OpenCloudOS-Kernel/drivers/thunderbolt/tb.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Thunderbolt driver - bus logic (NHI independent)
*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
* Copyright (C) 2018, Intel Corporation
*/
#ifndef TB_H_
#define TB_H_
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
#include <linux/nvmem-provider.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
#include <linux/thunderbolt.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include "tb_regs.h"
#include "ctl.h"
#include "dma_port.h"
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
/**
* struct tb_switch_nvm - Structure holding switch NVM information
* @major: Major version number of the active NVM portion
* @minor: Minor version number of the active NVM portion
* @id: Identifier used with both NVM portions
* @active: Active portion NVMem device
* @non_active: Non-active portion NVMem device
* @buf: Buffer where the NVM image is stored before it is written to
* the actual NVM flash device
* @buf_data_size: Number of bytes actually consumed by the new NVM
* image
* @authenticating: The switch is authenticating the new NVM
*/
struct tb_switch_nvm {
u8 major;
u8 minor;
int id;
struct nvmem_device *active;
struct nvmem_device *non_active;
void *buf;
size_t buf_data_size;
bool authenticating;
};
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
#define TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE 32
#define TB_SWITCH_MAX_DEPTH 6
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
/**
* struct tb_switch - a thunderbolt switch
* @dev: Device for the switch
* @config: Switch configuration
* @ports: Ports in this switch
* @dma_port: If the switch has port supporting DMA configuration based
* mailbox this will hold the pointer to that (%NULL
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
* otherwise). If set it also means the switch has
* upgradeable NVM.
* @tb: Pointer to the domain the switch belongs to
* @uid: Unique ID of the switch
* @uuid: UUID of the switch (or %NULL if not supported)
* @vendor: Vendor ID of the switch
* @device: Device ID of the switch
* @vendor_name: Name of the vendor (or %NULL if not known)
* @device_name: Name of the device (or %NULL if not known)
* @generation: Switch Thunderbolt generation
* @cap_plug_events: Offset to the plug events capability (%0 if not found)
* @cap_lc: Offset to the link controller capability (%0 if not found)
* @is_unplugged: The switch is going away
* @drom: DROM of the switch (%NULL if not found)
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
* @nvm: Pointer to the NVM if the switch has one (%NULL otherwise)
* @no_nvm_upgrade: Prevent NVM upgrade of this switch
* @safe_mode: The switch is in safe-mode
* @boot: Whether the switch was already authorized on boot or not
* @rpm: The switch supports runtime PM
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
* @authorized: Whether the switch is authorized by user or policy
* @security_level: Switch supported security level
* @key: Contains the key used to challenge the device or %NULL if not
* supported. Size of the key is %TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE.
* @connection_id: Connection ID used with ICM messaging
* @connection_key: Connection key used with ICM messaging
* @link: Root switch link this switch is connected (ICM only)
* @depth: Depth in the chain this switch is connected (ICM only)
* @rpm_complete: Completion used to wait for runtime resume to
* complete (ICM only)
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
*
* When the switch is being added or removed to the domain (other
thunderbolt: Take domain lock in switch sysfs attribute callbacks switch_lock was introduced because it allowed serialization of device authorization requests from userspace without need to take the big domain lock (tb->lock). This was fine because device authorization with ICM is just one command that is sent to the firmware. Now that we start to handle all tunneling in the driver switch_lock is not enough because we need to walk over the topology to establish paths. For this reason drop switch_lock from the driver completely in favour of big domain lock. There is one complication, though. If userspace is waiting for the lock in tb_switch_set_authorized(), it keeps the device_del() from removing the sysfs attribute because it waits for active users to release the attribute first which leads into following splat: INFO: task kworker/u8:3:73 blocked for more than 61 seconds. Tainted: G W 5.1.0-rc1+ #244 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. kworker/u8:3 D12976 73 2 0x80000000 Workqueue: thunderbolt0 tb_handle_hotplug [thunderbolt] Call Trace: ? __schedule+0x2e5/0x740 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x40 ? prepare_to_wait_event+0xc5/0x160 schedule+0x2d/0x80 __kernfs_remove.part.17+0x183/0x1f0 ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x4a/0x90 remove_files.isra.1+0x2b/0x60 sysfs_remove_group+0x38/0x80 sysfs_remove_groups+0x24/0x40 device_remove_attrs+0x3d/0x70 device_del+0x14c/0x360 device_unregister+0x15/0x50 tb_switch_remove+0x9e/0x1d0 [thunderbolt] tb_handle_hotplug+0x119/0x5a0 [thunderbolt] ? process_one_work+0x1b7/0x420 process_one_work+0x1b7/0x420 worker_thread+0x37/0x380 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf/0x30 ? process_one_work+0x420/0x420 kthread+0x118/0x130 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 We deal this by following what network stack did for some of their attributes and use mutex_trylock() with restart_syscall(). This makes userspace release the attribute allowing sysfs attribute removal to progress before the write is restarted and eventually fail when the attribute is removed. Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2019-03-19 22:48:41 +08:00
* switches) you need to have domain lock held.
*/
struct tb_switch {
struct device dev;
struct tb_regs_switch_header config;
struct tb_port *ports;
struct tb_dma_port *dma_port;
struct tb *tb;
u64 uid;
uuid_t *uuid;
u16 vendor;
u16 device;
const char *vendor_name;
const char *device_name;
unsigned int generation;
int cap_plug_events;
int cap_lc;
bool is_unplugged;
u8 *drom;
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
struct tb_switch_nvm *nvm;
bool no_nvm_upgrade;
bool safe_mode;
bool boot;
bool rpm;
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
unsigned int authorized;
enum tb_security_level security_level;
u8 *key;
u8 connection_id;
u8 connection_key;
u8 link;
u8 depth;
struct completion rpm_complete;
};
/**
* struct tb_port - a thunderbolt port, part of a tb_switch
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
* @config: Cached port configuration read from registers
* @sw: Switch the port belongs to
* @remote: Remote port (%NULL if not connected)
* @xdomain: Remote host (%NULL if not connected)
* @cap_phy: Offset, zero if not found
* @cap_adap: Offset of the adapter specific capability (%0 if not present)
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
* @port: Port number on switch
* @disabled: Disabled by eeprom
* @dual_link_port: If the switch is connected using two ports, points
* to the other port.
* @link_nr: Is this primary or secondary port on the dual_link.
* @in_hopids: Currently allocated input HopIDs
* @out_hopids: Currently allocated output HopIDs
*/
struct tb_port {
struct tb_regs_port_header config;
struct tb_switch *sw;
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
struct tb_port *remote;
struct tb_xdomain *xdomain;
int cap_phy;
int cap_adap;
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
u8 port;
bool disabled;
struct tb_port *dual_link_port;
u8 link_nr:1;
struct ida in_hopids;
struct ida out_hopids;
};
/**
* struct tb_path_hop - routing information for a tb_path
* @in_port: Ingress port of a switch
* @out_port: Egress port of a switch where the packet is routed out
* (must be on the same switch than @in_port)
* @in_hop_index: HopID where the path configuration entry is placed in
* the path config space of @in_port.
* @in_counter_index: Used counter index (not used in the driver
* currently, %-1 to disable)
* @next_hop_index: HopID of the packet when it is routed out from @out_port
* @initial_credits: Number of initial flow control credits allocated for
* the path
*
* Hop configuration is always done on the IN port of a switch.
* in_port and out_port have to be on the same switch. Packets arriving on
* in_port with "hop" = in_hop_index will get routed to through out_port. The
* next hop to take (on out_port->remote) is determined by
* next_hop_index. When routing packet to another switch (out->remote is
* set) the @next_hop_index must match the @in_hop_index of that next
* hop to make routing possible.
*
* in_counter_index is the index of a counter (in TB_CFG_COUNTERS) on the in
* port.
*/
struct tb_path_hop {
struct tb_port *in_port;
struct tb_port *out_port;
int in_hop_index;
int in_counter_index;
int next_hop_index;
unsigned int initial_credits;
};
/**
* enum tb_path_port - path options mask
* @TB_PATH_NONE: Do not activate on any hop on path
* @TB_PATH_SOURCE: Activate on the first hop (out of src)
* @TB_PATH_INTERNAL: Activate on the intermediate hops (not the first/last)
* @TB_PATH_DESTINATION: Activate on the last hop (into dst)
* @TB_PATH_ALL: Activate on all hops on the path
*/
enum tb_path_port {
TB_PATH_NONE = 0,
TB_PATH_SOURCE = 1,
TB_PATH_INTERNAL = 2,
TB_PATH_DESTINATION = 4,
TB_PATH_ALL = 7,
};
/**
* struct tb_path - a unidirectional path between two ports
* @tb: Pointer to the domain structure
* @name: Name of the path (used for debugging)
* @nfc_credits: Number of non flow controlled credits allocated for the path
* @ingress_shared_buffer: Shared buffering used for ingress ports on the path
* @egress_shared_buffer: Shared buffering used for egress ports on the path
* @ingress_fc_enable: Flow control for ingress ports on the path
* @egress_fc_enable: Flow control for egress ports on the path
* @priority: Priority group if the path
* @weight: Weight of the path inside the priority group
* @drop_packages: Drop packages from queue tail or head
* @activated: Is the path active
* @clear_fc: Clear all flow control from the path config space entries
* when deactivating this path
* @hops: Path hops
* @path_length: How many hops the path uses
*
* A path consists of a number of hops (see &struct tb_path_hop). To
* establish a PCIe tunnel two paths have to be created between the two
* PCIe ports.
*/
struct tb_path {
struct tb *tb;
const char *name;
int nfc_credits;
enum tb_path_port ingress_shared_buffer;
enum tb_path_port egress_shared_buffer;
enum tb_path_port ingress_fc_enable;
enum tb_path_port egress_fc_enable;
unsigned int priority:3;
int weight:4;
bool drop_packages;
bool activated;
bool clear_fc;
struct tb_path_hop *hops;
int path_length;
};
/* HopIDs 0-7 are reserved by the Thunderbolt protocol */
#define TB_PATH_MIN_HOPID 8
#define TB_PATH_MAX_HOPS 7
/**
* struct tb_cm_ops - Connection manager specific operations vector
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
* @driver_ready: Called right after control channel is started. Used by
* ICM to send driver ready message to the firmware.
* @start: Starts the domain
* @stop: Stops the domain
* @suspend_noirq: Connection manager specific suspend_noirq
* @resume_noirq: Connection manager specific resume_noirq
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
* @suspend: Connection manager specific suspend
* @complete: Connection manager specific complete
* @runtime_suspend: Connection manager specific runtime_suspend
* @runtime_resume: Connection manager specific runtime_resume
* @runtime_suspend_switch: Runtime suspend a switch
* @runtime_resume_switch: Runtime resume a switch
* @handle_event: Handle thunderbolt event
* @get_boot_acl: Get boot ACL list
* @set_boot_acl: Set boot ACL list
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
* @approve_switch: Approve switch
* @add_switch_key: Add key to switch
* @challenge_switch_key: Challenge switch using key
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
* @disconnect_pcie_paths: Disconnects PCIe paths before NVM update
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
* @approve_xdomain_paths: Approve (establish) XDomain DMA paths
* @disconnect_xdomain_paths: Disconnect XDomain DMA paths
*/
struct tb_cm_ops {
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
int (*driver_ready)(struct tb *tb);
int (*start)(struct tb *tb);
void (*stop)(struct tb *tb);
int (*suspend_noirq)(struct tb *tb);
int (*resume_noirq)(struct tb *tb);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
int (*suspend)(struct tb *tb);
void (*complete)(struct tb *tb);
int (*runtime_suspend)(struct tb *tb);
int (*runtime_resume)(struct tb *tb);
int (*runtime_suspend_switch)(struct tb_switch *sw);
int (*runtime_resume_switch)(struct tb_switch *sw);
void (*handle_event)(struct tb *tb, enum tb_cfg_pkg_type,
const void *buf, size_t size);
int (*get_boot_acl)(struct tb *tb, uuid_t *uuids, size_t nuuids);
int (*set_boot_acl)(struct tb *tb, const uuid_t *uuids, size_t nuuids);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
int (*approve_switch)(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw);
int (*add_switch_key)(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw);
int (*challenge_switch_key)(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw,
const u8 *challenge, u8 *response);
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
int (*disconnect_pcie_paths)(struct tb *tb);
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
int (*approve_xdomain_paths)(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd);
int (*disconnect_xdomain_paths)(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd);
};
static inline void *tb_priv(struct tb *tb)
{
return (void *)tb->privdata;
}
#define TB_AUTOSUSPEND_DELAY 15000 /* ms */
/* helper functions & macros */
/**
* tb_upstream_port() - return the upstream port of a switch
*
* Every switch has an upstream port (for the root switch it is the NHI).
*
* During switch alloc/init tb_upstream_port()->remote may be NULL, even for
* non root switches (on the NHI port remote is always NULL).
*
* Return: Returns the upstream port of the switch.
*/
static inline struct tb_port *tb_upstream_port(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
return &sw->ports[sw->config.upstream_port_number];
}
/**
* tb_is_upstream_port() - Is the port upstream facing
* @port: Port to check
*
* Returns true if @port is upstream facing port. In case of dual link
* ports both return true.
*/
static inline bool tb_is_upstream_port(const struct tb_port *port)
{
const struct tb_port *upstream_port = tb_upstream_port(port->sw);
return port == upstream_port || port->dual_link_port == upstream_port;
}
static inline u64 tb_route(const struct tb_switch *sw)
{
return ((u64) sw->config.route_hi) << 32 | sw->config.route_lo;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
static inline struct tb_port *tb_port_at(u64 route, struct tb_switch *sw)
{
u8 port;
port = route >> (sw->config.depth * 8);
if (WARN_ON(port > sw->config.max_port_number))
return NULL;
return &sw->ports[port];
}
/**
* tb_port_has_remote() - Does the port have switch connected downstream
* @port: Port to check
*
* Returns true only when the port is primary port and has remote set.
*/
static inline bool tb_port_has_remote(const struct tb_port *port)
{
if (tb_is_upstream_port(port))
return false;
if (!port->remote)
return false;
if (port->dual_link_port && port->link_nr)
return false;
return true;
}
static inline bool tb_port_is_null(const struct tb_port *port)
{
return port && port->port && port->config.type == TB_TYPE_PORT;
}
static inline bool tb_port_is_pcie_down(const struct tb_port *port)
{
return port && port->config.type == TB_TYPE_PCIE_DOWN;
}
static inline bool tb_port_is_pcie_up(const struct tb_port *port)
{
return port && port->config.type == TB_TYPE_PCIE_UP;
}
static inline bool tb_port_is_dpin(const struct tb_port *port)
{
return port && port->config.type == TB_TYPE_DP_HDMI_IN;
}
static inline bool tb_port_is_dpout(const struct tb_port *port)
{
return port && port->config.type == TB_TYPE_DP_HDMI_OUT;
}
static inline int tb_sw_read(struct tb_switch *sw, void *buffer,
enum tb_cfg_space space, u32 offset, u32 length)
{
if (sw->is_unplugged)
return -ENODEV;
return tb_cfg_read(sw->tb->ctl,
buffer,
tb_route(sw),
0,
space,
offset,
length);
}
static inline int tb_sw_write(struct tb_switch *sw, void *buffer,
enum tb_cfg_space space, u32 offset, u32 length)
{
if (sw->is_unplugged)
return -ENODEV;
return tb_cfg_write(sw->tb->ctl,
buffer,
tb_route(sw),
0,
space,
offset,
length);
}
static inline int tb_port_read(struct tb_port *port, void *buffer,
enum tb_cfg_space space, u32 offset, u32 length)
{
if (port->sw->is_unplugged)
return -ENODEV;
return tb_cfg_read(port->sw->tb->ctl,
buffer,
tb_route(port->sw),
port->port,
space,
offset,
length);
}
static inline int tb_port_write(struct tb_port *port, const void *buffer,
enum tb_cfg_space space, u32 offset, u32 length)
{
if (port->sw->is_unplugged)
return -ENODEV;
return tb_cfg_write(port->sw->tb->ctl,
buffer,
tb_route(port->sw),
port->port,
space,
offset,
length);
}
#define tb_err(tb, fmt, arg...) dev_err(&(tb)->nhi->pdev->dev, fmt, ## arg)
#define tb_WARN(tb, fmt, arg...) dev_WARN(&(tb)->nhi->pdev->dev, fmt, ## arg)
#define tb_warn(tb, fmt, arg...) dev_warn(&(tb)->nhi->pdev->dev, fmt, ## arg)
#define tb_info(tb, fmt, arg...) dev_info(&(tb)->nhi->pdev->dev, fmt, ## arg)
#define tb_dbg(tb, fmt, arg...) dev_dbg(&(tb)->nhi->pdev->dev, fmt, ## arg)
#define __TB_SW_PRINT(level, sw, fmt, arg...) \
do { \
const struct tb_switch *__sw = (sw); \
level(__sw->tb, "%llx: " fmt, \
tb_route(__sw), ## arg); \
} while (0)
#define tb_sw_WARN(sw, fmt, arg...) __TB_SW_PRINT(tb_WARN, sw, fmt, ##arg)
#define tb_sw_warn(sw, fmt, arg...) __TB_SW_PRINT(tb_warn, sw, fmt, ##arg)
#define tb_sw_info(sw, fmt, arg...) __TB_SW_PRINT(tb_info, sw, fmt, ##arg)
#define tb_sw_dbg(sw, fmt, arg...) __TB_SW_PRINT(tb_dbg, sw, fmt, ##arg)
#define __TB_PORT_PRINT(level, _port, fmt, arg...) \
do { \
const struct tb_port *__port = (_port); \
level(__port->sw->tb, "%llx:%x: " fmt, \
tb_route(__port->sw), __port->port, ## arg); \
} while (0)
#define tb_port_WARN(port, fmt, arg...) \
__TB_PORT_PRINT(tb_WARN, port, fmt, ##arg)
#define tb_port_warn(port, fmt, arg...) \
__TB_PORT_PRINT(tb_warn, port, fmt, ##arg)
#define tb_port_info(port, fmt, arg...) \
__TB_PORT_PRINT(tb_info, port, fmt, ##arg)
#define tb_port_dbg(port, fmt, arg...) \
__TB_PORT_PRINT(tb_dbg, port, fmt, ##arg)
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
struct tb *icm_probe(struct tb_nhi *nhi);
struct tb *tb_probe(struct tb_nhi *nhi);
extern struct device_type tb_domain_type;
extern struct device_type tb_switch_type;
int tb_domain_init(void);
void tb_domain_exit(void);
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
void tb_switch_exit(void);
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
int tb_xdomain_init(void);
void tb_xdomain_exit(void);
struct tb *tb_domain_alloc(struct tb_nhi *nhi, size_t privsize);
int tb_domain_add(struct tb *tb);
void tb_domain_remove(struct tb *tb);
int tb_domain_suspend_noirq(struct tb *tb);
int tb_domain_resume_noirq(struct tb *tb);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
int tb_domain_suspend(struct tb *tb);
void tb_domain_complete(struct tb *tb);
int tb_domain_runtime_suspend(struct tb *tb);
int tb_domain_runtime_resume(struct tb *tb);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
int tb_domain_approve_switch(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_domain_approve_switch_key(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_domain_challenge_switch_key(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw);
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
int tb_domain_disconnect_pcie_paths(struct tb *tb);
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
int tb_domain_approve_xdomain_paths(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd);
int tb_domain_disconnect_xdomain_paths(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd);
int tb_domain_disconnect_all_paths(struct tb *tb);
static inline struct tb *tb_domain_get(struct tb *tb)
{
if (tb)
get_device(&tb->dev);
return tb;
}
static inline void tb_domain_put(struct tb *tb)
{
put_device(&tb->dev);
}
struct tb_switch *tb_switch_alloc(struct tb *tb, struct device *parent,
u64 route);
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
struct tb_switch *tb_switch_alloc_safe_mode(struct tb *tb,
struct device *parent, u64 route);
int tb_switch_configure(struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_switch_add(struct tb_switch *sw);
void tb_switch_remove(struct tb_switch *sw);
void tb_switch_suspend(struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_switch_resume(struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_switch_reset(struct tb *tb, u64 route);
void tb_sw_set_unplugged(struct tb_switch *sw);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
struct tb_switch *tb_switch_find_by_link_depth(struct tb *tb, u8 link,
u8 depth);
struct tb_switch *tb_switch_find_by_uuid(struct tb *tb, const uuid_t *uuid);
struct tb_switch *tb_switch_find_by_route(struct tb *tb, u64 route);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
static inline struct tb_switch *tb_switch_get(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
if (sw)
get_device(&sw->dev);
return sw;
}
static inline void tb_switch_put(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
put_device(&sw->dev);
}
static inline bool tb_is_switch(const struct device *dev)
{
return dev->type == &tb_switch_type;
}
static inline struct tb_switch *tb_to_switch(struct device *dev)
{
if (tb_is_switch(dev))
return container_of(dev, struct tb_switch, dev);
return NULL;
}
static inline struct tb_switch *tb_switch_parent(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
return tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent);
}
static inline bool tb_switch_is_lr(const struct tb_switch *sw)
{
return sw->config.device_id == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_LIGHT_RIDGE;
}
static inline bool tb_switch_is_er(const struct tb_switch *sw)
{
return sw->config.device_id == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_EAGLE_RIDGE;
}
static inline bool tb_switch_is_cr(const struct tb_switch *sw)
{
switch (sw->config.device_id) {
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CACTUS_RIDGE_2C:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CACTUS_RIDGE_4C:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
static inline bool tb_switch_is_fr(const struct tb_switch *sw)
{
switch (sw->config.device_id) {
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_FALCON_RIDGE_2C_BRIDGE:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_FALCON_RIDGE_4C_BRIDGE:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
int tb_wait_for_port(struct tb_port *port, bool wait_if_unplugged);
int tb_port_add_nfc_credits(struct tb_port *port, int credits);
int tb_port_set_initial_credits(struct tb_port *port, u32 credits);
int tb_port_clear_counter(struct tb_port *port, int counter);
int tb_port_alloc_in_hopid(struct tb_port *port, int hopid, int max_hopid);
void tb_port_release_in_hopid(struct tb_port *port, int hopid);
int tb_port_alloc_out_hopid(struct tb_port *port, int hopid, int max_hopid);
void tb_port_release_out_hopid(struct tb_port *port, int hopid);
struct tb_port *tb_next_port_on_path(struct tb_port *start, struct tb_port *end,
struct tb_port *prev);
int tb_switch_find_vse_cap(struct tb_switch *sw, enum tb_switch_vse_cap vsec);
int tb_port_find_cap(struct tb_port *port, enum tb_port_cap cap);
bool tb_port_is_enabled(struct tb_port *port);
bool tb_pci_port_is_enabled(struct tb_port *port);
int tb_pci_port_enable(struct tb_port *port, bool enable);
int tb_dp_port_hpd_is_active(struct tb_port *port);
int tb_dp_port_hpd_clear(struct tb_port *port);
int tb_dp_port_set_hops(struct tb_port *port, unsigned int video,
unsigned int aux_tx, unsigned int aux_rx);
bool tb_dp_port_is_enabled(struct tb_port *port);
int tb_dp_port_enable(struct tb_port *port, bool enable);
struct tb_path *tb_path_discover(struct tb_port *src, int src_hopid,
struct tb_port *dst, int dst_hopid,
struct tb_port **last, const char *name);
struct tb_path *tb_path_alloc(struct tb *tb, struct tb_port *src, int src_hopid,
struct tb_port *dst, int dst_hopid, int link_nr,
const char *name);
void tb_path_free(struct tb_path *path);
int tb_path_activate(struct tb_path *path);
void tb_path_deactivate(struct tb_path *path);
bool tb_path_is_invalid(struct tb_path *path);
int tb_drom_read(struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_drom_read_uid_only(struct tb_switch *sw, u64 *uid);
int tb_lc_read_uuid(struct tb_switch *sw, u32 *uuid);
int tb_lc_configure_link(struct tb_switch *sw);
void tb_lc_unconfigure_link(struct tb_switch *sw);
int tb_lc_set_sleep(struct tb_switch *sw);
static inline int tb_route_length(u64 route)
{
return (fls64(route) + TB_ROUTE_SHIFT - 1) / TB_ROUTE_SHIFT;
}
/**
* tb_downstream_route() - get route to downstream switch
*
* Port must not be the upstream port (otherwise a loop is created).
*
* Return: Returns a route to the switch behind @port.
*/
static inline u64 tb_downstream_route(struct tb_port *port)
{
return tb_route(port->sw)
| ((u64) port->port << (port->sw->config.depth * 8));
}
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 18:38:34 +08:00
bool tb_xdomain_handle_request(struct tb *tb, enum tb_cfg_pkg_type type,
const void *buf, size_t size);
struct tb_xdomain *tb_xdomain_alloc(struct tb *tb, struct device *parent,
u64 route, const uuid_t *local_uuid,
const uuid_t *remote_uuid);
void tb_xdomain_add(struct tb_xdomain *xd);
void tb_xdomain_remove(struct tb_xdomain *xd);
struct tb_xdomain *tb_xdomain_find_by_link_depth(struct tb *tb, u8 link,
u8 depth);
#endif