OpenCloudOS-Kernel/net/ipv6/raw.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* RAW sockets for IPv6
* Linux INET6 implementation
*
* Authors:
* Pedro Roque <roque@di.fc.ul.pt>
*
* Adapted from linux/net/ipv4/raw.c
*
* Fixes:
* Hideaki YOSHIFUJI : sin6_scope_id support
* YOSHIFUJI,H.@USAGI : raw checksum (RFC2292(bis) compliance)
* Kazunori MIYAZAWA @USAGI: change process style to use ip6_append_data
*/
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sockios.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/if_arp.h>
#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/snmp.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/ndisc.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/ip6_route.h>
#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
#include <net/transp_v6.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
#include <net/mip6.h>
#endif
#include <linux/mroute6.h>
#include <net/raw.h>
#include <net/rawv6.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#define ICMPV6_HDRLEN 4 /* ICMPv6 header, RFC 4443 Section 2.1 */
struct raw_hashinfo raw_v6_hashinfo;
net: ip, diag -- Add diag interface for raw sockets In criu we are actively using diag interface to collect sockets present in the system when dumping applications. And while for unix, tcp, udp[lite], packet, netlink it works as expected, the raw sockets do not have. Thus add it. v2: - add missing sock_put calls in raw_diag_dump_one (by eric.dumazet@) - implement @destroy for diag requests (by dsa@) v3: - add export of raw_abort for IPv6 (by dsa@) - pass net-admin flag into inet_sk_diag_fill due to changes in net-next branch (by dsa@) v4: - use @pad in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for raw socket protocol specification: raw module carries sockets which may have custom protocol passed from socket() syscall and sole @sdiag_protocol is not enough to match underlied ones - start reporting protocol specifed in socket() call when sockets are raw ones for the same reason: user space tools like ss may parse this attribute and use it for socket matching v5 (by eric.dumazet@): - use sock_hold in raw_sock_get instead of atomic_inc, we're holding (raw_v4_hashinfo|raw_v6_hashinfo)->lock when looking up so counter won't be zero here. v6: - use sdiag_raw_protocol() helper which will access @pad structure used for raw sockets protocol specification: we can't simply rename this member without breaking uapi v7: - sine sdiag_raw_protocol() helper is not suitable for uapi lets rather make an alias structure with proper names. __check_inet_diag_req_raw helper will catch if any of structure unintentionally changed. CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> CC: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> CC: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> CC: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> CC: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-21 18:03:44 +08:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_v6_hashinfo);
bool raw_v6_match(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, unsigned short num,
const struct in6_addr *loc_addr,
const struct in6_addr *rmt_addr, int dif, int sdif)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != num ||
!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) ||
(!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_daddr) &&
!ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_daddr, rmt_addr)) ||
!raw_sk_bound_dev_eq(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
dif, sdif))
return false;
if (ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr) ||
ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, loc_addr) ||
(ipv6_addr_is_multicast(loc_addr) &&
inet6_mc_check(sk, loc_addr, rmt_addr)))
return true;
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(raw_v6_match);
/*
* 0 - deliver
* 1 - block
*/
static int icmpv6_filter(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct icmp6hdr _hdr;
const struct icmp6hdr *hdr;
/* We require only the four bytes of the ICMPv6 header, not any
* additional bytes of message body in "struct icmp6hdr".
*/
hdr = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
ICMPV6_HDRLEN, &_hdr);
if (hdr) {
const __u32 *data = &raw6_sk(sk)->filter.data[0];
unsigned int type = hdr->icmp6_type;
return (data[type >> 5] & (1U << (type & 31))) != 0;
}
return 1;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
typedef int mh_filter_t(struct sock *sock, struct sk_buff *skb);
static mh_filter_t __rcu *mh_filter __read_mostly;
int rawv6_mh_filter_register(mh_filter_t filter)
{
rcu_assign_pointer(mh_filter, filter);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rawv6_mh_filter_register);
int rawv6_mh_filter_unregister(mh_filter_t filter)
{
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mh_filter, NULL);
synchronize_rcu();
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rawv6_mh_filter_unregister);
#endif
/*
* demultiplex raw sockets.
* (should consider queueing the skb in the sock receive_queue
* without calling rawv6.c)
*
* Caller owns SKB so we must make clones.
*/
static bool ipv6_raw_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
const struct in6_addr *saddr;
const struct in6_addr *daddr;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct sock *sk;
bool delivered = false;
__u8 hash;
saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
daddr = saddr + 1;
hash = nexthdr & (RAW_HTABLE_SIZE - 1);
head = &raw_v6_hashinfo.ht[hash];
if (hlist_empty(head))
return false;
rcu_read_lock();
sk_for_each_rcu(sk, head) {
int filtered;
if (!raw_v6_match(net, sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr,
inet6_iif(skb), inet6_sdif(skb)))
continue;
delivered = true;
switch (nexthdr) {
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
filtered = icmpv6_filter(sk, skb);
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
case IPPROTO_MH:
{
/* XXX: To validate MH only once for each packet,
* this is placed here. It should be after checking
* xfrm policy, however it doesn't. The checking xfrm
* policy is placed in rawv6_rcv() because it is
* required for each socket.
*/
mh_filter_t *filter;
filter = rcu_dereference(mh_filter);
filtered = filter ? (*filter)(sk, skb) : 0;
break;
}
#endif
default:
filtered = 0;
break;
}
if (filtered < 0)
break;
if (filtered == 0) {
struct sk_buff *clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Not releasing hash table! */
[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem. The existing connection tracking subsystem in netfilter can only handle ipv4. There were basically two choices present to add connection tracking support for ipv6. We could either duplicate all of the ipv4 connection tracking code into an ipv6 counterpart, or (the choice taken by these patches) we could design a generic layer that could handle both ipv4 and ipv6 and thus requiring only one sub-protocol (TCP, UDP, etc.) connection tracking helper module to be written. In fact nf_conntrack is capable of working with any layer 3 protocol. The existing ipv4 specific conntrack code could also not deal with the pecularities of doing connection tracking on ipv6, which is also cured here. For example, these issues include: 1) ICMPv6 handling, which is used for neighbour discovery in ipv6 thus some messages such as these should not participate in connection tracking since effectively they are like ARP messages 2) fragmentation must be handled differently in ipv6, because the simplistic "defrag, connection track and NAT, refrag" (which the existing ipv4 connection tracking does) approach simply isn't feasible in ipv6 3) ipv6 extension header parsing must occur at the correct spots before and after connection tracking decisions, and there were no provisions for this in the existing connection tracking design 4) ipv6 has no need for stateful NAT The ipv4 specific conntrack layer is kept around, until all of the ipv4 specific conntrack helpers are ported over to nf_conntrack and it is feature complete. Once that occurs, the old conntrack stuff will get placed into the feature-removal-schedule and we will fully kill it off 6 months later. Signed-off-by: Yasuyuki Kozakai <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
2005-11-10 08:38:16 +08:00
if (clone) {
nf_reset_ct(clone);
rawv6_rcv(sk, clone);
[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem. The existing connection tracking subsystem in netfilter can only handle ipv4. There were basically two choices present to add connection tracking support for ipv6. We could either duplicate all of the ipv4 connection tracking code into an ipv6 counterpart, or (the choice taken by these patches) we could design a generic layer that could handle both ipv4 and ipv6 and thus requiring only one sub-protocol (TCP, UDP, etc.) connection tracking helper module to be written. In fact nf_conntrack is capable of working with any layer 3 protocol. The existing ipv4 specific conntrack code could also not deal with the pecularities of doing connection tracking on ipv6, which is also cured here. For example, these issues include: 1) ICMPv6 handling, which is used for neighbour discovery in ipv6 thus some messages such as these should not participate in connection tracking since effectively they are like ARP messages 2) fragmentation must be handled differently in ipv6, because the simplistic "defrag, connection track and NAT, refrag" (which the existing ipv4 connection tracking does) approach simply isn't feasible in ipv6 3) ipv6 extension header parsing must occur at the correct spots before and after connection tracking decisions, and there were no provisions for this in the existing connection tracking design 4) ipv6 has no need for stateful NAT The ipv4 specific conntrack layer is kept around, until all of the ipv4 specific conntrack helpers are ported over to nf_conntrack and it is feature complete. Once that occurs, the old conntrack stuff will get placed into the feature-removal-schedule and we will fully kill it off 6 months later. Signed-off-by: Yasuyuki Kozakai <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
2005-11-10 08:38:16 +08:00
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return delivered;
}
bool raw6_local_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr)
{
return ipv6_raw_deliver(skb, nexthdr);
}
/* This cleans up af_inet6 a bit. -DaveM */
static int rawv6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
__be32 v4addr = 0;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
/* Raw sockets are IPv6 only */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
lock_sock(sk);
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
addr->sin6_scope_id) {
/* Override any existing binding, if another
* one is supplied by user.
*/
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Binding to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
err = -ENODEV;
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev)
goto out_unlock;
}
/* ipv4 addr of the socket is invalid. Only the
* unspecified and mapped address have a v4 equivalent.
*/
v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) &&
!ipv6_can_nonlocal_bind(sock_net(sk), inet)) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipv6_chk_addr(sock_net(sk), &addr->sin6_addr,
dev, 0)) {
goto out_unlock;
}
}
}
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = v4addr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
err = 0;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static void rawv6_err(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
int err;
int harderr;
/* Report error on raw socket, if:
1. User requested recverr.
2. Socket is connected (otherwise the error indication
is useless without recverr and error is hard.
*/
if (!np->recverr && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return;
harderr = icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG) {
ip6_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, info);
harderr = (np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO);
}
if (type == NDISC_REDIRECT) {
ip6_sk_redirect(skb, sk);
return;
}
if (np->recverr) {
u8 *payload = skb->data;
if (!inet->hdrincl)
payload += offset;
ipv6_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, 0, ntohl(info), payload);
}
if (np->recverr || harderr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
}
void raw6_icmp_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr,
u8 type, u8 code, int inner_offset, __be32 info)
{
const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct hlist_head *head;
struct sock *sk;
int hash;
hash = nexthdr & (RAW_HTABLE_SIZE - 1);
head = &raw_v6_hashinfo.ht[hash];
rcu_read_lock();
sk_for_each_rcu(sk, head) {
/* Note: ipv6_hdr(skb) != skb->data */
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
saddr = &ip6h->saddr;
daddr = &ip6h->daddr;
if (!raw_v6_match(net, sk, nexthdr, &ip6h->saddr, &ip6h->daddr,
inet6_iif(skb), inet6_iif(skb)))
continue;
rawv6_err(sk, skb, NULL, type, code, inner_offset, info);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
static inline int rawv6_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if ((raw6_sk(sk)->checksum || rcu_access_pointer(sk->sk_filter)) &&
skb_checksum_complete(skb)) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
/* Charge it to the socket. */
ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst reference Le lundi 07 novembre 2011 à 15:33 +0100, Eric Dumazet a écrit : > At least, in recent kernels we dont change dst->refcnt in forwarding > patch (usinf NOREF skb->dst) > > One particular point is the atomic_inc(dst->refcnt) we have to perform > when queuing an UDP packet if socket asked PKTINFO stuff (for example a > typical DNS server has to setup this option) > > I have one patch somewhere that stores the information in skb->cb[] and > avoid the atomic_{inc|dec}(dst->refcnt). > OK I found it, I did some extra tests and believe its ready. [PATCH net-next] ipv4: IP_PKTINFO doesnt need dst reference When a socket uses IP_PKTINFO notifications, we currently force a dst reference for each received skb. Reader has to access dst to get needed information (rt_iif & rt_spec_dst) and must release dst reference. We also forced a dst reference if skb was put in socket backlog, even without IP_PKTINFO handling. This happens under stress/load. We can instead store the needed information in skb->cb[], so that only softirq handler really access dst, improving cache hit ratios. This removes two atomic operations per packet, and false sharing as well. On a benchmark using a mono threaded receiver (doing only recvmsg() calls), I can reach 720.000 pps instead of 570.000 pps. IP_PKTINFO is typically used by DNS servers, and any multihomed aware UDP application. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-09 15:24:35 +08:00
skb_dst_drop(skb);
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* This is next to useless...
* if we demultiplex in network layer we don't need the extra call
* just to queue the skb...
* maybe we could have the network decide upon a hint if it
* should call raw_rcv for demultiplexing
*/
int rawv6_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
if (!rp->checksum)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, skb_network_header(skb),
skb_network_header_len(skb));
if (!csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len, inet->inet_num, skb->csum))
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
if (!skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
skb->csum = ~csum_unfold(csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
skb->len,
inet->inet_num, 0));
if (inet->hdrincl) {
if (skb_checksum_complete(skb)) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
}
rawv6_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
return 0;
}
/*
* This should be easy, if there is something there
* we return it, otherwise we block.
*/
static int rawv6_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)) {
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
} else if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_TRUNC) {
if (__skb_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
} else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (err)
goto out_free;
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin6) {
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
inet6_iif(skb));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
net: Generalize socket rx gap / receive queue overflow cmsg Create a new socket level option to report number of queue overflows Recently I augmented the AF_PACKET protocol to report the number of frames lost on the socket receive queue between any two enqueued frames. This value was exported via a SOL_PACKET level cmsg. AFter I completed that work it was requested that this feature be generalized so that any datagram oriented socket could make use of this option. As such I've created this patch, It creates a new SOL_SOCKET level option called SO_RXQ_OVFL, which when enabled exports a SOL_SOCKET level cmsg that reports the nubmer of times the sk_receive_queue overflowed between any two given frames. It also augments the AF_PACKET protocol to take advantage of this new feature (as it previously did not touch sk->sk_drops, which this patch uses to record the overflow count). Tested successfully by me. Notes: 1) Unlike my previous patch, this patch simply records the sk_drops value, which is not a number of drops between packets, but rather a total number of drops. Deltas must be computed in user space. 2) While this patch currently works with datagram oriented protocols, it will also be accepted by non-datagram oriented protocols. I'm not sure if thats agreeable to everyone, but my argument in favor of doing so is that, for those protocols which aren't applicable to this option, sk_drops will always be zero, and reporting no drops on a receive queue that isn't used for those non-participating protocols seems reasonable to me. This also saves us having to code in a per-protocol opt in mechanism. 3) This applies cleanly to net-next assuming that commit 977750076d98c7ff6cbda51858bb5a5894a9d9ab (my af packet cmsg patch) is reverted Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-10-13 04:26:31 +08:00
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = skb->len;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags);
/* Error for blocking case is chosen to masquerade
as some normal condition.
*/
err = (flags&MSG_DONTWAIT) ? -EAGAIN : -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
static int rawv6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct raw6_sock *rp)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = 0;
int offset;
int len;
int total_len;
__wsum tmp_csum;
__sum16 csum;
if (!rp->checksum)
goto send;
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue);
if (!skb)
goto out;
offset = rp->offset;
total_len = inet_sk(sk)->cork.base.length;
opt = inet6_sk(sk)->cork.opt;
total_len -= opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0;
if (offset >= total_len - 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
goto out;
}
/* should be check HW csum miyazawa */
if (skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_write_queue) == 1) {
/*
* Only one fragment on the socket.
*/
tmp_csum = skb->csum;
} else {
struct sk_buff *csum_skb = NULL;
tmp_csum = 0;
skb_queue_walk(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb) {
tmp_csum = csum_add(tmp_csum, skb->csum);
if (csum_skb)
continue;
len = skb->len - skb_transport_offset(skb);
if (offset >= len) {
offset -= len;
continue;
}
csum_skb = skb;
}
skb = csum_skb;
}
offset += skb_transport_offset(skb);
ipv6: handle -EFAULT from skb_copy_bits By setting certain socket options on ipv6 raw sockets, we can confuse the length calculation in rawv6_push_pending_frames triggering a BUG_ON. RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff817c6390>] [<ffffffff817c6390>] rawv6_sendmsg+0xc30/0xc40 RSP: 0018:ffff881f6c4a7c18 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffff2 RBX: ffff881f6c681680 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: ffff881f6c4a7cf8 RSI: 0000000000000030 RDI: ffff881fed0f6a00 RBP: ffff881f6c4a7da8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000009 R10: ffff881fed0f6a00 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: ffff881fed0f6a00 R14: ffff881fee39ba00 R15: ffff881fefa93a80 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8118ba23>] ? unmap_page_range+0x693/0x830 [<ffffffff81772697>] inet_sendmsg+0x67/0xa0 [<ffffffff816d93f8>] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x50 [<ffffffff816d982f>] SYSC_sendto+0xef/0x170 [<ffffffff816da27e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81002910>] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xa0 [<ffffffff817f7cbc>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Handle by jumping to the failure path if skb_copy_bits gets an EFAULT. Reproducer: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #define LEN 504 int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { int fd; int zero = 0; char buf[LEN]; memset(buf, 0, LEN); fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, 7); setsockopt(fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_CHECKSUM, &zero, 4); setsockopt(fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_DSTOPTS, &buf, LEN); sendto(fd, buf, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *) buf, 110); } Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-23 00:16:22 +08:00
err = skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &csum, 2);
if (err < 0) {
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
goto out;
}
/* in case cksum was not initialized */
if (unlikely(csum))
tmp_csum = csum_sub(tmp_csum, csum_unfold(csum));
csum = csum_ipv6_magic(&fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
total_len, fl6->flowi6_proto, tmp_csum);
if (csum == 0 && fl6->flowi6_proto == IPPROTO_UDP)
csum = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
BUG_ON(skb_store_bits(skb, offset, &csum, 2));
send:
err = ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
out:
return err;
}
static int rawv6_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int length,
struct flowi6 *fl6, struct dst_entry **dstp,
unsigned int flags, const struct sockcm_cookie *sockc)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)*dstp;
int hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
int tlen = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
if (length > rt->dst.dev->mtu) {
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, rt->dst.dev->mtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header raw_send_hdrinc() and rawv6_send_hdrinc() expect that the buffer copied from the userspace contains the IPv4/IPv6 header, so if too few bytes are copied, parts of the header may remain uninitialized. This bug has been detected with KMSAN. For the record, the KMSAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in nf_ct_frag6_gather+0xf5a/0x44a0 inter: 0 CPU: 0 PID: 1036 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2455 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52 kmsan_report+0x16b/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1078 __kmsan_warning_32+0x5c/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:510 nf_ct_frag6_gather+0xf5a/0x44a0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:577 ipv6_defrag+0x1d9/0x280 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68 nf_hook_entry_hookfn ./include/linux/netfilter.h:102 nf_hook_slow+0x13f/0x3c0 net/netfilter/core.c:310 nf_hook ./include/linux/netfilter.h:212 NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:255 rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:673 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2fcb/0x41a0 net/ipv6/raw.c:919 inet_sendmsg+0x3f8/0x6d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x6a5/0x7c0 net/socket.c:1696 SyS_sendto+0xbc/0xe0 net/socket.c:1664 do_syscall_64+0x72/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:285 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 RIP: 0033:0x436e03 RSP: 002b:00007ffce48baf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002b0 RCX: 0000000000436e03 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffce48baf90 R08: 00007ffce48baf50 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000401790 R14: 0000000000401820 R15: 0000000000000000 origin: 00000000d9400053 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:362 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb1/0x1a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:257 kmsan_poison_shadow+0x6d/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:270 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2735 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1f4/0x390 mm/slub.c:4341 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 __alloc_skb+0x2cd/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:231 alloc_skb ./include/linux/skbuff.h:933 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x209/0xbc0 net/core/skbuff.c:4678 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x9ff/0xe00 net/core/sock.c:1903 sock_alloc_send_skb+0xe4/0x100 net/core/sock.c:1920 rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:638 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2918/0x41a0 net/ipv6/raw.c:919 inet_sendmsg+0x3f8/0x6d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x6a5/0x7c0 net/socket.c:1696 SyS_sendto+0xbc/0xe0 net/socket.c:1664 do_syscall_64+0x72/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:285 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 ================================================================== , triggered by the following syscalls: socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW) = 3 sendto(3, NULL, 0, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(0), inet_pton(AF_INET6, "ff00::", &sin6_addr), sin6_flowinfo=0, sin6_scope_id=0}, 28) = -1 EPERM A similar report is triggered in net/ipv4/raw.c if we use a PF_INET socket instead of a PF_INET6 one. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-03 23:06:58 +08:00
if (length < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
goto out;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
length + hlen + tlen + 15,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto error;
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sockc->mark;
skb->tstamp = sockc->transmit_time;
skb_put(skb, length);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_setup_tx_timestamp(skb, sockc->tsflags);
if (flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
skb_set_dst_pending_confirm(skb, 1);
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header;
err = memcpy_from_msg(iph, msg, length);
ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc() In rawv6_send_hdrinc(), in order to avoid an extra dst_hold(), we directly assign the dst to skb and set passed in dst to NULL to avoid double free. However, in error case, we free skb and then do stats update with the dst pointer passed in. This causes use-after-free on the dst. Fix it by taking rcu read lock right before dst could get released to make sure dst does not get freed until the stats update is done. Note: we don't have this issue in ipv4 cause dst is not used for stats update in v4. Syzkaller reported following crash: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d95ba730 by task syz-executor0/32088 CPU: 1 PID: 32088 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457099 Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f83756edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f83756ee6d4 RCX: 0000000000457099 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020003840 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000009300a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000004d4b30 R14: 00000000004c90b1 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 32088: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554 dst_alloc+0xbb/0x1d0 net/core/dst.c:105 ip6_dst_alloc+0x35/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:353 ip6_rt_cache_alloc+0x247/0x7b0 net/ipv6/route.c:1186 ip6_pol_route+0x8f8/0xd90 net/ipv6/route.c:1895 ip6_pol_route_output+0x54/0x70 net/ipv6/route.c:2093 fib6_rule_lookup+0x277/0x860 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:122 ip6_route_output_flags+0x2c5/0x350 net/ipv6/route.c:2121 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:88 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0xe27/0x1d60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xc8/0x270 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1079 rawv6_sendmsg+0x12d9/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:905 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5356: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756 dst_destroy+0x267/0x3c0 net/core/dst.c:141 dst_destroy_rcu+0x16/0x19 net/core/dst.c:154 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:236 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2576 [inline] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2880 [inline] __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2847 [inline] rcu_process_callbacks+0xf23/0x2670 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2864 __do_softirq+0x30b/0xad8 kernel/softirq.c:292 Fixes: 1789a640f556 ("raw: avoid two atomics in xmit") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-05 01:12:37 +08:00
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
*dstp = NULL;
/* if egress device is enslaved to an L3 master device pass the
* skb to its handler for processing
*/
skb = l3mdev_ip6_out(sk, skb);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return 0;
ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc() In rawv6_send_hdrinc(), in order to avoid an extra dst_hold(), we directly assign the dst to skb and set passed in dst to NULL to avoid double free. However, in error case, we free skb and then do stats update with the dst pointer passed in. This causes use-after-free on the dst. Fix it by taking rcu read lock right before dst could get released to make sure dst does not get freed until the stats update is done. Note: we don't have this issue in ipv4 cause dst is not used for stats update in v4. Syzkaller reported following crash: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d95ba730 by task syz-executor0/32088 CPU: 1 PID: 32088 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457099 Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f83756edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f83756ee6d4 RCX: 0000000000457099 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020003840 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000009300a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000004d4b30 R14: 00000000004c90b1 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 32088: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554 dst_alloc+0xbb/0x1d0 net/core/dst.c:105 ip6_dst_alloc+0x35/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:353 ip6_rt_cache_alloc+0x247/0x7b0 net/ipv6/route.c:1186 ip6_pol_route+0x8f8/0xd90 net/ipv6/route.c:1895 ip6_pol_route_output+0x54/0x70 net/ipv6/route.c:2093 fib6_rule_lookup+0x277/0x860 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:122 ip6_route_output_flags+0x2c5/0x350 net/ipv6/route.c:2121 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:88 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0xe27/0x1d60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xc8/0x270 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1079 rawv6_sendmsg+0x12d9/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:905 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5356: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756 dst_destroy+0x267/0x3c0 net/core/dst.c:141 dst_destroy_rcu+0x16/0x19 net/core/dst.c:154 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:236 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2576 [inline] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2880 [inline] __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2847 [inline] rcu_process_callbacks+0xf23/0x2670 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2864 __do_softirq+0x30b/0xad8 kernel/softirq.c:292 Fixes: 1789a640f556 ("raw: avoid two atomics in xmit") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-05 01:12:37 +08:00
/* Acquire rcu_read_lock() in case we need to use rt->rt6i_idev
* in the error path. Since skb has been freed, the dst could
* have been queued for deletion.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUT, skb->len);
2015-09-16 09:04:16 +08:00
err = NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, net, sk, skb,
NULL, rt->dst.dev, dst_output);
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc() In rawv6_send_hdrinc(), in order to avoid an extra dst_hold(), we directly assign the dst to skb and set passed in dst to NULL to avoid double free. However, in error case, we free skb and then do stats update with the dst pointer passed in. This causes use-after-free on the dst. Fix it by taking rcu read lock right before dst could get released to make sure dst does not get freed until the stats update is done. Note: we don't have this issue in ipv4 cause dst is not used for stats update in v4. Syzkaller reported following crash: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d95ba730 by task syz-executor0/32088 CPU: 1 PID: 32088 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457099 Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f83756edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f83756ee6d4 RCX: 0000000000457099 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020003840 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000009300a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000004d4b30 R14: 00000000004c90b1 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 32088: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554 dst_alloc+0xbb/0x1d0 net/core/dst.c:105 ip6_dst_alloc+0x35/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:353 ip6_rt_cache_alloc+0x247/0x7b0 net/ipv6/route.c:1186 ip6_pol_route+0x8f8/0xd90 net/ipv6/route.c:1895 ip6_pol_route_output+0x54/0x70 net/ipv6/route.c:2093 fib6_rule_lookup+0x277/0x860 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:122 ip6_route_output_flags+0x2c5/0x350 net/ipv6/route.c:2121 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:88 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0xe27/0x1d60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xc8/0x270 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1079 rawv6_sendmsg+0x12d9/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:905 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5356: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756 dst_destroy+0x267/0x3c0 net/core/dst.c:141 dst_destroy_rcu+0x16/0x19 net/core/dst.c:154 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:236 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2576 [inline] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2880 [inline] __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2847 [inline] rcu_process_callbacks+0xf23/0x2670 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2864 __do_softirq+0x30b/0xad8 kernel/softirq.c:292 Fixes: 1789a640f556 ("raw: avoid two atomics in xmit") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-05 01:12:37 +08:00
if (err) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
rcu_read_unlock();
goto error_check;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return 0;
error:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc() In rawv6_send_hdrinc(), in order to avoid an extra dst_hold(), we directly assign the dst to skb and set passed in dst to NULL to avoid double free. However, in error case, we free skb and then do stats update with the dst pointer passed in. This causes use-after-free on the dst. Fix it by taking rcu read lock right before dst could get released to make sure dst does not get freed until the stats update is done. Note: we don't have this issue in ipv4 cause dst is not used for stats update in v4. Syzkaller reported following crash: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d95ba730 by task syz-executor0/32088 CPU: 1 PID: 32088 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 rawv6_send_hdrinc net/ipv6/raw.c:692 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x4421/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:921 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457099 Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f83756edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f83756ee6d4 RCX: 0000000000457099 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020003840 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000009300a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000004d4b30 R14: 00000000004c90b1 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 32088: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554 dst_alloc+0xbb/0x1d0 net/core/dst.c:105 ip6_dst_alloc+0x35/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:353 ip6_rt_cache_alloc+0x247/0x7b0 net/ipv6/route.c:1186 ip6_pol_route+0x8f8/0xd90 net/ipv6/route.c:1895 ip6_pol_route_output+0x54/0x70 net/ipv6/route.c:2093 fib6_rule_lookup+0x277/0x860 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:122 ip6_route_output_flags+0x2c5/0x350 net/ipv6/route.c:2121 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:88 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0xe27/0x1d60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xc8/0x270 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1079 rawv6_sendmsg+0x12d9/0x4630 net/ipv6/raw.c:905 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:631 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2159 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5356: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756 dst_destroy+0x267/0x3c0 net/core/dst.c:141 dst_destroy_rcu+0x16/0x19 net/core/dst.c:154 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:236 [inline] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2576 [inline] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2880 [inline] __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2847 [inline] rcu_process_callbacks+0xf23/0x2670 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2864 __do_softirq+0x30b/0xad8 kernel/softirq.c:292 Fixes: 1789a640f556 ("raw: avoid two atomics in xmit") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-05 01:12:37 +08:00
error_check:
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !np->recverr)
err = 0;
return err;
}
struct raw6_frag_vec {
struct msghdr *msg;
int hlen;
char c[4];
};
static int rawv6_probe_proto_opt(struct raw6_frag_vec *rfv, struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
int err = 0;
switch (fl6->flowi6_proto) {
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
rfv->hlen = 2;
err = memcpy_from_msg(rfv->c, rfv->msg, rfv->hlen);
if (!err) {
fl6->fl6_icmp_type = rfv->c[0];
fl6->fl6_icmp_code = rfv->c[1];
}
break;
case IPPROTO_MH:
rfv->hlen = 4;
err = memcpy_from_msg(rfv->c, rfv->msg, rfv->hlen);
if (!err)
fl6->fl6_mh_type = rfv->c[2];
}
return err;
}
static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct raw6_frag_vec *rfv = from;
if (offset < rfv->hlen) {
int copy = min(rfv->hlen - offset, len);
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
memcpy(to, rfv->c + offset, copy);
else
skb->csum = csum_block_add(
skb->csum,
csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv->c + offset,
to, copy, 0),
odd);
odd = 0;
offset += copy;
to += copy;
len -= copy;
if (!len)
return 0;
}
offset -= rfv->hlen;
return ip_generic_getfrag(rfv->msg, to, offset, len, odd, skb);
}
static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct raw6_frag_vec rfv;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hdrincl;
u16 proto;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* hdrincl should be READ_ONCE(inet->hdrincl)
* but READ_ONCE() doesn't work with bit fields.
* Doing this indirectly yields the same result.
*/
hdrincl = inet->hdrincl;
hdrincl = READ_ONCE(hdrincl);
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.flowi6_uid = sk->sk_uid;
ipcm6_init(&ipc6);
ipc6.sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
ipc6.sockc.mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (sin6->sin6_family && sin6->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
/* port is the proto value [0..255] carried in nexthdr */
proto = ntohs(sin6->sin6_port);
if (!proto)
proto = inet->inet_num;
else if (proto != inet->inet_num)
return -EINVAL;
if (proto > 255)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (IS_ERR(flowlabel))
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
proto = inet->inet_num;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
ipc6.opt = opt;
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, &ipc6);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (IS_ERR(flowlabel))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (!opt) {
opt = txopt_get(np);
opt_to_free = opt;
}
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = proto;
fl6.flowi6_mark = ipc6.sockc.mark;
if (!hdrincl) {
rfv.msg = msg;
rfv.hlen = 0;
err = rawv6_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl6);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
if (hdrincl)
fl6.flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH;
if (ipc6.tclass < 0)
ipc6.tclass = np->tclass;
fl6.flowlabel = ip6_make_flowinfo(ipc6.tclass, fl6.flowlabel);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sock_net(sk), sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (ipc6.hlimit < 0)
ipc6.hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (ipc6.dontfrag < 0)
ipc6.dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (hdrincl)
err = rawv6_send_hdrinc(sk, msg, len, &fl6, &dst,
msg->msg_flags, &ipc6.sockc);
else {
ipc6.opt = opt;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, raw6_getfrag, &rfv,
len, 0, &ipc6, &fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = rawv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, rp);
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE)
dst_confirm_neigh(dst, &fl6.daddr);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
static int rawv6_seticmpfilter(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
switch (optname) {
case ICMPV6_FILTER:
if (optlen > sizeof(struct icmp6_filter))
optlen = sizeof(struct icmp6_filter);
if (copy_from_user(&raw6_sk(sk)->filter, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return 0;
}
static int rawv6_geticmpfilter(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int len;
switch (optname) {
case ICMPV6_FILTER:
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (len > sizeof(struct icmp6_filter))
len = sizeof(struct icmp6_filter);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &raw6_sk(sk)->filter, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return 0;
}
static int do_rawv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
int val;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_HDRINCL:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW)
return -EINVAL;
inet_sk(sk)->hdrincl = !!val;
return 0;
case IPV6_CHECKSUM:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num == IPPROTO_ICMPV6 &&
level == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
/*
* RFC3542 tells that IPV6_CHECKSUM socket
* option in the IPPROTO_IPV6 level is not
* allowed on ICMPv6 sockets.
* If you want to set it, use IPPROTO_RAW
* level IPV6_CHECKSUM socket option
* (Linux extension).
*/
return -EINVAL;
}
/* You may get strange result with a positive odd offset;
RFC2292bis agrees with me. */
if (val > 0 && (val&1))
return -EINVAL;
if (val < 0) {
rp->checksum = 0;
} else {
rp->checksum = 1;
rp->offset = val;
}
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
static int rawv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
switch (level) {
case SOL_RAW:
break;
case SOL_ICMPV6:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return rawv6_seticmpfilter(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
case SOL_IPV6:
if (optname == IPV6_CHECKSUM ||
optname == IPV6_HDRINCL)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
return ipv6_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
return do_rawv6_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int compat_rawv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
switch (level) {
case SOL_RAW:
break;
case SOL_ICMPV6:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return rawv6_seticmpfilter(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
case SOL_IPV6:
if (optname == IPV6_CHECKSUM ||
optname == IPV6_HDRINCL)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
return compat_ipv6_setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
}
return do_rawv6_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
#endif
static int do_rawv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
int val, len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_HDRINCL:
val = inet_sk(sk)->hdrincl;
break;
case IPV6_CHECKSUM:
/*
* We allow getsockopt() for IPPROTO_IPV6-level
* IPV6_CHECKSUM socket option on ICMPv6 sockets
* since RFC3542 is silent about it.
*/
if (rp->checksum == 0)
val = -1;
else
val = rp->offset;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(int), len);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
static int rawv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
switch (level) {
case SOL_RAW:
break;
case SOL_ICMPV6:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return rawv6_geticmpfilter(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
case SOL_IPV6:
if (optname == IPV6_CHECKSUM ||
optname == IPV6_HDRINCL)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
return ipv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
return do_rawv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int compat_rawv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
switch (level) {
case SOL_RAW:
break;
case SOL_ICMPV6:
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num != IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return rawv6_geticmpfilter(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
case SOL_IPV6:
if (optname == IPV6_CHECKSUM ||
optname == IPV6_HDRINCL)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
return compat_ipv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
}
return do_rawv6_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
#endif
static int rawv6_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCOUTQ: {
int amount = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
case SIOCINQ: {
struct sk_buff *skb;
int amount = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb)
amount = skb->len;
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
default:
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE
return ip6mr_ioctl(sk, cmd, (void __user *)arg);
#else
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
#endif
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int compat_rawv6_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCOUTQ:
case SIOCINQ:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
default:
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE
return ip6mr_compat_ioctl(sk, cmd, compat_ptr(arg));
#else
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
#endif
}
}
#endif
static void rawv6_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num == IPPROTO_RAW)
ip6_ra_control(sk, -1);
ip6mr_sk_done(sk);
sk_common_release(sk);
}
static void raw6_destroy(struct sock *sk)
{
lock_sock(sk);
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
}
static int rawv6_init_sk(struct sock *sk)
{
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
switch (inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) {
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
rp->checksum = 1;
rp->offset = 2;
break;
case IPPROTO_MH:
rp->checksum = 1;
rp->offset = 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
struct proto rawv6_prot = {
.name = "RAWv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.close = rawv6_close,
.destroy = raw6_destroy,
.connect = ip6_datagram_connect_v6_only,
.disconnect = __udp_disconnect,
.ioctl = rawv6_ioctl,
.init = rawv6_init_sk,
.setsockopt = rawv6_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = rawv6_getsockopt,
.sendmsg = rawv6_sendmsg,
.recvmsg = rawv6_recvmsg,
.bind = rawv6_bind,
.backlog_rcv = rawv6_rcv_skb,
.hash = raw_hash_sk,
.unhash = raw_unhash_sk,
.obj_size = sizeof(struct raw6_sock),
.useroffset = offsetof(struct raw6_sock, filter),
.usersize = sizeof_field(struct raw6_sock, filter),
.h.raw_hash = &raw_v6_hashinfo,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_setsockopt = compat_rawv6_setsockopt,
.compat_getsockopt = compat_rawv6_getsockopt,
.compat_ioctl = compat_rawv6_ioctl,
#endif
net: ip, diag -- Add diag interface for raw sockets In criu we are actively using diag interface to collect sockets present in the system when dumping applications. And while for unix, tcp, udp[lite], packet, netlink it works as expected, the raw sockets do not have. Thus add it. v2: - add missing sock_put calls in raw_diag_dump_one (by eric.dumazet@) - implement @destroy for diag requests (by dsa@) v3: - add export of raw_abort for IPv6 (by dsa@) - pass net-admin flag into inet_sk_diag_fill due to changes in net-next branch (by dsa@) v4: - use @pad in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for raw socket protocol specification: raw module carries sockets which may have custom protocol passed from socket() syscall and sole @sdiag_protocol is not enough to match underlied ones - start reporting protocol specifed in socket() call when sockets are raw ones for the same reason: user space tools like ss may parse this attribute and use it for socket matching v5 (by eric.dumazet@): - use sock_hold in raw_sock_get instead of atomic_inc, we're holding (raw_v4_hashinfo|raw_v6_hashinfo)->lock when looking up so counter won't be zero here. v6: - use sdiag_raw_protocol() helper which will access @pad structure used for raw sockets protocol specification: we can't simply rename this member without breaking uapi v7: - sine sdiag_raw_protocol() helper is not suitable for uapi lets rather make an alias structure with proper names. __check_inet_diag_req_raw helper will catch if any of structure unintentionally changed. CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> CC: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> CC: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> CC: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> CC: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-21 18:03:44 +08:00
.diag_destroy = raw_abort,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
static int raw6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq, IPV6_SEQ_DGRAM_HEADER);
} else {
struct sock *sp = v;
__u16 srcp = inet_sk(sp)->inet_num;
ip6_dgram_sock_seq_show(seq, v, srcp, 0,
raw_seq_private(seq)->bucket);
}
return 0;
}
static const struct seq_operations raw6_seq_ops = {
.start = raw_seq_start,
.next = raw_seq_next,
.stop = raw_seq_stop,
.show = raw6_seq_show,
};
static int __net_init raw6_init_net(struct net *net)
{
if (!proc_create_net_data("raw6", 0444, net->proc_net, &raw6_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct raw_iter_state), &raw_v6_hashinfo))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static void __net_exit raw6_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
remove_proc_entry("raw6", net->proc_net);
}
static struct pernet_operations raw6_net_ops = {
.init = raw6_init_net,
.exit = raw6_exit_net,
};
int __init raw6_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&raw6_net_ops);
}
void raw6_proc_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&raw6_net_ops);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
/* Same as inet6_dgram_ops, sans udp_poll. */
const struct proto_ops inet6_sockraw_ops = {
.family = PF_INET6,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.release = inet6_release,
.bind = inet6_bind,
.connect = inet_dgram_connect, /* ok */
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair, /* a do nothing */
.accept = sock_no_accept, /* a do nothing */
.getname = inet6_getname,
.poll = datagram_poll, /* ok */
.ioctl = inet6_ioctl, /* must change */
.gettstamp = sock_gettstamp,
.listen = sock_no_listen, /* ok */
.shutdown = inet_shutdown, /* ok */
.setsockopt = sock_common_setsockopt, /* ok */
.getsockopt = sock_common_getsockopt, /* ok */
.sendmsg = inet_sendmsg, /* ok */
.recvmsg = sock_common_recvmsg, /* ok */
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.sendpage = sock_no_sendpage,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_setsockopt = compat_sock_common_setsockopt,
.compat_getsockopt = compat_sock_common_getsockopt,
#endif
};
static struct inet_protosw rawv6_protosw = {
.type = SOCK_RAW,
.protocol = IPPROTO_IP, /* wild card */
.prot = &rawv6_prot,
.ops = &inet6_sockraw_ops,
.flags = INET_PROTOSW_REUSE,
};
int __init rawv6_init(void)
{
return inet6_register_protosw(&rawv6_protosw);
}
void rawv6_exit(void)
{
inet6_unregister_protosw(&rawv6_protosw);
}