2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* linux/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/shm.h>
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2017-02-09 01:51:30 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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2008-09-05 21:08:44 +08:00
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#include <linux/io.h>
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2011-04-13 11:57:17 +08:00
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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2010-06-15 09:16:19 +08:00
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#include <linux/random.h>
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2011-11-22 11:01:06 +08:00
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#include <asm/cachetype.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#define COLOUR_ALIGN(addr,pgoff) \
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((((addr)+SHMLBA-1)&~(SHMLBA-1)) + \
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(((pgoff)<<PAGE_SHIFT) & (SHMLBA-1)))
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2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
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/* gap between mmap and stack */
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#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024UL)
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#define MAX_GAP ((TASK_SIZE)/6*5)
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static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
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{
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if (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT)
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return 1;
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if (rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) == RLIM_INFINITY)
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return 1;
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return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
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}
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static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
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{
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unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
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if (gap < MIN_GAP)
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gap = MIN_GAP;
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else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
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gap = MAX_GAP;
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return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - rnd);
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}
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* We need to ensure that shared mappings are correctly aligned to
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* avoid aliasing issues with VIPT caches. We need to ensure that
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* a specific page of an object is always mapped at a multiple of
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* SHMLBA bytes.
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*
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* We unconditionally provide this function for all cases, however
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* in the VIVT case, we optimise out the alignment rules.
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*/
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unsigned long
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arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
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unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
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{
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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2011-11-22 11:01:06 +08:00
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int do_align = 0;
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int aliasing = cache_is_vipt_aliasing();
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2012-12-12 08:02:10 +08:00
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struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* We only need to do colour alignment if either the I or D
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2011-11-22 11:01:06 +08:00
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* caches alias.
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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*/
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2011-11-22 11:01:06 +08:00
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if (aliasing)
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do_align = filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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2007-05-07 05:50:07 +08:00
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* We enforce the MAP_FIXED case.
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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*/
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if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
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2009-12-06 04:10:44 +08:00
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if (aliasing && flags & MAP_SHARED &&
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(addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1))
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return -EINVAL;
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return addr;
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}
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if (len > TASK_SIZE)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (addr) {
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if (do_align)
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addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
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else
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addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
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vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
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if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
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(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
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return addr;
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}
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2012-12-12 08:02:10 +08:00
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info.flags = 0;
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info.length = len;
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info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
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info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
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info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
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info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
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return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
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unsigned long
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arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
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const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
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const unsigned long flags)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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unsigned long addr = addr0;
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int do_align = 0;
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int aliasing = cache_is_vipt_aliasing();
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2012-12-12 08:02:10 +08:00
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struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
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2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
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/*
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* We only need to do colour alignment if either the I or D
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* caches alias.
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*/
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if (aliasing)
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do_align = filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED);
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/* requested length too big for entire address space */
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if (len > TASK_SIZE)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
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if (aliasing && flags & MAP_SHARED &&
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(addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1))
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return -EINVAL;
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return addr;
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}
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/* requesting a specific address */
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if (addr) {
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if (do_align)
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addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
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else
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addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
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vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
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if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
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(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
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return addr;
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}
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2012-12-12 08:02:10 +08:00
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info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
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info.length = len;
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2013-11-29 05:43:40 +08:00
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info.low_limit = FIRST_USER_ADDRESS;
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2012-12-12 08:02:10 +08:00
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info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base;
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info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
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info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
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addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
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2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
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/*
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* A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
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* so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
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* can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
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* allocations.
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*/
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2012-12-12 08:02:10 +08:00
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if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
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VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
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info.flags = 0;
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info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
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info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
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addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
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}
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2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
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return addr;
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}
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|
2015-04-15 06:48:00 +08:00
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unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
|
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd
To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR
from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are
already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have
their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures,
arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well.
This is an alternative to the solutions in:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442
I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy
with building the rest.
[1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html
This patch (of 10):
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR
calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86.
This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is
already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:41 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long rnd;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-27 07:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
|
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd
To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR
from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are
already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have
their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures,
arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well.
This is an alternative to the solutions in:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442
I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy
with building the rest.
[1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html
This patch (of 10):
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR
calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86.
This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is
already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
|
|
|
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
|
|
|
|
|
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd
To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR
from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are
already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have
their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures,
arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well.
This is an alternative to the solutions in:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442
I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy
with building the rest.
[1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html
This patch (of 10):
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR
calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86.
This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is
already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
|
2015-04-15 06:48:00 +08:00
|
|
|
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
|
2011-11-22 11:01:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
|
|
|
|
mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
|
|
|
|
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor);
|
|
|
|
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-09-16 17:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* You really shouldn't be using read() or write() on /dev/mem. This
|
|
|
|
* might go away in the future.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-09-13 02:05:58 +08:00
|
|
|
int valid_phys_addr_range(phys_addr_t addr, size_t size)
|
2006-09-16 17:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-27 01:42:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (addr < PHYS_OFFSET)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-10-02 07:45:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (addr + size > __pa(high_memory - 1) + 1)
|
2006-09-16 17:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2013-09-24 23:38:00 +08:00
|
|
|
* Do not allow /dev/mem mappings beyond the supported physical range.
|
2006-09-16 17:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(unsigned long pfn, size_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-24 23:38:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return (pfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) <= (1 + (PHYS_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT));
|
2006-09-16 17:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-09-23 06:34:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/ioport.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* devmem_is_allowed() checks to see if /dev/mem access to a certain
|
|
|
|
* address is valid. The argument is a physical page number.
|
|
|
|
* We mimic x86 here by disallowing access to system RAM as well as
|
|
|
|
* device-exclusive MMIO regions. This effectively disable read()/write()
|
|
|
|
* on /dev/mem.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (iomem_is_exclusive(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!page_is_ram(pfn))
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|