OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c

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/*
* handle transition of Linux booting another kernel
* Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
*
* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
* Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec: " fmt
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/numa.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
x86/mm: Decouple <linux/vmalloc.h> from <asm/io.h> Nothing in <asm/io.h> uses anything from <linux/vmalloc.h>, so remove it from there and fix up the resulting build problems triggered on x86 {64|32}-bit {def|allmod|allno}configs. The breakages were triggering in places where x86 builds relied on vmalloc() facilities but did not include <linux/vmalloc.h> explicitly and relied on the implicit inclusion via <asm/io.h>. Also add: - <linux/init.h> to <linux/io.h> - <asm/pgtable_types> to <asm/io.h> ... which were two other implicit header file dependencies. Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [ Tidied up the changelog. ] Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <JBottomley@odin.com> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Suma Ramars <sramars@cisco.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-06-02 17:01:38 +08:00
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <asm/init.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
kexec: create a new config option CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE for new syscall Currently new system call kexec_file_load() and all the associated code compiles if CONFIG_KEXEC=y. But new syscall also compiles purgatory code which currently uses gcc option -mcmodel=large. This option seems to be available only gcc 4.4 onwards. Hiding new functionality behind a new config option will not break existing users of old gcc. Those who wish to enable new functionality will require new gcc. Having said that, I am trying to figure out how can I move away from using -mcmodel=large but that can take a while. I think there are other advantages of introducing this new config option. As this option will be enabled only on x86_64, other arches don't have to compile generic kexec code which will never be used. This new code selects CRYPTO=y and CRYPTO_SHA256=y. And all other arches had to do this for CONFIG_KEXEC. Now with introduction of new config option, we can remove crypto dependency from other arches. Now CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is available only on x86_64. So whereever I had CONFIG_X86_64 defined, I got rid of that. For CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE, instead of doing select CRYPTO=y, I changed it to "depends on CRYPTO=y". This should be safer as "select" is not recursive. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-30 06:18:46 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
&kexec_bzImage64_ops,
NULL
};
kexec: create a new config option CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE for new syscall Currently new system call kexec_file_load() and all the associated code compiles if CONFIG_KEXEC=y. But new syscall also compiles purgatory code which currently uses gcc option -mcmodel=large. This option seems to be available only gcc 4.4 onwards. Hiding new functionality behind a new config option will not break existing users of old gcc. Those who wish to enable new functionality will require new gcc. Having said that, I am trying to figure out how can I move away from using -mcmodel=large but that can take a while. I think there are other advantages of introducing this new config option. As this option will be enabled only on x86_64, other arches don't have to compile generic kexec code which will never be used. This new code selects CRYPTO=y and CRYPTO_SHA256=y. And all other arches had to do this for CONFIG_KEXEC. Now with introduction of new config option, we can remove crypto dependency from other arches. Now CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is available only on x86_64. So whereever I had CONFIG_X86_64 defined, I got rid of that. For CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE, instead of doing select CRYPTO=y, I changed it to "depends on CRYPTO=y". This should be safer as "select" is not recursive. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-30 06:18:46 +08:00
#endif
static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image)
{
free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.p4d);
x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure >From ff82bedd3e12f0d3353282054ae48c3bd8c72012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 12:12:39 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v3] x86/kexec: avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure. syzbot is reporting crashes after memory allocation failure inside do_kexec_load() [1]. This is because free_transition_pgtable() is called by both init_transition_pgtable() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside init_transition_pgtable(). Regarding 32bit code, machine_kexec_free_page_tables() is called by both machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(). Fix this by leaving the error handling to machine_kexec_cleanup() (and optionally setting NULL after free_page()). [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=91e52396168cf2bdd572fe1e1bc0bc645c1c6b40 Fixes: f5deb79679af6eb4 ("x86: kexec: Use one page table in x86_64 machine_kexec") Fixes: 92be3d6bdf2cb349 ("kexec/i386: allocate page table pages dynamically") Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+d96f60296ef613fe1d69@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Cc: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: dyoung@redhat.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201805091942.DGG12448.tMFVFSJFQOOLHO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
2018-05-09 18:42:20 +08:00
image->arch.p4d = NULL;
free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pud);
x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure >From ff82bedd3e12f0d3353282054ae48c3bd8c72012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 12:12:39 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v3] x86/kexec: avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure. syzbot is reporting crashes after memory allocation failure inside do_kexec_load() [1]. This is because free_transition_pgtable() is called by both init_transition_pgtable() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside init_transition_pgtable(). Regarding 32bit code, machine_kexec_free_page_tables() is called by both machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(). Fix this by leaving the error handling to machine_kexec_cleanup() (and optionally setting NULL after free_page()). [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=91e52396168cf2bdd572fe1e1bc0bc645c1c6b40 Fixes: f5deb79679af6eb4 ("x86: kexec: Use one page table in x86_64 machine_kexec") Fixes: 92be3d6bdf2cb349 ("kexec/i386: allocate page table pages dynamically") Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+d96f60296ef613fe1d69@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Cc: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: dyoung@redhat.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201805091942.DGG12448.tMFVFSJFQOOLHO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
2018-05-09 18:42:20 +08:00
image->arch.pud = NULL;
free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd);
x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure >From ff82bedd3e12f0d3353282054ae48c3bd8c72012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 12:12:39 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v3] x86/kexec: avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure. syzbot is reporting crashes after memory allocation failure inside do_kexec_load() [1]. This is because free_transition_pgtable() is called by both init_transition_pgtable() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside init_transition_pgtable(). Regarding 32bit code, machine_kexec_free_page_tables() is called by both machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(). Fix this by leaving the error handling to machine_kexec_cleanup() (and optionally setting NULL after free_page()). [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=91e52396168cf2bdd572fe1e1bc0bc645c1c6b40 Fixes: f5deb79679af6eb4 ("x86: kexec: Use one page table in x86_64 machine_kexec") Fixes: 92be3d6bdf2cb349 ("kexec/i386: allocate page table pages dynamically") Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+d96f60296ef613fe1d69@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Cc: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: dyoung@redhat.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201805091942.DGG12448.tMFVFSJFQOOLHO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
2018-05-09 18:42:20 +08:00
image->arch.pmd = NULL;
free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte);
x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure >From ff82bedd3e12f0d3353282054ae48c3bd8c72012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 12:12:39 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v3] x86/kexec: avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure. syzbot is reporting crashes after memory allocation failure inside do_kexec_load() [1]. This is because free_transition_pgtable() is called by both init_transition_pgtable() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside init_transition_pgtable(). Regarding 32bit code, machine_kexec_free_page_tables() is called by both machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory allocation failed inside machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(). Fix this by leaving the error handling to machine_kexec_cleanup() (and optionally setting NULL after free_page()). [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=91e52396168cf2bdd572fe1e1bc0bc645c1c6b40 Fixes: f5deb79679af6eb4 ("x86: kexec: Use one page table in x86_64 machine_kexec") Fixes: 92be3d6bdf2cb349 ("kexec/i386: allocate page table pages dynamically") Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+d96f60296ef613fe1d69@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Cc: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: dyoung@redhat.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201805091942.DGG12448.tMFVFSJFQOOLHO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
2018-05-09 18:42:20 +08:00
image->arch.pte = NULL;
}
static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
{
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
unsigned long vaddr, paddr;
int result = -ENOMEM;
vaddr = (unsigned long)relocate_kernel;
paddr = __pa(page_address(image->control_code_page)+PAGE_SIZE);
pgd += pgd_index(vaddr);
if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
p4d = (p4d_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p4d)
goto err;
image->arch.p4d = p4d;
set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
}
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, vaddr);
if (!p4d_present(*p4d)) {
pud = (pud_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pud)
goto err;
image->arch.pud = pud;
set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
}
pud = pud_offset(p4d, vaddr);
if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
pmd = (pmd_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pmd)
goto err;
image->arch.pmd = pmd;
set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
}
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) {
pte = (pte_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pte)
goto err;
image->arch.pte = pte;
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
}
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is enabled. Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner as originally booted. Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa). Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on which cacheline is written last. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b95ff075db3e7cd545313f2fb609a49619a09625.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:28 +08:00
set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC));
return 0;
err:
return result;
}
static void *alloc_pgt_page(void *data)
{
struct kimage *image = (struct kimage *)data;
struct page *page;
void *p = NULL;
page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0);
if (page) {
p = page_address(page);
clear_page(p);
}
return p;
}
static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
{
struct x86_mapping_info info = {
.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
.context = image,
x86/mm: Add support for gbpages to kernel_ident_mapping_init() Kernel identity mappings on x86-64 kernels are created in two ways: by the early x86 boot code, or by kernel_ident_mapping_init(). Native kernels (which is the dominant usecase) use the former, but the kexec and the hibernation code uses kernel_ident_mapping_init(). There's a subtle difference between these two ways of how identity mappings are created, the current kernel_ident_mapping_init() code creates identity mappings always using 2MB page(PMD level) - while the native kernel boot path also utilizes gbpages where available. This difference is suboptimal both for performance and for memory usage: kernel_ident_mapping_init() needs to allocate pages for the page tables when creating the new identity mappings. This patch adds 1GB page(PUD level) support to kernel_ident_mapping_init() to address these concerns. The primary advantage would be better TLB coverage/performance, because we'd utilize 1GB TLBs instead of 2MB ones. It is also useful for machines with large number of memory to save paging structure allocations(around 4MB/TB using 2MB page) when setting identity mappings for all the memory, after using 1GB page it will consume only 8KB/TB. ( Note that this change alone does not activate gbpages in kexec, we are doing that in a separate patch. ) Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493862171-8799-1-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-04 09:42:50 +08:00
.page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is enabled. Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner as originally booted. Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa). Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on which cacheline is written last. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b95ff075db3e7cd545313f2fb609a49619a09625.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:28 +08:00
.kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
};
unsigned long mstart, mend;
pgd_t *level4p;
int result;
int i;
level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
clear_page(level4p);
x86/kexec/64: Use gbpages for identity mappings if available Kexec sets up all identity mappings before booting into the new kernel, and this will cause extra memory consumption for paging structures which is quite considerable on modern machines with huge memory sizes. E.g. on a 32TB machine that is kdumping, it could waste around 128MB (around 4MB/TB) from the reserved memory after kexec sets all the identity mappings using the current 2MB page. Add to that the memory needed for the loaded kdump kernel, initramfs, etc., and it causes a kexec syscall -NOMEM failure. As a result, we had to enlarge reserved memory via "crashkernel=X" to work around this problem. This causes some trouble for distributions that use policies to evaluate the proper "crashkernel=X" value for users. So enable gbpages for kexec mappings. Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493862171-8799-2-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-04 09:42:51 +08:00
if (direct_gbpages)
info.direct_gbpages = true;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pfn_mapped; i++) {
mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT;
mend = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT;
result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info,
level4p, mstart, mend);
if (result)
return result;
}
/*
* segments's mem ranges could be outside 0 ~ max_pfn,
* for example when jump back to original kernel from kexeced kernel.
* or first kernel is booted with user mem map, and second kernel
* could be loaded out of that range.
*/
for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz;
result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info,
level4p, mstart, mend);
if (result)
return result;
}
return init_transition_pgtable(image, level4p);
}
static void set_idt(void *newidt, u16 limit)
{
struct desc_ptr curidt;
/* x86-64 supports unaliged loads & stores */
curidt.size = limit;
curidt.address = (unsigned long)newidt;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
"lidtq %0\n"
: : "m" (curidt)
);
};
static void set_gdt(void *newgdt, u16 limit)
{
struct desc_ptr curgdt;
/* x86-64 supports unaligned loads & stores */
curgdt.size = limit;
curgdt.address = (unsigned long)newgdt;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
"lgdtq %0\n"
: : "m" (curgdt)
);
};
static void load_segments(void)
{
__asm__ __volatile__ (
"\tmovl %0,%%ds\n"
"\tmovl %0,%%es\n"
"\tmovl %0,%%ss\n"
"\tmovl %0,%%fs\n"
"\tmovl %0,%%gs\n"
: : "a" (__KERNEL_DS) : "memory"
);
}
kexec: create a new config option CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE for new syscall Currently new system call kexec_file_load() and all the associated code compiles if CONFIG_KEXEC=y. But new syscall also compiles purgatory code which currently uses gcc option -mcmodel=large. This option seems to be available only gcc 4.4 onwards. Hiding new functionality behind a new config option will not break existing users of old gcc. Those who wish to enable new functionality will require new gcc. Having said that, I am trying to figure out how can I move away from using -mcmodel=large but that can take a while. I think there are other advantages of introducing this new config option. As this option will be enabled only on x86_64, other arches don't have to compile generic kexec code which will never be used. This new code selects CRYPTO=y and CRYPTO_SHA256=y. And all other arches had to do this for CONFIG_KEXEC. Now with introduction of new config option, we can remove crypto dependency from other arches. Now CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is available only on x86_64. So whereever I had CONFIG_X86_64 defined, I got rid of that. For CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE, instead of doing select CRYPTO=y, I changed it to "depends on CRYPTO=y". This should be safer as "select" is not recursive. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-30 06:18:46 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
/* Update purgatory as needed after various image segments have been prepared */
static int arch_update_purgatory(struct kimage *image)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!image->file_mode)
return 0;
/* Setup copying of backup region */
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
kexec, x86/purgatory: Unbreak it and clean it up The purgatory code defines global variables which are referenced via a symbol lookup in the kexec code (core and arch). A recent commit addressing sparse warnings made these static and thereby broke kexec_file. Why did this happen? Simply because the whole machinery is undocumented and lacks any form of forward declarations. The variable names are unspecific and lack a prefix, so adding forward declarations creates shadow variables in the core code. Aside of that the code relies on magic constants and duplicate struct definitions with no way to ensure that these things stay in sync. The section placement of the purgatory variables happened by chance and not by design. Unbreak kexec and cleanup the mess: - Add proper forward declarations and document the usage - Use common struct definition - Use the proper common defines instead of magic constants - Add a purgatory_ prefix to have a proper name space - Use ARRAY_SIZE() instead of a homebrewn reimplementation - Add proper sections to the purgatory variables [ From Mike ] Fixes: 72042a8c7b01 ("x86/purgatory: Make functions and variables static") Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <<efault@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Nicholas Mc Guire <der.herr@hofr.at> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1703101315140.3681@nanos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-10 20:17:18 +08:00
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image,
"purgatory_backup_dest",
&image->arch.backup_load_addr,
sizeof(image->arch.backup_load_addr), 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
kexec, x86/purgatory: Unbreak it and clean it up The purgatory code defines global variables which are referenced via a symbol lookup in the kexec code (core and arch). A recent commit addressing sparse warnings made these static and thereby broke kexec_file. Why did this happen? Simply because the whole machinery is undocumented and lacks any form of forward declarations. The variable names are unspecific and lack a prefix, so adding forward declarations creates shadow variables in the core code. Aside of that the code relies on magic constants and duplicate struct definitions with no way to ensure that these things stay in sync. The section placement of the purgatory variables happened by chance and not by design. Unbreak kexec and cleanup the mess: - Add proper forward declarations and document the usage - Use common struct definition - Use the proper common defines instead of magic constants - Add a purgatory_ prefix to have a proper name space - Use ARRAY_SIZE() instead of a homebrewn reimplementation - Add proper sections to the purgatory variables [ From Mike ] Fixes: 72042a8c7b01 ("x86/purgatory: Make functions and variables static") Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <<efault@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Nicholas Mc Guire <der.herr@hofr.at> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1703101315140.3681@nanos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-10 20:17:18 +08:00
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image,
"purgatory_backup_src",
&image->arch.backup_src_start,
sizeof(image->arch.backup_src_start), 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
kexec, x86/purgatory: Unbreak it and clean it up The purgatory code defines global variables which are referenced via a symbol lookup in the kexec code (core and arch). A recent commit addressing sparse warnings made these static and thereby broke kexec_file. Why did this happen? Simply because the whole machinery is undocumented and lacks any form of forward declarations. The variable names are unspecific and lack a prefix, so adding forward declarations creates shadow variables in the core code. Aside of that the code relies on magic constants and duplicate struct definitions with no way to ensure that these things stay in sync. The section placement of the purgatory variables happened by chance and not by design. Unbreak kexec and cleanup the mess: - Add proper forward declarations and document the usage - Use common struct definition - Use the proper common defines instead of magic constants - Add a purgatory_ prefix to have a proper name space - Use ARRAY_SIZE() instead of a homebrewn reimplementation - Add proper sections to the purgatory variables [ From Mike ] Fixes: 72042a8c7b01 ("x86/purgatory: Make functions and variables static") Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <<efault@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Nicholas Mc Guire <der.herr@hofr.at> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1703101315140.3681@nanos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-10 20:17:18 +08:00
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image,
"purgatory_backup_sz",
&image->arch.backup_src_sz,
sizeof(image->arch.backup_src_sz), 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
kexec: create a new config option CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE for new syscall Currently new system call kexec_file_load() and all the associated code compiles if CONFIG_KEXEC=y. But new syscall also compiles purgatory code which currently uses gcc option -mcmodel=large. This option seems to be available only gcc 4.4 onwards. Hiding new functionality behind a new config option will not break existing users of old gcc. Those who wish to enable new functionality will require new gcc. Having said that, I am trying to figure out how can I move away from using -mcmodel=large but that can take a while. I think there are other advantages of introducing this new config option. As this option will be enabled only on x86_64, other arches don't have to compile generic kexec code which will never be used. This new code selects CRYPTO=y and CRYPTO_SHA256=y. And all other arches had to do this for CONFIG_KEXEC. Now with introduction of new config option, we can remove crypto dependency from other arches. Now CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is available only on x86_64. So whereever I had CONFIG_X86_64 defined, I got rid of that. For CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE, instead of doing select CRYPTO=y, I changed it to "depends on CRYPTO=y". This should be safer as "select" is not recursive. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-30 06:18:46 +08:00
#else /* !CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
static inline int arch_update_purgatory(struct kimage *image)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
{
unsigned long start_pgtable;
int result;
/* Calculate the offsets */
start_pgtable = page_to_pfn(image->control_code_page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
/* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */
result = init_pgtable(image, start_pgtable);
if (result)
return result;
/* update purgatory as needed */
result = arch_update_purgatory(image);
if (result)
return result;
return 0;
}
void machine_kexec_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
{
free_transition_pgtable(image);
}
/*
* Do not allocate memory (or fail in any way) in machine_kexec().
* We are past the point of no return, committed to rebooting now.
*/
kexec jump This patch provides an enhancement to kexec/kdump. It implements the following features: - Backup/restore memory used by the original kernel before/after kexec. - Save/restore CPU state before/after kexec. The features of this patch can be used as a general method to call program in physical mode (paging turning off). This can be used to call BIOS code under Linux. kexec-tools needs to be patched to support kexec jump. The patches and the precompiled kexec can be download from the following URL: source: http://khibernation.sourceforge.net/download/release_v10/kexec-tools/kexec-tools-src_git_kh10.tar.bz2 patches: http://khibernation.sourceforge.net/download/release_v10/kexec-tools/kexec-tools-patches_git_kh10.tar.bz2 binary: http://khibernation.sourceforge.net/download/release_v10/kexec-tools/kexec_git_kh10 Usage example of calling some physical mode code and return: 1. Compile and install patched kernel with following options selected: CONFIG_X86_32=y CONFIG_KEXEC=y CONFIG_PM=y CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP=y 2. Build patched kexec-tool or download the pre-built one. 3. Build some physical mode executable named such as "phy_mode" 4. Boot kernel compiled in step 1. 5. Load physical mode executable with /sbin/kexec. The shell command line can be as follow: /sbin/kexec --load-preserve-context --args-none phy_mode 6. Call physical mode executable with following shell command line: /sbin/kexec -e Implementation point: To support jumping without reserving memory. One shadow backup page (source page) is allocated for each page used by kexeced code image (destination page). When do kexec_load, the image of kexeced code is loaded into source pages, and before executing, the destination pages and the source pages are swapped, so the contents of destination pages are backupped. Before jumping to the kexeced code image and after jumping back to the original kernel, the destination pages and the source pages are swapped too. C ABI (calling convention) is used as communication protocol between kernel and called code. A flag named KEXEC_PRESERVE_CONTEXT for sys_kexec_load is added to indicate that the loaded kernel image is used for jumping back. Now, only the i386 architecture is supported. Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigel.suspend2.net> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 10:45:07 +08:00
void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
{
unsigned long page_list[PAGES_NR];
void *control_page;
int save_ftrace_enabled;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
save_processor_state();
#endif
save_ftrace_enabled = __ftrace_enabled_save();
/* Interrupts aren't acceptable while we reboot */
local_irq_disable();
hw_breakpoint_disable();
if (image->preserve_context) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
/*
* We need to put APICs in legacy mode so that we can
* get timer interrupts in second kernel. kexec/kdump
* paths already have calls to restore_boot_irq_mode()
* in one form or other. kexec jump path also need one.
*/
clear_IO_APIC();
restore_boot_irq_mode();
#endif
}
control_page = page_address(image->control_code_page) + PAGE_SIZE;
memcpy(control_page, relocate_kernel, KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE);
page_list[PA_CONTROL_PAGE] = virt_to_phys(control_page);
page_list[VA_CONTROL_PAGE] = (unsigned long)control_page;
page_list[PA_TABLE_PAGE] =
(unsigned long)__pa(page_address(image->control_code_page));
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT)
page_list[PA_SWAP_PAGE] = (page_to_pfn(image->swap_page)
<< PAGE_SHIFT);
/*
* The segment registers are funny things, they have both a
* visible and an invisible part. Whenever the visible part is
* set to a specific selector, the invisible part is loaded
* with from a table in memory. At no other time is the
* descriptor table in memory accessed.
*
* I take advantage of this here by force loading the
* segments, before I zap the gdt with an invalid value.
*/
load_segments();
/*
* The gdt & idt are now invalid.
* If you want to load them you must set up your own idt & gdt.
*/
set_gdt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
set_idt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
/* now call it */
image->start = relocate_kernel((unsigned long)image->head,
(unsigned long)page_list,
image->start,
image->preserve_context,
sme_active());
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
restore_processor_state();
#endif
__ftrace_enabled_restore(save_ftrace_enabled);
}
void arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void)
{
kexec: export the value of phys_base instead of symbol address Currently in x86_64, the symbol address of phys_base is exported to vmcoreinfo. Dave Anderson complained this is really useless for his Crash implementation. Because in user-space utility Crash and Makedumpfile which exported vmcore information is mainly used for, value of phys_base is needed to covert virtual address of exported kernel symbol to physical address. Especially init_level4_pgt, if we want to access and go over the page table to look up a PA corresponding to VA, firstly we need calculate page_dir = SYMBOL(init_level4_pgt) - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base; Now in Crash and Makedumpfile, we have to analyze the vmcore elf program header to get value of phys_base. As Dave said, it would be preferable if it were readily availabl in vmcoreinfo rather than depending upon the PT_LOAD semantics. Hence in this patch change to export the value of phys_base instead of its virtual address. And people also complained that KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE exporting is x86_64 only, should be moved into arch dependent function arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo. Do the moving in this patch. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478568596-30060-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Eugene Surovegin <surovegin@google.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Atsushi Kumagai <ats-kumagai@wm.jp.nec.com> Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-15 07:04:20 +08:00
VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(phys_base);
VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(init_top_pgt);
vmcoreinfo_append_str("NUMBER(pgtable_l5_enabled)=%d\n",
pgtable_l5_enabled());
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(node_data);
VMCOREINFO_LENGTH(node_data, MAX_NUMNODES);
#endif
vmcoreinfo_append_str("KERNELOFFSET=%lx\n",
kaslr_offset());
kexec: export the value of phys_base instead of symbol address Currently in x86_64, the symbol address of phys_base is exported to vmcoreinfo. Dave Anderson complained this is really useless for his Crash implementation. Because in user-space utility Crash and Makedumpfile which exported vmcore information is mainly used for, value of phys_base is needed to covert virtual address of exported kernel symbol to physical address. Especially init_level4_pgt, if we want to access and go over the page table to look up a PA corresponding to VA, firstly we need calculate page_dir = SYMBOL(init_level4_pgt) - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base; Now in Crash and Makedumpfile, we have to analyze the vmcore elf program header to get value of phys_base. As Dave said, it would be preferable if it were readily availabl in vmcoreinfo rather than depending upon the PT_LOAD semantics. Hence in this patch change to export the value of phys_base instead of its virtual address. And people also complained that KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE exporting is x86_64 only, should be moved into arch dependent function arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo. Do the moving in this patch. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478568596-30060-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Eugene Surovegin <surovegin@google.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Atsushi Kumagai <ats-kumagai@wm.jp.nec.com> Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-15 07:04:20 +08:00
VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE);
}
/* arch-dependent functionality related to kexec file-based syscall */
kexec: create a new config option CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE for new syscall Currently new system call kexec_file_load() and all the associated code compiles if CONFIG_KEXEC=y. But new syscall also compiles purgatory code which currently uses gcc option -mcmodel=large. This option seems to be available only gcc 4.4 onwards. Hiding new functionality behind a new config option will not break existing users of old gcc. Those who wish to enable new functionality will require new gcc. Having said that, I am trying to figure out how can I move away from using -mcmodel=large but that can take a while. I think there are other advantages of introducing this new config option. As this option will be enabled only on x86_64, other arches don't have to compile generic kexec code which will never be used. This new code selects CRYPTO=y and CRYPTO_SHA256=y. And all other arches had to do this for CONFIG_KEXEC. Now with introduction of new config option, we can remove crypto dependency from other arches. Now CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is available only on x86_64. So whereever I had CONFIG_X86_64 defined, I got rid of that. For CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE, instead of doing select CRYPTO=y, I changed it to "depends on CRYPTO=y". This should be safer as "select" is not recursive. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-30 06:18:46 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
{
vfree(image->arch.elf_headers);
image->arch.elf_headers = NULL;
if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
return image->fops->load(image, image->kernel_buf,
image->kernel_buf_len, image->initrd_buf,
image->initrd_buf_len, image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len);
}
/*
* Apply purgatory relocations.
*
* @pi: Purgatory to be relocated.
* @section: Section relocations applying to.
* @relsec: Section containing RELAs.
* @symtabsec: Corresponding symtab.
*
* TODO: Some of the code belongs to generic code. Move that in kexec.c.
*/
int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi,
Elf_Shdr *section, const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
const Elf_Shdr *symtabsec)
{
unsigned int i;
Elf64_Rela *rel;
Elf64_Sym *sym;
void *location;
unsigned long address, sec_base, value;
const char *strtab, *name, *shstrtab;
const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
/* String & section header string table */
sechdrs = (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff;
strtab = (char *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[symtabsec->sh_link].sh_offset;
shstrtab = (char *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[pi->ehdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset;
rel = (void *)pi->ehdr + relsec->sh_offset;
pr_debug("Applying relocate section %s to %u\n",
shstrtab + relsec->sh_name, relsec->sh_info);
for (i = 0; i < relsec->sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) {
/*
* rel[i].r_offset contains byte offset from beginning
* of section to the storage unit affected.
*
* This is location to update. This is temporary buffer
* where section is currently loaded. This will finally be
* loaded to a different address later, pointed to by
* ->sh_addr. kexec takes care of moving it
* (kexec_load_segment()).
*/
location = pi->purgatory_buf;
location += section->sh_offset;
location += rel[i].r_offset;
/* Final address of the location */
address = section->sh_addr + rel[i].r_offset;
/*
* rel[i].r_info contains information about symbol table index
* w.r.t which relocation must be made and type of relocation
* to apply. ELF64_R_SYM() and ELF64_R_TYPE() macros get
* these respectively.
*/
sym = (void *)pi->ehdr + symtabsec->sh_offset;
sym += ELF64_R_SYM(rel[i].r_info);
if (sym->st_name)
name = strtab + sym->st_name;
else
name = shstrtab + sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_name;
pr_debug("Symbol: %s info: %02x shndx: %02x value=%llx size: %llx\n",
name, sym->st_info, sym->st_shndx, sym->st_value,
sym->st_size);
if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) {
pr_err("Undefined symbol: %s\n", name);
return -ENOEXEC;
}
if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_COMMON) {
pr_err("symbol '%s' in common section\n", name);
return -ENOEXEC;
}
if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_ABS)
sec_base = 0;
else if (sym->st_shndx >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum) {
pr_err("Invalid section %d for symbol %s\n",
sym->st_shndx, name);
return -ENOEXEC;
} else
sec_base = pi->sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_addr;
value = sym->st_value;
value += sec_base;
value += rel[i].r_addend;
switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info)) {
case R_X86_64_NONE:
break;
case R_X86_64_64:
*(u64 *)location = value;
break;
case R_X86_64_32:
*(u32 *)location = value;
if (value != *(u32 *)location)
goto overflow;
break;
case R_X86_64_32S:
*(s32 *)location = value;
if ((s64)value != *(s32 *)location)
goto overflow;
break;
case R_X86_64_PC32:
x86: Treat R_X86_64_PLT32 as R_X86_64_PC32 On i386, there are 2 types of PLTs, PIC and non-PIC. PIE and shared objects must use PIC PLT. To use PIC PLT, you need to load _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ into EBX first. There is no need for that on x86-64 since x86-64 uses PC-relative PLT. On x86-64, for 32-bit PC-relative branches, we can generate PLT32 relocation, instead of PC32 relocation, which can also be used as a marker for 32-bit PC-relative branches. Linker can always reduce PLT32 relocation to PC32 if function is defined locally. Local functions should use PC32 relocation. As far as Linux kernel is concerned, R_X86_64_PLT32 can be treated the same as R_X86_64_PC32 since Linux kernel doesn't use PLT. R_X86_64_PLT32 for 32-bit PC-relative branches has been enabled in binutils master branch which will become binutils 2.31. [ hjl is working on having better documentation on this all, but a few more notes from him: "PLT32 relocation is used as marker for PC-relative branches. Because of EBX, it looks odd to generate PLT32 relocation on i386 when EBX doesn't have GOT. As for symbol resolution, PLT32 and PC32 relocations are almost interchangeable. But when linker sees PLT32 relocation against a protected symbol, it can resolved locally at link-time since it is used on a branch instruction. Linker can't do that for PC32 relocation" but for the kernel use, the two are basically the same, and this commit gets things building and working with the current binutils master - Linus ] Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-08 06:20:09 +08:00
case R_X86_64_PLT32:
value -= (u64)address;
*(u32 *)location = value;
break;
default:
pr_err("Unknown rela relocation: %llu\n",
ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info));
return -ENOEXEC;
}
}
return 0;
overflow:
pr_err("Overflow in relocation type %d value 0x%lx\n",
(int)ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info), value);
return -ENOEXEC;
}
kexec: create a new config option CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE for new syscall Currently new system call kexec_file_load() and all the associated code compiles if CONFIG_KEXEC=y. But new syscall also compiles purgatory code which currently uses gcc option -mcmodel=large. This option seems to be available only gcc 4.4 onwards. Hiding new functionality behind a new config option will not break existing users of old gcc. Those who wish to enable new functionality will require new gcc. Having said that, I am trying to figure out how can I move away from using -mcmodel=large but that can take a while. I think there are other advantages of introducing this new config option. As this option will be enabled only on x86_64, other arches don't have to compile generic kexec code which will never be used. This new code selects CRYPTO=y and CRYPTO_SHA256=y. And all other arches had to do this for CONFIG_KEXEC. Now with introduction of new config option, we can remove crypto dependency from other arches. Now CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is available only on x86_64. So whereever I had CONFIG_X86_64 defined, I got rid of that. For CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE, instead of doing select CRYPTO=y, I changed it to "depends on CRYPTO=y". This should be safer as "select" is not recursive. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-30 06:18:46 +08:00
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
static int
kexec_mark_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, bool protect)
{
struct page *page;
unsigned int nr_pages;
/*
* For physical range: [start, end]. We must skip the unassigned
* crashk resource with zero-valued "end" member.
*/
if (!end || start > end)
return 0;
page = pfn_to_page(start >> PAGE_SHIFT);
nr_pages = (end >> PAGE_SHIFT) - (start >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
if (protect)
return set_pages_ro(page, nr_pages);
else
return set_pages_rw(page, nr_pages);
}
static void kexec_mark_crashkres(bool protect)
{
unsigned long control;
kexec_mark_range(crashk_low_res.start, crashk_low_res.end, protect);
/* Don't touch the control code page used in crash_kexec().*/
control = PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(kexec_crash_image->control_code_page));
/* Control code page is located in the 2nd page. */
kexec_mark_range(crashk_res.start, control + PAGE_SIZE - 1, protect);
control += KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE;
kexec_mark_range(control, crashk_res.end, protect);
}
void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
{
kexec_mark_crashkres(true);
}
void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
{
kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
}
x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is enabled. Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner as originally booted. Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa). Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on which cacheline is written last. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b95ff075db3e7cd545313f2fb609a49619a09625.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:28 +08:00
int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
{
/*
* If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
* not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
* pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
*/
return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
}
void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
{
/*
* If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
* an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
*/
set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
}