OpenCloudOS-Kernel/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* -*- linux-c -*-
* sysctl_net_core.c: sysctl interface to net core subsystem.
*
* Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver.
* Added /proc/sys/net/core directory entry (empty =) ). [MS]
*/
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/net_ratelimit.h>
#include <net/busy_poll.h>
#include <net/pkt_sched.h>
static int two = 2;
static int three = 3;
static int int_3600 = 3600;
net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length sysctl has sysctl.net.core.rmem_*/wmem_* parameters which can be set to incorrect values. Given that 'struct sk_buff' allocates from rcvbuf, incorrectly set buffer length could result to memory allocation failures. For example, set them as follows: # sysctl net.core.rmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # sysctl net.core.wmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # ping localhost -s 1024 -i 0 > /dev/null This could result to the following failure: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff81628db4 len:-32 put:-32 head:ffff88003a1cc200 data:ffff88003a1cc200 tail:0xffffffe0 end:0xc0 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... task: ffff88003b7f5550 ti: ffff88003ae88000 task.ti: ffff88003ae88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8155fbd1>] [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ae8bc68 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 000000000000008d RBX: 00000000ffffffe0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88003fdcf598 RSI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RDI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RBP: ffff88003ae8bc88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000002b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003d3f7300 R15: ffff88000012a900 FS: 00007fa0e2b4a840(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000d0f7e0 CR3: 000000003b8fb000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88003a1cc200 00000000ffffffe0 00000000000000c0 ffffffff818cab1d ffff88003ae8bd68 ffffffff81628db4 ffff88003ae8bd48 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff880031a09408 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff88000012aa48 ffff88000012ab00 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81628db4>] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2c4/0x470 [<ffffffff81556f56>] sock_write_iter+0x146/0x160 [<ffffffff811d9612>] new_sync_write+0x92/0xd0 [<ffffffff811d9cd6>] vfs_write+0xd6/0x180 [<ffffffff811da499>] SyS_write+0x59/0xd0 [<ffffffff81651532>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 30 db 91 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f a8 0e 00 <0f> 0b eb fe 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 RIP [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP <ffff88003ae8bc68> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Moreover, the possible minimum is 1, so we can get another kernel panic: ... BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88013caee5c0 IP: [<ffffffff815604cf>] __alloc_skb+0x12f/0x1f0 ... Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-11 19:29:17 +08:00
static int min_sndbuf = SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF;
static int min_rcvbuf = SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF;
static int max_skb_frags = MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
static long long_one __maybe_unused = 1;
static long long_max __maybe_unused = LONG_MAX;
static int net_msg_warn; /* Unused, but still a sysctl */
int sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net __read_mostly = 0;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net);
net: introduce a knob to control whether to inherit devconf config There have been many people complaining about the inconsistent behaviors of IPv4 and IPv6 devconf when creating new network namespaces. Currently, for IPv4, we inherit all current settings from init_net, but for IPv6 we reset all setting to default. This patch introduces a new /proc file /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net to control the behavior of whether to inhert sysctl current settings from init_net. This file itself is only available in init_net. As demonstrated below: Initial setup in init_net: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Default value 0 (current behavior): # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to 1 (inherit from init_net): # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Set to 2 (reset to default): # echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 0 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to a value out of range (invalid): # echo 3 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument # echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument Reported-by: Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com> Reported-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-18 15:27:11 +08:00
/* 0 - Keep current behavior:
* IPv4: inherit all current settings from init_net
* IPv6: reset all settings to default
* 1 - Both inherit all current settings from init_net
* 2 - Both reset all settings to default
* 3 - Both inherit all settings from current netns
net: introduce a knob to control whether to inherit devconf config There have been many people complaining about the inconsistent behaviors of IPv4 and IPv6 devconf when creating new network namespaces. Currently, for IPv4, we inherit all current settings from init_net, but for IPv6 we reset all setting to default. This patch introduces a new /proc file /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net to control the behavior of whether to inhert sysctl current settings from init_net. This file itself is only available in init_net. As demonstrated below: Initial setup in init_net: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Default value 0 (current behavior): # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to 1 (inherit from init_net): # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Set to 2 (reset to default): # echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 0 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to a value out of range (invalid): # echo 3 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument # echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument Reported-by: Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com> Reported-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-18 15:27:11 +08:00
*/
int sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net);
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
{
unsigned int orig_size, size;
int ret, i;
struct ctl_table tmp = {
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
.data = &size,
.maxlen = sizeof(size),
.mode = table->mode
};
struct rps_sock_flow_table *orig_sock_table, *sock_table;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(sock_flow_mutex);
mutex_lock(&sock_flow_mutex);
orig_sock_table = rcu_dereference_protected(rps_sock_flow_table,
lockdep_is_held(&sock_flow_mutex));
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
size = orig_size = orig_sock_table ? orig_sock_table->mask + 1 : 0;
ret = proc_dointvec(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write) {
if (size) {
if (size > 1<<29) {
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
/* Enforce limit to prevent overflow */
mutex_unlock(&sock_flow_mutex);
return -EINVAL;
}
size = roundup_pow_of_two(size);
if (size != orig_size) {
sock_table =
vmalloc(RPS_SOCK_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(size));
if (!sock_table) {
mutex_unlock(&sock_flow_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
rps_cpu_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(nr_cpu_ids) - 1;
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
sock_table->mask = size - 1;
} else
sock_table = orig_sock_table;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sock_table->ents[i] = RPS_NO_CPU;
} else
sock_table = NULL;
if (sock_table != orig_sock_table) {
rcu_assign_pointer(rps_sock_flow_table, sock_table);
if (sock_table) {
static_branch_inc(&rps_needed);
static_branch_inc(&rfs_needed);
}
if (orig_sock_table) {
static_branch_dec(&rps_needed);
static_branch_dec(&rfs_needed);
synchronize_rcu();
vfree(orig_sock_table);
}
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
}
}
mutex_unlock(&sock_flow_mutex);
return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_RPS */
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_FLOW_LIMIT
static DEFINE_MUTEX(flow_limit_update_mutex);
static int flow_limit_cpu_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct sd_flow_limit *cur;
struct softnet_data *sd;
cpumask_var_t mask;
int i, len, ret = 0;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mask, GFP_KERNEL))
return -ENOMEM;
if (write) {
ret = cpumask_parse(buffer, mask);
if (ret)
goto done;
mutex_lock(&flow_limit_update_mutex);
len = sizeof(*cur) + netdev_flow_limit_table_len;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
sd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, i);
cur = rcu_dereference_protected(sd->flow_limit,
lockdep_is_held(&flow_limit_update_mutex));
if (cur && !cpumask_test_cpu(i, mask)) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(sd->flow_limit, NULL);
synchronize_rcu();
kfree(cur);
} else if (!cur && cpumask_test_cpu(i, mask)) {
cur = kzalloc_node(len, GFP_KERNEL,
cpu_to_node(i));
if (!cur) {
/* not unwinding previous changes */
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto write_unlock;
}
cur->num_buckets = netdev_flow_limit_table_len;
rcu_assign_pointer(sd->flow_limit, cur);
}
}
write_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&flow_limit_update_mutex);
} else {
char kbuf[128];
if (*ppos || !*lenp) {
*lenp = 0;
goto done;
}
cpumask_clear(mask);
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
sd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, i);
if (rcu_dereference(sd->flow_limit))
cpumask_set_cpu(i, mask);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
len = min(sizeof(kbuf) - 1, *lenp);
len = scnprintf(kbuf, len, "%*pb", cpumask_pr_args(mask));
if (!len) {
*lenp = 0;
goto done;
}
if (len < *lenp)
kbuf[len++] = '\n';
memcpy(buffer, kbuf, len);
*lenp = len;
*ppos += len;
}
done:
free_cpumask_var(mask);
return ret;
}
static int flow_limit_table_len_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
unsigned int old, *ptr;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&flow_limit_update_mutex);
ptr = table->data;
old = *ptr;
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (!ret && write && !is_power_of_2(*ptr)) {
*ptr = old;
ret = -EINVAL;
}
mutex_unlock(&flow_limit_update_mutex);
return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NET_FLOW_LIMIT */
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED
static int set_default_qdisc(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
char id[IFNAMSIZ];
struct ctl_table tbl = {
.data = id,
.maxlen = IFNAMSIZ,
};
int ret;
qdisc_get_default(id, IFNAMSIZ);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
ret = qdisc_set_default(id);
return ret;
}
#endif
static int proc_do_dev_weight(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
dev_rx_weight = weight_p * dev_weight_rx_bias;
dev_tx_weight = weight_p * dev_weight_tx_bias;
return ret;
}
static int proc_do_rss_key(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table fake_table;
char buf[NETDEV_RSS_KEY_LEN * 3];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%*phC", NETDEV_RSS_KEY_LEN, netdev_rss_key);
fake_table.data = buf;
fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
static int proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret, jit_enable = *(int *)table->data;
struct ctl_table tmp = *table;
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
tmp.data = &jit_enable;
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && !ret) {
if (jit_enable < 2 ||
(jit_enable == 2 && bpf_dump_raw_ok(current_cred()))) {
*(int *)table->data = jit_enable;
if (jit_enable == 2)
pr_warn("bpf_jit_enable = 2 was set! NEVER use this in production, only for JIT debugging!\n");
} else {
ret = -EPERM;
}
}
return ret;
}
# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT
static int
proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
# endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT */
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
static int
proc_dolongvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
#endif
static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
{
.procname = "wmem_max",
.data = &sysctl_wmem_max,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length sysctl has sysctl.net.core.rmem_*/wmem_* parameters which can be set to incorrect values. Given that 'struct sk_buff' allocates from rcvbuf, incorrectly set buffer length could result to memory allocation failures. For example, set them as follows: # sysctl net.core.rmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # sysctl net.core.wmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # ping localhost -s 1024 -i 0 > /dev/null This could result to the following failure: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff81628db4 len:-32 put:-32 head:ffff88003a1cc200 data:ffff88003a1cc200 tail:0xffffffe0 end:0xc0 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... task: ffff88003b7f5550 ti: ffff88003ae88000 task.ti: ffff88003ae88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8155fbd1>] [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ae8bc68 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 000000000000008d RBX: 00000000ffffffe0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88003fdcf598 RSI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RDI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RBP: ffff88003ae8bc88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000002b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003d3f7300 R15: ffff88000012a900 FS: 00007fa0e2b4a840(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000d0f7e0 CR3: 000000003b8fb000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88003a1cc200 00000000ffffffe0 00000000000000c0 ffffffff818cab1d ffff88003ae8bd68 ffffffff81628db4 ffff88003ae8bd48 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff880031a09408 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff88000012aa48 ffff88000012ab00 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81628db4>] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2c4/0x470 [<ffffffff81556f56>] sock_write_iter+0x146/0x160 [<ffffffff811d9612>] new_sync_write+0x92/0xd0 [<ffffffff811d9cd6>] vfs_write+0xd6/0x180 [<ffffffff811da499>] SyS_write+0x59/0xd0 [<ffffffff81651532>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 30 db 91 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f a8 0e 00 <0f> 0b eb fe 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 RIP [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP <ffff88003ae8bc68> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Moreover, the possible minimum is 1, so we can get another kernel panic: ... BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88013caee5c0 IP: [<ffffffff815604cf>] __alloc_skb+0x12f/0x1f0 ... Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-11 19:29:17 +08:00
.extra1 = &min_sndbuf,
},
{
.procname = "rmem_max",
.data = &sysctl_rmem_max,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length sysctl has sysctl.net.core.rmem_*/wmem_* parameters which can be set to incorrect values. Given that 'struct sk_buff' allocates from rcvbuf, incorrectly set buffer length could result to memory allocation failures. For example, set them as follows: # sysctl net.core.rmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # sysctl net.core.wmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # ping localhost -s 1024 -i 0 > /dev/null This could result to the following failure: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff81628db4 len:-32 put:-32 head:ffff88003a1cc200 data:ffff88003a1cc200 tail:0xffffffe0 end:0xc0 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... task: ffff88003b7f5550 ti: ffff88003ae88000 task.ti: ffff88003ae88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8155fbd1>] [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ae8bc68 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 000000000000008d RBX: 00000000ffffffe0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88003fdcf598 RSI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RDI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RBP: ffff88003ae8bc88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000002b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003d3f7300 R15: ffff88000012a900 FS: 00007fa0e2b4a840(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000d0f7e0 CR3: 000000003b8fb000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88003a1cc200 00000000ffffffe0 00000000000000c0 ffffffff818cab1d ffff88003ae8bd68 ffffffff81628db4 ffff88003ae8bd48 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff880031a09408 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff88000012aa48 ffff88000012ab00 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81628db4>] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2c4/0x470 [<ffffffff81556f56>] sock_write_iter+0x146/0x160 [<ffffffff811d9612>] new_sync_write+0x92/0xd0 [<ffffffff811d9cd6>] vfs_write+0xd6/0x180 [<ffffffff811da499>] SyS_write+0x59/0xd0 [<ffffffff81651532>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 30 db 91 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f a8 0e 00 <0f> 0b eb fe 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 RIP [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP <ffff88003ae8bc68> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Moreover, the possible minimum is 1, so we can get another kernel panic: ... BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88013caee5c0 IP: [<ffffffff815604cf>] __alloc_skb+0x12f/0x1f0 ... Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-11 19:29:17 +08:00
.extra1 = &min_rcvbuf,
},
{
.procname = "wmem_default",
.data = &sysctl_wmem_default,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length sysctl has sysctl.net.core.rmem_*/wmem_* parameters which can be set to incorrect values. Given that 'struct sk_buff' allocates from rcvbuf, incorrectly set buffer length could result to memory allocation failures. For example, set them as follows: # sysctl net.core.rmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # sysctl net.core.wmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # ping localhost -s 1024 -i 0 > /dev/null This could result to the following failure: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff81628db4 len:-32 put:-32 head:ffff88003a1cc200 data:ffff88003a1cc200 tail:0xffffffe0 end:0xc0 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... task: ffff88003b7f5550 ti: ffff88003ae88000 task.ti: ffff88003ae88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8155fbd1>] [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ae8bc68 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 000000000000008d RBX: 00000000ffffffe0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88003fdcf598 RSI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RDI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RBP: ffff88003ae8bc88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000002b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003d3f7300 R15: ffff88000012a900 FS: 00007fa0e2b4a840(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000d0f7e0 CR3: 000000003b8fb000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88003a1cc200 00000000ffffffe0 00000000000000c0 ffffffff818cab1d ffff88003ae8bd68 ffffffff81628db4 ffff88003ae8bd48 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff880031a09408 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff88000012aa48 ffff88000012ab00 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81628db4>] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2c4/0x470 [<ffffffff81556f56>] sock_write_iter+0x146/0x160 [<ffffffff811d9612>] new_sync_write+0x92/0xd0 [<ffffffff811d9cd6>] vfs_write+0xd6/0x180 [<ffffffff811da499>] SyS_write+0x59/0xd0 [<ffffffff81651532>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 30 db 91 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f a8 0e 00 <0f> 0b eb fe 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 RIP [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP <ffff88003ae8bc68> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Moreover, the possible minimum is 1, so we can get another kernel panic: ... BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88013caee5c0 IP: [<ffffffff815604cf>] __alloc_skb+0x12f/0x1f0 ... Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-11 19:29:17 +08:00
.extra1 = &min_sndbuf,
},
{
.procname = "rmem_default",
.data = &sysctl_rmem_default,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length sysctl has sysctl.net.core.rmem_*/wmem_* parameters which can be set to incorrect values. Given that 'struct sk_buff' allocates from rcvbuf, incorrectly set buffer length could result to memory allocation failures. For example, set them as follows: # sysctl net.core.rmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # sysctl net.core.wmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # ping localhost -s 1024 -i 0 > /dev/null This could result to the following failure: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff81628db4 len:-32 put:-32 head:ffff88003a1cc200 data:ffff88003a1cc200 tail:0xffffffe0 end:0xc0 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... task: ffff88003b7f5550 ti: ffff88003ae88000 task.ti: ffff88003ae88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8155fbd1>] [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ae8bc68 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 000000000000008d RBX: 00000000ffffffe0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88003fdcf598 RSI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RDI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RBP: ffff88003ae8bc88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000002b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003d3f7300 R15: ffff88000012a900 FS: 00007fa0e2b4a840(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000d0f7e0 CR3: 000000003b8fb000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88003a1cc200 00000000ffffffe0 00000000000000c0 ffffffff818cab1d ffff88003ae8bd68 ffffffff81628db4 ffff88003ae8bd48 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff880031a09408 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff88000012aa48 ffff88000012ab00 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81628db4>] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2c4/0x470 [<ffffffff81556f56>] sock_write_iter+0x146/0x160 [<ffffffff811d9612>] new_sync_write+0x92/0xd0 [<ffffffff811d9cd6>] vfs_write+0xd6/0x180 [<ffffffff811da499>] SyS_write+0x59/0xd0 [<ffffffff81651532>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 30 db 91 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f a8 0e 00 <0f> 0b eb fe 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 RIP [<ffffffff8155fbd1>] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP <ffff88003ae8bc68> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Moreover, the possible minimum is 1, so we can get another kernel panic: ... BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88013caee5c0 IP: [<ffffffff815604cf>] __alloc_skb+0x12f/0x1f0 ... Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-11 19:29:17 +08:00
.extra1 = &min_rcvbuf,
},
{
.procname = "dev_weight",
.data = &weight_p,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_dev_weight,
},
{
.procname = "dev_weight_rx_bias",
.data = &dev_weight_rx_bias,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_dev_weight,
},
{
.procname = "dev_weight_tx_bias",
.data = &dev_weight_tx_bias,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_dev_weight,
},
{
.procname = "netdev_max_backlog",
.data = &netdev_max_backlog,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "netdev_rss_key",
.data = &netdev_rss_key,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_rss_key,
},
net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64 In order to speedup packet filtering, here is an implementation of a JIT compiler for x86_64 It is disabled by default, and must be enabled by the admin. echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable It uses module_alloc() and module_free() to get memory in the 2GB text kernel range since we call helpers functions from the generated code. EAX : BPF A accumulator EBX : BPF X accumulator RDI : pointer to skb (first argument given to JIT function) RBP : frame pointer (even if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=n) r9d : skb->len - skb->data_len (headlen) r8 : skb->data To get a trace of generated code, use : echo 2 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable Example of generated code : # tcpdump -p -n -s 0 -i eth1 host 192.168.20.0/24 flen=18 proglen=147 pass=3 image=ffffffffa00b5000 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5000: 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 60 48 89 5d f8 44 8b 4f 60 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5010: 44 2b 4f 64 4c 8b 87 b8 00 00 00 be 0c 00 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5020: e8 24 7b f7 e0 3d 00 08 00 00 75 28 be 1a 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5030: 00 e8 fe 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 74 49 be JIT code: ffffffffa00b5040: 1e 00 00 00 e8 eb 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5050: 74 36 eb 3b 3d 06 08 00 00 74 07 3d 35 80 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5060: 75 2d be 1c 00 00 00 e8 c8 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5070: 14 a8 c0 74 13 be 26 00 00 00 e8 b5 7a f7 e0 24 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5080: 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 75 07 b8 ff ff 00 00 eb 02 31 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5090: c0 c9 c3 BPF program is 144 bytes long, so native program is almost same size ;) (000) ldh [12] (001) jeq #0x800 jt 2 jf 8 (002) ld [26] (003) and #0xffffff00 (004) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 5 (005) ld [30] (006) and #0xffffff00 (007) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 17 (008) jeq #0x806 jt 10 jf 9 (009) jeq #0x8035 jt 10 jf 17 (010) ld [28] (011) and #0xffffff00 (012) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 13 (013) ld [38] (014) and #0xffffff00 (015) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 17 (016) ret #65535 (017) ret #0 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-20 17:27:32 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
{
.procname = "bpf_jit_enable",
.data = &bpf_jit_enable,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable,
# ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
# else
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &two,
# endif
net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64 In order to speedup packet filtering, here is an implementation of a JIT compiler for x86_64 It is disabled by default, and must be enabled by the admin. echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable It uses module_alloc() and module_free() to get memory in the 2GB text kernel range since we call helpers functions from the generated code. EAX : BPF A accumulator EBX : BPF X accumulator RDI : pointer to skb (first argument given to JIT function) RBP : frame pointer (even if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=n) r9d : skb->len - skb->data_len (headlen) r8 : skb->data To get a trace of generated code, use : echo 2 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable Example of generated code : # tcpdump -p -n -s 0 -i eth1 host 192.168.20.0/24 flen=18 proglen=147 pass=3 image=ffffffffa00b5000 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5000: 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 60 48 89 5d f8 44 8b 4f 60 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5010: 44 2b 4f 64 4c 8b 87 b8 00 00 00 be 0c 00 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5020: e8 24 7b f7 e0 3d 00 08 00 00 75 28 be 1a 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5030: 00 e8 fe 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 74 49 be JIT code: ffffffffa00b5040: 1e 00 00 00 e8 eb 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5050: 74 36 eb 3b 3d 06 08 00 00 74 07 3d 35 80 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5060: 75 2d be 1c 00 00 00 e8 c8 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5070: 14 a8 c0 74 13 be 26 00 00 00 e8 b5 7a f7 e0 24 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5080: 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 75 07 b8 ff ff 00 00 eb 02 31 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5090: c0 c9 c3 BPF program is 144 bytes long, so native program is almost same size ;) (000) ldh [12] (001) jeq #0x800 jt 2 jf 8 (002) ld [26] (003) and #0xffffff00 (004) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 5 (005) ld [30] (006) and #0xffffff00 (007) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 17 (008) jeq #0x806 jt 10 jf 9 (009) jeq #0x8035 jt 10 jf 17 (010) ld [28] (011) and #0xffffff00 (012) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 13 (013) ld [38] (014) and #0xffffff00 (015) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 17 (016) ret #65535 (017) ret #0 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-20 17:27:32 +08:00
},
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT
{
.procname = "bpf_jit_harden",
.data = &bpf_jit_harden,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0600,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &two,
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
},
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
{
.procname = "bpf_jit_kallsyms",
.data = &bpf_jit_kallsyms,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0600,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
},
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
# endif
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
{
.procname = "bpf_jit_limit",
.data = &bpf_jit_limit,
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
.maxlen = sizeof(long),
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
.mode = 0600,
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
.proc_handler = proc_dolongvec_minmax_bpf_restricted,
.extra1 = &long_one,
.extra2 = &bpf_jit_limit_max,
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
},
net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64 In order to speedup packet filtering, here is an implementation of a JIT compiler for x86_64 It is disabled by default, and must be enabled by the admin. echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable It uses module_alloc() and module_free() to get memory in the 2GB text kernel range since we call helpers functions from the generated code. EAX : BPF A accumulator EBX : BPF X accumulator RDI : pointer to skb (first argument given to JIT function) RBP : frame pointer (even if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=n) r9d : skb->len - skb->data_len (headlen) r8 : skb->data To get a trace of generated code, use : echo 2 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable Example of generated code : # tcpdump -p -n -s 0 -i eth1 host 192.168.20.0/24 flen=18 proglen=147 pass=3 image=ffffffffa00b5000 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5000: 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 60 48 89 5d f8 44 8b 4f 60 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5010: 44 2b 4f 64 4c 8b 87 b8 00 00 00 be 0c 00 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5020: e8 24 7b f7 e0 3d 00 08 00 00 75 28 be 1a 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5030: 00 e8 fe 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 74 49 be JIT code: ffffffffa00b5040: 1e 00 00 00 e8 eb 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5050: 74 36 eb 3b 3d 06 08 00 00 74 07 3d 35 80 00 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5060: 75 2d be 1c 00 00 00 e8 c8 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5070: 14 a8 c0 74 13 be 26 00 00 00 e8 b5 7a f7 e0 24 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5080: 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 75 07 b8 ff ff 00 00 eb 02 31 JIT code: ffffffffa00b5090: c0 c9 c3 BPF program is 144 bytes long, so native program is almost same size ;) (000) ldh [12] (001) jeq #0x800 jt 2 jf 8 (002) ld [26] (003) and #0xffffff00 (004) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 5 (005) ld [30] (006) and #0xffffff00 (007) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 17 (008) jeq #0x806 jt 10 jf 9 (009) jeq #0x8035 jt 10 jf 17 (010) ld [28] (011) and #0xffffff00 (012) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 13 (013) ld [38] (014) and #0xffffff00 (015) jeq #0xc0a81400 jt 16 jf 17 (016) ret #65535 (017) ret #0 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-20 17:27:32 +08:00
#endif
{
.procname = "netdev_tstamp_prequeue",
.data = &netdev_tstamp_prequeue,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "message_cost",
.data = &net_ratelimit_state.interval,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "message_burst",
.data = &net_ratelimit_state.burst,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "optmem_max",
.data = &sysctl_optmem_max,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tstamp_allow_data",
.data = &sysctl_tstamp_allow_data,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
rfs: Receive Flow Steering This patch implements receive flow steering (RFS). RFS steers received packets for layer 3 and 4 processing to the CPU where the application for the corresponding flow is running. RFS is an extension of Receive Packet Steering (RPS). The basic idea of RFS is that when an application calls recvmsg (or sendmsg) the application's running CPU is stored in a hash table that is indexed by the connection's rxhash which is stored in the socket structure. The rxhash is passed in skb's received on the connection from netif_receive_skb. For each received packet, the associated rxhash is used to look up the CPU in the hash table, if a valid CPU is set then the packet is steered to that CPU using the RPS mechanisms. The convolution of the simple approach is that it would potentially allow OOO packets. If threads are thrashing around CPUs or multiple threads are trying to read from the same sockets, a quickly changing CPU value in the hash table could cause rampant OOO packets-- we consider this a non-starter. To avoid OOO packets, this solution implements two types of hash tables: rps_sock_flow_table and rps_dev_flow_table. rps_sock_table is a global hash table. Each entry is just a CPU number and it is populated in recvmsg and sendmsg as described above. This table contains the "desired" CPUs for flows. rps_dev_flow_table is specific to each device queue. Each entry contains a CPU and a tail queue counter. The CPU is the "current" CPU for a matching flow. The tail queue counter holds the value of a tail queue counter for the associated CPU's backlog queue at the time of last enqueue for a flow matching the entry. Each backlog queue has a queue head counter which is incremented on dequeue, and so a queue tail counter is computed as queue head count + queue length. When a packet is enqueued on a backlog queue, the current value of the queue tail counter is saved in the hash entry of the rps_dev_flow_table. And now the trick: when selecting the CPU for RPS (get_rps_cpu) the rps_sock_flow table and the rps_dev_flow table for the RX queue are consulted. When the desired CPU for the flow (found in the rps_sock_flow table) does not match the current CPU (found in the rps_dev_flow table), the current CPU is changed to the desired CPU if one of the following is true: - The current CPU is unset (equal to RPS_NO_CPU) - Current CPU is offline - The current CPU's queue head counter >= queue tail counter in the rps_dev_flow table. This checks if the queue tail has advanced beyond the last packet that was enqueued using this table entry. This guarantees that all packets queued using this entry have been dequeued, thus preserving in order delivery. Making each queue have its own rps_dev_flow table has two advantages: 1) the tail queue counters will be written on each receive, so keeping the table local to interrupting CPU s good for locality. 2) this allows lockless access to the table-- the CPU number and queue tail counter need to be accessed together under mutual exclusion from netif_receive_skb, we assume that this is only called from device napi_poll which is non-reentrant. This patch implements RFS for TCP and connected UDP sockets. It should be usable for other flow oriented protocols. There are two configuration parameters for RFS. The "rps_flow_entries" kernel init parameter sets the number of entries in the rps_sock_flow_table, the per rxqueue sysfs entry "rps_flow_cnt" contains the number of entries in the rps_dev_flow table for the rxqueue. Both are rounded to power of two. The obvious benefit of RFS (over just RPS) is that it achieves CPU locality between the receive processing for a flow and the applications processing; this can result in increased performance (higher pps, lower latency). The benefits of RFS are dependent on cache hierarchy, application load, and other factors. On simple benchmarks, we don't necessarily see improvement and sometimes see degradation. However, for more complex benchmarks and for applications where cache pressure is much higher this technique seems to perform very well. Below are some benchmark results which show the potential benfit of this patch. The netperf test has 500 instances of netperf TCP_RR test with 1 byte req. and resp. The RPC test is an request/response test similar in structure to netperf RR test ith 100 threads on each host, but does more work in userspace that netperf. e1000e on 8 core Intel No RFS or RPS 104K tps at 30% CPU No RFS (best RPS config): 290K tps at 63% CPU RFS 303K tps at 61% CPU RPC test tps CPU% 50/90/99% usec latency Latency StdDev No RFS/RPS 103K 48% 757/900/3185 4472.35 RPS only: 174K 73% 415/993/2468 491.66 RFS 223K 73% 379/651/1382 315.61 Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-04-17 07:01:27 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
{
.procname = "rps_sock_flow_entries",
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = rps_sock_flow_sysctl
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_FLOW_LIMIT
{
.procname = "flow_limit_cpu_bitmap",
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = flow_limit_cpu_sysctl
},
{
.procname = "flow_limit_table_len",
.data = &netdev_flow_limit_table_len,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = flow_limit_table_len_sysctl
},
#endif /* CONFIG_NET_FLOW_LIMIT */
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
{
.procname = "busy_poll",
.data = &sysctl_net_busy_poll,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
.procname = "busy_read",
.data = &sysctl_net_busy_read,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED
{
.procname = "default_qdisc",
.mode = 0644,
.maxlen = IFNAMSIZ,
.proc_handler = set_default_qdisc
},
#endif
{
.procname = "netdev_budget",
.data = &netdev_budget,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "warnings",
.data = &net_msg_warn,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "max_skb_frags",
.data = &sysctl_max_skb_frags,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
.extra2 = &max_skb_frags,
},
{
.procname = "netdev_budget_usecs",
.data = &netdev_budget_usecs,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
.procname = "fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net",
.data = &sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &two,
},
net: introduce a knob to control whether to inherit devconf config There have been many people complaining about the inconsistent behaviors of IPv4 and IPv6 devconf when creating new network namespaces. Currently, for IPv4, we inherit all current settings from init_net, but for IPv6 we reset all setting to default. This patch introduces a new /proc file /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net to control the behavior of whether to inhert sysctl current settings from init_net. This file itself is only available in init_net. As demonstrated below: Initial setup in init_net: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Default value 0 (current behavior): # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to 1 (inherit from init_net): # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Set to 2 (reset to default): # echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 0 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to a value out of range (invalid): # echo 3 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument # echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument Reported-by: Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com> Reported-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-18 15:27:11 +08:00
{
.procname = "devconf_inherit_init_net",
.data = &sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &three,
net: introduce a knob to control whether to inherit devconf config There have been many people complaining about the inconsistent behaviors of IPv4 and IPv6 devconf when creating new network namespaces. Currently, for IPv4, we inherit all current settings from init_net, but for IPv6 we reset all setting to default. This patch introduces a new /proc file /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net to control the behavior of whether to inhert sysctl current settings from init_net. This file itself is only available in init_net. As demonstrated below: Initial setup in init_net: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Default value 0 (current behavior): # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to 1 (inherit from init_net): # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 2 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 1 Set to 2 (reset to default): # echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net # ip netns del test # ip netns add test # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter 0 # ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad 0 Set to a value out of range (invalid): # echo 3 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument # echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument Reported-by: Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com> Reported-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-18 15:27:11 +08:00
},
net: add high_order_alloc_disable sysctl/static key >From linux-3.7, (commit 5640f7685831 "net: use a per task frag allocator") TCP sendmsg() has preferred using order-3 allocations. While it gives good results for most cases, we had reports that heavy uses of TCP over loopback were hitting a spinlock contention in page allocations/freeing. This commits adds a sysctl so that admins can opt-in for order-0 allocations. Hopefully mm layer might optimize order-3 allocations in the future since it could give us a nice boost (see 8 lines of following benchmark) The following benchmark shows a win when more than 8 TCP_STREAM threads are running (56 x86 cores server in my tests) for thr in {1..30} do sysctl -wq net.core.high_order_alloc_disable=0 T0=`./super_netperf $thr -H 127.0.0.1 -l 15` sysctl -wq net.core.high_order_alloc_disable=1 T1=`./super_netperf $thr -H 127.0.0.1 -l 15` echo $thr:$T0:$T1 done 1: 49979: 37267 2: 98745: 76286 3: 141088: 110051 4: 177414: 144772 5: 197587: 173563 6: 215377: 208448 7: 241061: 234087 8: 267155: 263373 9: 295069: 297402 10: 312393: 335213 11: 340462: 368778 12: 371366: 403954 13: 412344: 443713 14: 426617: 473580 15: 474418: 507861 16: 503261: 538539 17: 522331: 563096 18: 532409: 567084 19: 550824: 605240 20: 525493: 641988 21: 564574: 665843 22: 567349: 690868 23: 583846: 710917 24: 588715: 736306 25: 603212: 763494 26: 604083: 792654 27: 602241: 796450 28: 604291: 797993 29: 611610: 833249 30: 577356: 841062 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-15 07:22:21 +08:00
{
.procname = "high_order_alloc_disable",
.data = &net_high_order_alloc_disable_key.key,
.maxlen = sizeof(net_high_order_alloc_disable_key),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_static_key,
},
{
.procname = "gro_normal_batch",
.data = &gro_normal_batch,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "netdev_unregister_timeout_secs",
.data = &netdev_unregister_timeout_secs,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
.extra2 = &int_3600,
},
{ }
};
static struct ctl_table netns_core_table[] = {
{
.procname = "somaxconn",
.data = &init_net.core.sysctl_somaxconn,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-19 06:58:50 +08:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax
},
{ }
};
static int __init fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net_sysctl_setup(char *str)
{
/* fallback tunnels for initns only */
if (!strncmp(str, "initns", 6))
sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net = 1;
/* no fallback tunnels anywhere */
else if (!strncmp(str, "none", 4))
sysctl_fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net = 2;
return 1;
}
__setup("fb_tunnels=", fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net_sysctl_setup);
static __net_init int sysctl_core_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *tbl;
tbl = netns_core_table;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
tbl = kmemdup(tbl, sizeof(netns_core_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tbl == NULL)
goto err_dup;
tbl[0].data = &net->core.sysctl_somaxconn;
/* Don't export any sysctls to unprivileged users */
if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
tbl[0].procname = NULL;
}
}
net->core.sysctl_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/core", tbl);
if (net->core.sysctl_hdr == NULL)
goto err_reg;
return 0;
err_reg:
if (tbl != netns_core_table)
kfree(tbl);
err_dup:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static __net_exit void sysctl_core_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *tbl;
tbl = net->core.sysctl_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->core.sysctl_hdr);
BUG_ON(tbl == netns_core_table);
kfree(tbl);
}
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations sysctl_core_ops = {
.init = sysctl_core_net_init,
.exit = sysctl_core_net_exit,
};
static __init int sysctl_core_init(void)
{
register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/core", net_core_table);
return register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_core_ops);
}
fs_initcall(sysctl_core_init);