided that the following
* conditions are met:
*
* - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer.
*
* - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
* provided with the distribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
*
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include "rds.h"
#include "tcp.h"
void rds_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk)
{
void (*state_change)(struct sock *sk);
struct rds_conn_path *cp;
struct rds_tcp_connection *tc;
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
cp = sk->sk_user_data;
if (!cp) {
state_change = sk->sk_state_change;
goto out;
}
tc = cp->cp_transport_data;
state_change = tc->t_orig_state_change;
rdsdebug("sock %p state_change to %d\n", tc->t_sock, sk->sk_state);
switch (sk->sk_state) {
/* ignore connecting sockets as they make progress */
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
break;
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
RDS: TCP: Force every connection to be initiated by numerically smaller IP address When 2 RDS peers initiate an RDS-TCP connection simultaneously, there is a potential for "duelling syns" on either/both sides. See commit 241b271952eb ("RDS-TCP: Reset tcp callbacks if re-using an outgoing socket in rds_tcp_accept_one()") for a description of this condition, and the arbitration logic which ensures that the numerically large IP address in the TCP connection is bound to the RDS_TCP_PORT ("canonical ordering"). The rds_connection should not be marked as RDS_CONN_UP until the arbitration logic has converged for the following reason. The sender may start transmitting RDS datagrams as soon as RDS_CONN_UP is set, and since the sender removes all datagrams from the rds_connection's cp_retrans queue based on TCP acks. If the TCP ack was sent from a tcp socket that got reset as part of duel aribitration (but before data was delivered to the receivers RDS socket layer), the sender may end up prematurely freeing the datagram, and the datagram is no longer reliably deliverable. This patch remedies that condition by making sure that, upon receipt of 3WH completion state change notification of TCP_ESTABLISHED in rds_tcp_state_change, we mark the rds_connection as RDS_CONN_UP if, and only if, the IP addresses and ports for the connection are canonically ordered. In all other cases, rds_tcp_state_change will force an rds_conn_path_drop(), and rds_queue_reconnect() on both peers will restart the connection to ensure canonical ordering. A side-effect of enforcing this condition in rds_tcp_state_change() is that rds_tcp_accept_one_path() can now be refactored for simplicity. It is also no longer possible to encounter an RDS_CONN_UP connection in the arbitration logic in rds_tcp_accept_one(). Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-17 05:29:50 +08:00
/* Force the peer to reconnect so that we have the
* TCP ports going from <smaller-ip>.<transient> to
* <larger-ip>.<RDS_TCP_PORT>. We avoid marking the
* RDS connection as RDS_CONN_UP until the reconnect,
* to avoid RDS datagram loss.
*/
if (rds_addr_cmp(&cp->cp_conn->c_laddr,
&cp->cp_conn->c_faddr) >= 0 &&
RDS: TCP: Force every connection to be initiated by numerically smaller IP address When 2 RDS peers initiate an RDS-TCP connection simultaneously, there is a potential for "duelling syns" on either/both sides. See commit 241b271952eb ("RDS-TCP: Reset tcp callbacks if re-using an outgoing socket in rds_tcp_accept_one()") for a description of this condition, and the arbitration logic which ensures that the numerically large IP address in the TCP connection is bound to the RDS_TCP_PORT ("canonical ordering"). The rds_connection should not be marked as RDS_CONN_UP until the arbitration logic has converged for the following reason. The sender may start transmitting RDS datagrams as soon as RDS_CONN_UP is set, and since the sender removes all datagrams from the rds_connection's cp_retrans queue based on TCP acks. If the TCP ack was sent from a tcp socket that got reset as part of duel aribitration (but before data was delivered to the receivers RDS socket layer), the sender may end up prematurely freeing the datagram, and the datagram is no longer reliably deliverable. This patch remedies that condition by making sure that, upon receipt of 3WH completion state change notification of TCP_ESTABLISHED in rds_tcp_state_change, we mark the rds_connection as RDS_CONN_UP if, and only if, the IP addresses and ports for the connection are canonically ordered. In all other cases, rds_tcp_state_change will force an rds_conn_path_drop(), and rds_queue_reconnect() on both peers will restart the connection to ensure canonical ordering. A side-effect of enforcing this condition in rds_tcp_state_change() is that rds_tcp_accept_one_path() can now be refactored for simplicity. It is also no longer possible to encounter an RDS_CONN_UP connection in the arbitration logic in rds_tcp_accept_one(). Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-17 05:29:50 +08:00
rds_conn_path_transition(cp, RDS_CONN_CONNECTING,
RDS_CONN_ERROR)) {
rds_conn_path_drop(cp, false);
RDS: TCP: Force every connection to be initiated by numerically smaller IP address When 2 RDS peers initiate an RDS-TCP connection simultaneously, there is a potential for "duelling syns" on either/both sides. See commit 241b271952eb ("RDS-TCP: Reset tcp callbacks if re-using an outgoing socket in rds_tcp_accept_one()") for a description of this condition, and the arbitration logic which ensures that the numerically large IP address in the TCP connection is bound to the RDS_TCP_PORT ("canonical ordering"). The rds_connection should not be marked as RDS_CONN_UP until the arbitration logic has converged for the following reason. The sender may start transmitting RDS datagrams as soon as RDS_CONN_UP is set, and since the sender removes all datagrams from the rds_connection's cp_retrans queue based on TCP acks. If the TCP ack was sent from a tcp socket that got reset as part of duel aribitration (but before data was delivered to the receivers RDS socket layer), the sender may end up prematurely freeing the datagram, and the datagram is no longer reliably deliverable. This patch remedies that condition by making sure that, upon receipt of 3WH completion state change notification of TCP_ESTABLISHED in rds_tcp_state_change, we mark the rds_connection as RDS_CONN_UP if, and only if, the IP addresses and ports for the connection are canonically ordered. In all other cases, rds_tcp_state_change will force an rds_conn_path_drop(), and rds_queue_reconnect() on both peers will restart the connection to ensure canonical ordering. A side-effect of enforcing this condition in rds_tcp_state_change() is that rds_tcp_accept_one_path() can now be refactored for simplicity. It is also no longer possible to encounter an RDS_CONN_UP connection in the arbitration logic in rds_tcp_accept_one(). Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-17 05:29:50 +08:00
} else {
rds_connect_path_complete(cp, RDS_CONN_CONNECTING);
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
case TCP_CLOSE:
rds_conn_path_drop(cp, false);
default:
break;
}
out:
read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
state_change(sk);
}
int rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(struct rds_conn_path *cp)
{
struct socket *sock = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int addrlen;
bool isv6;
int ret;
struct rds_connection *conn = cp->cp_conn;
struct rds_tcp_connection *tc = cp->cp_transport_data;
/* for multipath rds,we only trigger the connection after
* the handshake probe has determined the number of paths.
*/
if (cp->cp_index > 0 && cp->cp_conn->c_npaths < 2)
return -EAGAIN;
mutex_lock(&tc->t_conn_path_lock);
if (rds_conn_path_up(cp)) {
mutex_unlock(&tc->t_conn_path_lock);
return 0;
}
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&conn->c_laddr)) {
ret = sock_create_kern(rds_conn_net(conn), PF_INET,
SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, &sock);
isv6 = false;
} else {
ret = sock_create_kern(rds_conn_net(conn), PF_INET6,
SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, &sock);
isv6 = true;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
rds_tcp_tune(sock);
if (isv6) {
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6.sin6_addr = conn->c_laddr;
sin6.sin6_port = 0;
sin6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin6.sin6_scope_id = conn->c_dev_if;
addr = (struct sockaddr *)&sin6;
addrlen = sizeof(sin6);
} else {
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = conn->c_laddr.s6_addr32[3];
sin.sin_port = 0;
addr = (struct sockaddr *)&sin;
addrlen = sizeof(sin);
}
ret = sock->ops->bind(sock, addr, addrlen);
if (ret) {
rdsdebug("bind failed with %d at address %pI6c\n",
ret, &conn->c_laddr);
goto out;
}
if (isv6) {
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6.sin6_addr = conn->c_faddr;
sin6.sin6_port = htons(RDS_TCP_PORT);
sin6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin6.sin6_scope_id = conn->c_dev_if;
addr = (struct sockaddr *)&sin6;
addrlen = sizeof(sin6);
} else {
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = conn->c_faddr.s6_addr32[3];
sin.sin_port = htons(RDS_TCP_PORT);
addr = (struct sockaddr *)&sin;
addrlen = sizeof(sin);
}
/*
* once we call connect() we can start getting callbacks and they
* own the socket
*/
rds_tcp_set_callbacks(sock, cp);
ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, addr, addrlen, O_NONBLOCK);
rdsdebug("connect to address %pI6c returned %d\n", &conn->c_faddr, ret);
if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
ret = 0;
if (ret == 0) {
rds_tcp_keepalive(sock);
sock = NULL;
} else {
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks(sock, cp->cp_transport_data);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&tc->t_conn_path_lock);
if (sock)
sock_release(sock);
return ret;
}
/*
* Before killing the tcp socket this needs to serialize with callbacks. The
* caller has already grabbed the sending sem so we're serialized with other
* senders.
*
* TCP calls the callbacks with the sock lock so we hold it while we reset the
* callbacks to those set by TCP. Our callbacks won't execute again once we
* hold the sock lock.
*/
void rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(struct rds_conn_path *cp)
{
struct rds_tcp_connection *tc = cp->cp_transport_data;
struct socket *sock = tc->t_sock;
rdsdebug("shutting down conn %p tc %p sock %p\n",
cp->cp_conn, tc, sock);
if (sock) {
rds: tcp: use rds_destroy_pending() to synchronize netns/module teardown and rds connection/workq management An rds_connection can get added during netns deletion between lines 528 and 529 of 506 static void rds_tcp_kill_sock(struct net *net) : /* code to pull out all the rds_connections that should be destroyed */ : 528 spin_unlock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); 529 list_for_each_entry_safe(tc, _tc, &tmp_list, t_tcp_node) 530 rds_conn_destroy(tc->t_cpath->cp_conn); Such an rds_connection would miss out the rds_conn_destroy() loop (that cancels all pending work) and (if it was scheduled after netns deletion) could trigger the use-after-free. A similar race-window exists for the module unload path in rds_tcp_exit -> rds_tcp_destroy_conns Concurrency with netns deletion (rds_tcp_kill_sock()) must be handled by checking check_net() before enqueuing new work or adding new connections. Concurrency with module-unload is handled by maintaining a module specific flag that is set at the start of the module exit function, and must be checked before enqueuing new work or adding new connections. This commit refactors existing RDS_DESTROY_PENDING checks added by commit 3db6e0d172c9 ("rds: use RCU to synchronize work-enqueue with connection teardown") and consolidates all the concurrency checks listed above into the function rds_destroy_pending(). Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-03 20:26:51 +08:00
if (rds_destroy_pending(cp->cp_conn))
sock_no_linger(sock->sk);
sock->ops->shutdown(sock, RCV_SHUTDOWN | SEND_SHUTDOWN);
lock_sock(sock->sk);
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks(sock, tc); /* tc->tc_sock = NULL */
release_sock(sock->sk);
sock_release(sock);
}
if (tc->t_tinc) {
rds_inc_put(&tc->t_tinc->ti_inc);
tc->t_tinc = NULL;
}
tc->t_tinc_hdr_rem = sizeof(struct rds_header);
tc->t_tinc_data_rem = 0;
}