OpenCloudOS-Kernel/include/linux/dax.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _LINUX_DAX_H
#define _LINUX_DAX_H
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
/* Flag for synchronous flush */
#define DAXDEV_F_SYNC (1UL << 0)
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-01 00:05:06 +08:00
typedef unsigned long dax_entry_t;
struct iomap_ops;
struct iomap;
struct dax_device;
struct dax_operations {
/*
* direct_access: translate a device-relative
* logical-page-offset into an absolute physical pfn. Return the
* number of pages available for DAX at that pfn.
*/
long (*direct_access)(struct dax_device *, pgoff_t, long,
void **, pfn_t *);
dax: Arrange for dax_supported check to span multiple devices Pankaj reports that starting with commit ad428cdb525a "dax: Check the end of the block-device capacity with dax_direct_access()" device-mapper no longer allows dax operation. This results from the stricter checks in __bdev_dax_supported() that validate that the start and end of a block-device map to the same 'pagemap' instance. Teach the dax-core and device-mapper to validate the 'pagemap' on a per-target basis. This is accomplished by refactoring the bdev_dax_supported() internals into generic_fsdax_supported() which takes a sector range to validate. Consequently generic_fsdax_supported() is suitable to be used in a device-mapper ->iterate_devices() callback. A new ->dax_supported() operation is added to allow composite devices to split and route upper-level bdev_dax_supported() requests. Fixes: ad428cdb525a ("dax: Check the end of the block-device...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reported-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2019-05-17 04:26:29 +08:00
/*
* Validate whether this device is usable as an fsdax backing
* device.
*/
bool (*dax_supported)(struct dax_device *, struct block_device *, int,
sector_t, sector_t);
/* copy_from_iter: required operation for fs-dax direct-i/o */
x86, uaccess: introduce copy_from_iter_flushcache for pmem / cache-bypass operations The pmem driver has a need to transfer data with a persistent memory destination and be able to rely on the fact that the destination writes are not cached. It is sufficient for the writes to be flushed to a cpu-store-buffer (non-temporal / "movnt" in x86 terms), as we expect userspace to call fsync() to ensure data-writes have reached a power-fail-safe zone in the platform. The fsync() triggers a REQ_FUA or REQ_FLUSH to the pmem driver which will turn around and fence previous writes with an "sfence". Implement a __copy_from_user_inatomic_flushcache, memcpy_page_flushcache, and memcpy_flushcache, that guarantee that the destination buffer is not dirty in the cpu cache on completion. The new copy_from_iter_flushcache and sub-routines will be used to replace the "pmem api" (include/linux/pmem.h + arch/x86/include/asm/pmem.h). The availability of copy_from_iter_flushcache() and memcpy_flushcache() are gated by the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE config symbol, and fallback to copy_from_iter_nocache() and plain memcpy() otherwise. This is meant to satisfy the concern from Linus that if a driver wants to do something beyond the normal nocache semantics it should be something private to that driver [1], and Al's concern that anything uaccess related belongs with the rest of the uaccess code [2]. The first consumer of this interface is a new 'copy_from_iter' dax operation so that pmem can inject cache maintenance operations without imposing this overhead on other dax-capable drivers. [1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-January/008364.html [2]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-April/009942.html Cc: <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2017-05-30 03:22:50 +08:00
size_t (*copy_from_iter)(struct dax_device *, pgoff_t, void *, size_t,
struct iov_iter *);
/* copy_to_iter: required operation for fs-dax direct-i/o */
size_t (*copy_to_iter)(struct dax_device *, pgoff_t, void *, size_t,
struct iov_iter *);
/* zero_page_range: required operation. Zero page range */
int (*zero_page_range)(struct dax_device *, pgoff_t, size_t);
};
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DAX)
struct dax_device *alloc_dax(void *private, const char *host,
const struct dax_operations *ops, unsigned long flags);
void put_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
void kill_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
void dax_write_cache(struct dax_device *dax_dev, bool wc);
bool dax_write_cache_enabled(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
bool __dax_synchronous(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
static inline bool dax_synchronous(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
return __dax_synchronous(dax_dev);
}
void __set_dax_synchronous(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
static inline void set_dax_synchronous(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
__set_dax_synchronous(dax_dev);
}
/*
* Check if given mapping is supported by the file / underlying device.
*/
static inline bool daxdev_mapping_supported(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SYNC))
return true;
if (!IS_DAX(file_inode(vma->vm_file)))
return false;
return dax_synchronous(dax_dev);
}
#else
static inline struct dax_device *alloc_dax(void *private, const char *host,
const struct dax_operations *ops, unsigned long flags)
{
/*
* Callers should check IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DAX) to know if this
* NULL is an error or expected.
*/
return NULL;
}
static inline void put_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
}
static inline void kill_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
}
static inline void dax_write_cache(struct dax_device *dax_dev, bool wc)
{
}
static inline bool dax_write_cache_enabled(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
return false;
}
static inline bool dax_synchronous(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
return true;
}
static inline void set_dax_synchronous(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
}
static inline bool daxdev_mapping_supported(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
return !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SYNC);
}
#endif
struct writeback_control;
int bdev_dax_pgoff(struct block_device *, sector_t, size_t, pgoff_t *pgoff);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_DAX)
bool generic_fsdax_supported(struct dax_device *dax_dev,
dax: Arrange for dax_supported check to span multiple devices Pankaj reports that starting with commit ad428cdb525a "dax: Check the end of the block-device capacity with dax_direct_access()" device-mapper no longer allows dax operation. This results from the stricter checks in __bdev_dax_supported() that validate that the start and end of a block-device map to the same 'pagemap' instance. Teach the dax-core and device-mapper to validate the 'pagemap' on a per-target basis. This is accomplished by refactoring the bdev_dax_supported() internals into generic_fsdax_supported() which takes a sector range to validate. Consequently generic_fsdax_supported() is suitable to be used in a device-mapper ->iterate_devices() callback. A new ->dax_supported() operation is added to allow composite devices to split and route upper-level bdev_dax_supported() requests. Fixes: ad428cdb525a ("dax: Check the end of the block-device...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reported-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2019-05-17 04:26:29 +08:00
struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize, sector_t start,
sector_t sectors);
bool dax_supported(struct dax_device *dax_dev, struct block_device *bdev,
int blocksize, sector_t start, sector_t len);
static inline void fs_put_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
put_dax(dax_dev);
}
struct dax_device *fs_dax_get_by_bdev(struct block_device *bdev);
int dax_writeback_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping,
struct dax_device *dax_dev, struct writeback_control *wbc);
mm, fs, dax: handle layout changes to pinned dax mappings Background: get_user_pages() in the filesystem pins file backed memory pages for access by devices performing dma. However, it only pins the memory pages not the page-to-file offset association. If a file is truncated the pages are mapped out of the file and dma may continue indefinitely into a page that is owned by a device driver. This breaks coherency of the file vs dma, but the assumption is that if userspace wants the file-space truncated it does not matter what data is inbound from the device, it is not relevant anymore. The only expectation is that dma can safely continue while the filesystem reallocates the block(s). Problem: This expectation that dma can safely continue while the filesystem changes the block map is broken by dax. With dax the target dma page *is* the filesystem block. The model of leaving the page pinned for dma, but truncating the file block out of the file, means that the filesytem is free to reallocate a block under active dma to another file and now the expected data-incoherency situation has turned into active data-corruption. Solution: Defer all filesystem operations (fallocate(), truncate()) on a dax mode file while any page/block in the file is under active dma. This solution assumes that dma is transient. Cases where dma operations are known to not be transient, like RDMA, have been explicitly disabled via commits like 5f1d43de5416 "IB/core: disable memory registration of filesystem-dax vmas". The dax_layout_busy_page() routine is called by filesystems with a lock held against mm faults (i_mmap_lock) to find pinned / busy dax pages. The process of looking up a busy page invalidates all mappings to trigger any subsequent get_user_pages() to block on i_mmap_lock. The filesystem continues to call dax_layout_busy_page() until it finally returns no more active pages. This approach assumes that the page pinning is transient, if that assumption is violated the system would have likely hung from the uncompleted I/O. Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-03-10 09:44:31 +08:00
struct page *dax_layout_busy_page(struct address_space *mapping);
struct page *dax_layout_busy_page_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t start, loff_t end);
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-01 00:05:06 +08:00
dax_entry_t dax_lock_page(struct page *page);
void dax_unlock_page(struct page *page, dax_entry_t cookie);
#else
#define generic_fsdax_supported NULL
dax: Arrange for dax_supported check to span multiple devices Pankaj reports that starting with commit ad428cdb525a "dax: Check the end of the block-device capacity with dax_direct_access()" device-mapper no longer allows dax operation. This results from the stricter checks in __bdev_dax_supported() that validate that the start and end of a block-device map to the same 'pagemap' instance. Teach the dax-core and device-mapper to validate the 'pagemap' on a per-target basis. This is accomplished by refactoring the bdev_dax_supported() internals into generic_fsdax_supported() which takes a sector range to validate. Consequently generic_fsdax_supported() is suitable to be used in a device-mapper ->iterate_devices() callback. A new ->dax_supported() operation is added to allow composite devices to split and route upper-level bdev_dax_supported() requests. Fixes: ad428cdb525a ("dax: Check the end of the block-device...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reported-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2019-05-17 04:26:29 +08:00
static inline bool dax_supported(struct dax_device *dax_dev,
struct block_device *bdev, int blocksize, sector_t start,
sector_t len)
{
return false;
}
static inline void fs_put_dax(struct dax_device *dax_dev)
{
}
static inline struct dax_device *fs_dax_get_by_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
{
return NULL;
}
mm, fs, dax: handle layout changes to pinned dax mappings Background: get_user_pages() in the filesystem pins file backed memory pages for access by devices performing dma. However, it only pins the memory pages not the page-to-file offset association. If a file is truncated the pages are mapped out of the file and dma may continue indefinitely into a page that is owned by a device driver. This breaks coherency of the file vs dma, but the assumption is that if userspace wants the file-space truncated it does not matter what data is inbound from the device, it is not relevant anymore. The only expectation is that dma can safely continue while the filesystem reallocates the block(s). Problem: This expectation that dma can safely continue while the filesystem changes the block map is broken by dax. With dax the target dma page *is* the filesystem block. The model of leaving the page pinned for dma, but truncating the file block out of the file, means that the filesytem is free to reallocate a block under active dma to another file and now the expected data-incoherency situation has turned into active data-corruption. Solution: Defer all filesystem operations (fallocate(), truncate()) on a dax mode file while any page/block in the file is under active dma. This solution assumes that dma is transient. Cases where dma operations are known to not be transient, like RDMA, have been explicitly disabled via commits like 5f1d43de5416 "IB/core: disable memory registration of filesystem-dax vmas". The dax_layout_busy_page() routine is called by filesystems with a lock held against mm faults (i_mmap_lock) to find pinned / busy dax pages. The process of looking up a busy page invalidates all mappings to trigger any subsequent get_user_pages() to block on i_mmap_lock. The filesystem continues to call dax_layout_busy_page() until it finally returns no more active pages. This approach assumes that the page pinning is transient, if that assumption is violated the system would have likely hung from the uncompleted I/O. Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-03-10 09:44:31 +08:00
static inline struct page *dax_layout_busy_page(struct address_space *mapping)
{
return NULL;
}
static inline struct page *dax_layout_busy_page_range(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t nr_pages)
{
return NULL;
}
static inline int dax_writeback_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping,
struct dax_device *dax_dev, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-01 00:05:06 +08:00
static inline dax_entry_t dax_lock_page(struct page *page)
{
if (IS_DAX(page->mapping->host))
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-01 00:05:06 +08:00
return ~0UL;
return 0;
}
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-01 00:05:06 +08:00
static inline void dax_unlock_page(struct page *page, dax_entry_t cookie)
{
}
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DAX)
int dax_read_lock(void);
void dax_read_unlock(int id);
#else
static inline int dax_read_lock(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void dax_read_unlock(int id)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_DAX */
bool dax_alive(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
void *dax_get_private(struct dax_device *dax_dev);
long dax_direct_access(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff, long nr_pages,
void **kaddr, pfn_t *pfn);
size_t dax_copy_from_iter(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff, void *addr,
size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
size_t dax_copy_to_iter(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff, void *addr,
size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i);
int dax_zero_page_range(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff,
size_t nr_pages);
void dax_flush(struct dax_device *dax_dev, void *addr, size_t size);
ssize_t dax_iomap_rw(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
const struct iomap_ops *ops);
vm_fault_t dax_iomap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, enum page_entry_size pe_size,
pfn_t *pfnp, int *errp, const struct iomap_ops *ops);
vm_fault_t dax_finish_sync_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf,
enum page_entry_size pe_size, pfn_t pfn);
int dax_delete_mapping_entry(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index);
int dax_invalidate_mapping_entry_sync(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index);
s64 dax_iomap_zero(loff_t pos, u64 length, struct iomap *iomap);
dax: support dirty DAX entries in radix tree Add support for tracking dirty DAX entries in the struct address_space radix tree. This tree is already used for dirty page writeback, and it already supports the use of exceptional (non struct page*) entries. In order to properly track dirty DAX pages we will insert new exceptional entries into the radix tree that represent dirty DAX PTE or PMD pages. These exceptional entries will also contain the writeback addresses for the PTE or PMD faults that we can use at fsync/msync time. There are currently two types of exceptional entries (shmem and shadow) that can be placed into the radix tree, and this adds a third. We rely on the fact that only one type of exceptional entry can be found in a given radix tree based on its usage. This happens for free with DAX vs shmem but we explicitly prevent shadow entries from being added to radix trees for DAX mappings. The only shadow entries that would be generated for DAX radix trees would be to track zero page mappings that were created for holes. These pages would receive minimal benefit from having shadow entries, and the choice to have only one type of exceptional entry in a given radix tree makes the logic simpler both in clear_exceptional_entry() and in the rest of DAX. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-23 07:10:40 +08:00
static inline bool dax_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
{
return mapping->host && IS_DAX(mapping->host);
}
ACPI: HMAT: refactor hmat_register_target_device to hmem_register_device In preparation for exposing "Soft Reserved" memory ranges without an HMAT, move the hmem device registration to its own compilation unit and make the implementation generic. The generic implementation drops usage acpi_map_pxm_to_online_node() that was translating ACPI proximity domain values and instead relies on numa_map_to_online_node() to determine the numa node for the device. [joao.m.martins@oracle.com: CONFIG_DEV_DAX_HMEM_DEVICES should depend on CONFIG_DAX=y] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8f34727f-ec2d-9395-cb18-969ec8a5d0d4@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brice Goglin <Brice.Goglin@inria.fr> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com> Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Cc: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159643096584.4062302.5035370788475153738.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/158318761484.2216124.2049322072599482736.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-14 07:49:13 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_DEV_DAX_HMEM_DEVICES
void hmem_register_device(int target_nid, struct resource *r);
#else
static inline void hmem_register_device(int target_nid, struct resource *r)
{
}
#endif
#endif