OpenCloudOS-Kernel/fs/fuse/inode.c

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[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
/*
FUSE: Filesystem in Userspace
Copyright (C) 2001-2008 Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
This program can be distributed under the terms of the GNU GPL.
See the file COPYING.
*/
#include "fuse_i.h"
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
#include <linux/statfs.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
MODULE_AUTHOR("Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Filesystem in Userspace");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
static struct kmem_cache *fuse_inode_cachep;
struct list_head fuse_conn_list;
DEFINE_MUTEX(fuse_mutex);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
static int set_global_limit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
unsigned max_user_bgreq;
module_param_call(max_user_bgreq, set_global_limit, param_get_uint,
&max_user_bgreq, 0644);
__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(max_user_bgreq, "uint");
MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_user_bgreq,
"Global limit for the maximum number of backgrounded requests an "
"unprivileged user can set");
unsigned max_user_congthresh;
module_param_call(max_user_congthresh, set_global_limit, param_get_uint,
&max_user_congthresh, 0644);
__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(max_user_congthresh, "uint");
MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_user_congthresh,
"Global limit for the maximum congestion threshold an "
"unprivileged user can set");
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
#define FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC 0x65735546
#define FUSE_DEFAULT_BLKSIZE 512
/** Maximum number of outstanding background requests */
#define FUSE_DEFAULT_MAX_BACKGROUND 12
/** Congestion starts at 75% of maximum */
#define FUSE_DEFAULT_CONGESTION_THRESHOLD (FUSE_DEFAULT_MAX_BACKGROUND * 3 / 4)
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
static struct file_system_type fuseblk_fs_type;
#endif
struct fuse_forget_link *fuse_alloc_forget(void)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct fuse_forget_link), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
static struct inode *fuse_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fuse_inode *fi;
fi = kmem_cache_alloc(fuse_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fi)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return NULL;
fi->i_time = 0;
fi->inval_mask = 0;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
fi->nodeid = 0;
fi->nlookup = 0;
fi->attr_version = 0;
fi->orig_ino = 0;
fi->state = 0;
mutex_init(&fi->mutex);
spin_lock_init(&fi->lock);
fi->forget = fuse_alloc_forget();
if (!fi->forget) {
kmem_cache_free(fuse_inode_cachep, fi);
return NULL;
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return &fi->inode;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static void fuse_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
mutex_destroy(&fi->mutex);
kfree(fi->forget);
kmem_cache_free(fuse_inode_cachep, fi);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static void fuse_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cache Reclaim will be leaving shadow entries in the page cache radix tree upon evicting the real page. As those pages are found from the LRU, an iput() can lead to the inode being freed concurrently. At this point, reclaim must no longer install shadow pages because the inode freeing code needs to ensure the page tree is really empty. Add an address_space flag, AS_EXITING, that the inode freeing code sets under the tree lock before doing the final truncate. Reclaim will check for this flag before installing shadow pages. Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Metin Doslu <metin@citusdata.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Ozgun Erdogan <ozgun@citusdata.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-04 05:47:49 +08:00
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-28 05:05:09 +08:00
if (inode->i_sb->s_flags & SB_ACTIVE) {
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
fuse_queue_forget(fc, fi->forget, fi->nodeid, fi->nlookup);
fi->forget = NULL;
}
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !fuse_is_bad(inode)) {
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fi->write_files));
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fi->queued_writes));
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static int fuse_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
fs: push sync_filesystem() down to the file system's remount_fs() Previously, the no-op "mount -o mount /dev/xxx" operation when the file system is already mounted read-write causes an implied, unconditional syncfs(). This seems pretty stupid, and it's certainly documented or guaraunteed to do this, nor is it particularly useful, except in the case where the file system was mounted rw and is getting remounted read-only. However, it's possible that there might be some file systems that are actually depending on this behavior. In most file systems, it's probably fine to only call sync_filesystem() when transitioning from read-write to read-only, and there are some file systems where this is not needed at all (for example, for a pseudo-filesystem or something like romfs). Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Anders Larsen <al@alarsen.net> Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name> Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org Cc: codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-nilfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
2014-03-13 22:14:33 +08:00
sync_filesystem(sb);
if (fc->sb_flags & SB_MANDLOCK)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/*
* ino_t is 32-bits on 32-bit arch. We have to squash the 64-bit value down
* so that it will fit.
*/
static ino_t fuse_squash_ino(u64 ino64)
{
ino_t ino = (ino_t) ino64;
if (sizeof(ino_t) < sizeof(u64))
ino ^= ino64 >> (sizeof(u64) - sizeof(ino_t)) * 8;
return ino;
}
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 15:54:41 +08:00
void fuse_change_attributes_common(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr,
u64 attr_valid)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
lockdep_assert_held(&fi->lock);
fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version);
fi->i_time = attr_valid;
WRITE_ONCE(fi->inval_mask, 0);
inode->i_ino = fuse_squash_ino(attr->ino);
inode->i_mode = (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) | (attr->mode & 07777);
set_nlink(inode, attr->nlink);
fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns In order to support mounts from namespaces other than init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace from which /dev/fuse is opened. - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to rely on the checks in setattr_prepare for ownership changes. Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. For cuse the userns used is the opener of /dev/cuse. Semantically the cuse support does not appear safe for unprivileged users. Practically the permissions on /dev/cuse only make it accessible to the global root user. If something slips through the cracks in a user namespace the only users who will be able to use the cuse device are those users mapped into the user namespace. Translation in the posix acl is updated to use the uuser namespace of the filesystem. Avoiding cases which might bypass this translation is handled in a following change. This change is stronlgy based on a similar change from Seth Forshee and Dongsu Park. Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-22 01:18:07 +08:00
inode->i_uid = make_kuid(fc->user_ns, attr->uid);
inode->i_gid = make_kgid(fc->user_ns, attr->gid);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
inode->i_blocks = attr->blocks;
/* Sanitize nsecs */
attr->atimensec = min_t(u32, attr->atimensec, NSEC_PER_SEC - 1);
attr->mtimensec = min_t(u32, attr->mtimensec, NSEC_PER_SEC - 1);
attr->ctimensec = min_t(u32, attr->ctimensec, NSEC_PER_SEC - 1);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
inode->i_atime.tv_sec = attr->atime;
inode->i_atime.tv_nsec = attr->atimensec;
/* mtime from server may be stale due to local buffered write */
if (!fc->writeback_cache || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = attr->mtime;
inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = attr->mtimensec;
inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = attr->ctime;
inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = attr->ctimensec;
}
if (attr->blksize != 0)
inode->i_blkbits = ilog2(attr->blksize);
else
inode->i_blkbits = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
/*
* Don't set the sticky bit in i_mode, unless we want the VFS
* to check permissions. This prevents failures due to the
* check in may_delete().
*/
fi->orig_i_mode = inode->i_mode;
if (!fc->default_permissions)
inode->i_mode &= ~S_ISVTX;
fi->orig_ino = attr->ino;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 15:54:41 +08:00
}
void fuse_change_attributes(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr,
u64 attr_valid, u64 attr_version)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
bool is_wb = fc->writeback_cache;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 15:54:41 +08:00
loff_t oldsize;
struct timespec64 old_mtime;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 15:54:41 +08:00
spin_lock(&fi->lock);
fuse: hotfix truncate_pagecache() issue The way how fuse calls truncate_pagecache() from fuse_change_attributes() is completely wrong. Because, w/o i_mutex held, we never sure whether 'oldsize' and 'attr->size' are valid by the time of execution of truncate_pagecache(inode, oldsize, attr->size). In fact, as soon as we released fc->lock in the middle of fuse_change_attributes(), we completely loose control of actions which may happen with given inode until we reach truncate_pagecache. The list of potentially dangerous actions includes mmap-ed reads and writes, ftruncate(2) and write(2) extending file size. The typical outcome of doing truncate_pagecache() with outdated arguments is data corruption from user point of view. This is (in some sense) acceptable in cases when the issue is triggered by a change of the file on the server (i.e. externally wrt fuse operation), but it is absolutely intolerable in scenarios when a single fuse client modifies a file without any external intervention. A real life case I discovered by fsx-linux looked like this: 1. Shrinking ftruncate(2) comes to fuse_do_setattr(). The latter sends FUSE_SETATTR to the server synchronously, but before getting fc->lock ... 2. fuse_dentry_revalidate() is asynchronously called. It sends FUSE_LOOKUP to the server synchronously, then calls fuse_change_attributes(). The latter updates i_size, releases fc->lock, but before comparing oldsize vs attr->size.. 3. fuse_do_setattr() from the first step proceeds by acquiring fc->lock and updating attributes and i_size, but now oldsize is equal to outarg.attr.size because i_size has just been updated (step 2). Hence, fuse_do_setattr() returns w/o calling truncate_pagecache(). 4. As soon as ftruncate(2) completes, the user extends file size by write(2) making a hole in the middle of file, then reads data from the hole either by read(2) or mmap-ed read. The user expects to get zero data from the hole, but gets stale data because truncate_pagecache() is not executed yet. The scenario above illustrates one side of the problem: not truncating the page cache even though we should. Another side corresponds to truncating page cache too late, when the state of inode changed significantly. Theoretically, the following is possible: 1. As in the previous scenario fuse_dentry_revalidate() discovered that i_size changed (due to our own fuse_do_setattr()) and is going to call truncate_pagecache() for some 'new_size' it believes valid right now. But by the time that particular truncate_pagecache() is called ... 2. fuse_do_setattr() returns (either having called truncate_pagecache() or not -- it doesn't matter). 3. The file is extended either by write(2) or ftruncate(2) or fallocate(2). 4. mmap-ed write makes a page in the extended region dirty. The result will be the lost of data user wrote on the fourth step. The patch is a hotfix resolving the issue in a simplistic way: let's skip dangerous i_size update and truncate_pagecache if an operation changing file size is in progress. This simplistic approach looks correct for the cases w/o external changes. And to handle them properly, more sophisticated and intrusive techniques (e.g. NFS-like one) would be required. I'd like to postpone it until the issue is well discussed on the mailing list(s). Changed in v2: - improved patch description to cover both sides of the issue. Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2013-08-30 21:06:04 +08:00
if ((attr_version != 0 && fi->attr_version > attr_version) ||
test_bit(FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE, &fi->state)) {
spin_unlock(&fi->lock);
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 15:54:41 +08:00
return;
}
old_mtime = inode->i_mtime;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 15:54:41 +08:00
fuse_change_attributes_common(inode, attr, attr_valid);
oldsize = inode->i_size;
/*
* In case of writeback_cache enabled, the cached writes beyond EOF
* extend local i_size without keeping userspace server in sync. So,
* attr->size coming from server can be stale. We cannot trust it.
*/
if (!is_wb || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
i_size_write(inode, attr->size);
spin_unlock(&fi->lock);
if (!is_wb && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
bool inval = false;
if (oldsize != attr->size) {
truncate_pagecache(inode, attr->size);
fuse: allow filesystems to have precise control over data cache On networked filesystems file data can be changed externally. FUSE provides notification messages for filesystem to inform kernel that metadata or data region of a file needs to be invalidated in local page cache. That provides the basis for filesystem implementations to invalidate kernel cache explicitly based on observed filesystem-specific events. FUSE has also "automatic" invalidation mode(*) when the kernel automatically invalidates data cache of a file if it sees mtime change. It also automatically invalidates whole data cache of a file if it sees file size being changed. The automatic mode has corresponding capability - FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA. However, due to probably historical reason, that capability controls only whether mtime change should be resulting in automatic invalidation or not. A change in file size always results in invalidating whole data cache of a file irregardless of whether FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA was negotiated(+). The filesystem I write[1] represents data arrays stored in networked database as local files suitable for mmap. It is read-only filesystem - changes to data are committed externally via database interfaces and the filesystem only glues data into contiguous file streams suitable for mmap and traditional array processing. The files are big - starting from hundreds gigabytes and more. The files change regularly, and frequently by data being appended to their end. The size of files thus changes frequently. If a file was accessed locally and some part of its data got into page cache, we want that data to stay cached unless there is memory pressure, or unless corresponding part of the file was actually changed. However current FUSE behaviour - when it sees file size change - is to invalidate the whole file. The data cache of the file is thus completely lost even on small size change, and despite that the filesystem server is careful to accurately translate database changes into FUSE invalidation messages to kernel. Let's fix it: if a filesystem, through new FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA capability, indicates to kernel that it is fully responsible for data cache invalidation, then the kernel won't invalidate files data cache on size change and only truncate that cache to new size in case the size decreased. (*) see 72d0d248ca "fuse: add FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA init flag", eed2179efe "fuse: invalidate inode mapping if mtime changes" (+) in writeback mode the kernel does not invalidate data cache on file size change, but neither it allows the filesystem to set the size due to external event (see 8373200b12 "fuse: Trust kernel i_size only") [1] https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/a50f1d9f/wcfs/wcfs.go#L20 Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-03-27 19:14:15 +08:00
if (!fc->explicit_inval_data)
inval = true;
} else if (fc->auto_inval_data) {
struct timespec64 new_mtime = {
.tv_sec = attr->mtime,
.tv_nsec = attr->mtimensec,
};
/*
* Auto inval mode also checks and invalidates if mtime
* has changed.
*/
if (!timespec64_equal(&old_mtime, &new_mtime))
inval = true;
}
if (inval)
invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static void fuse_init_inode(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr)
{
inode->i_mode = attr->mode & S_IFMT;
inode->i_size = attr->size;
inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = attr->mtime;
inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = attr->mtimensec;
inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = attr->ctime;
inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = attr->ctimensec;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
fuse_init_common(inode);
fuse_init_file_inode(inode);
} else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
fuse_init_dir(inode);
else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
fuse_init_symlink(inode);
else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) ||
S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
fuse_init_common(inode);
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
new_decode_dev(attr->rdev));
} else
BUG();
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
int fuse_inode_eq(struct inode *inode, void *_nodeidp)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
u64 nodeid = *(u64 *) _nodeidp;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
if (get_node_id(inode) == nodeid)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
static int fuse_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *_nodeidp)
{
u64 nodeid = *(u64 *) _nodeidp;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
get_fuse_inode(inode)->nodeid = nodeid;
return 0;
}
struct inode *fuse_iget(struct super_block *sb, u64 nodeid,
int generation, struct fuse_attr *attr,
u64 attr_valid, u64 attr_version)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct inode *inode;
struct fuse_inode *fi;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
retry:
inode = iget5_locked(sb, nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, fuse_inode_set, &nodeid);
if (!inode)
return NULL;
if ((inode->i_state & I_NEW)) {
inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME;
if (!fc->writeback_cache || !S_ISREG(attr->mode))
inode->i_flags |= S_NOCMTIME;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
inode->i_generation = generation;
fuse_init_inode(inode, attr);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
} else if ((inode->i_mode ^ attr->mode) & S_IFMT) {
/* Inode has changed type, any I/O on the old should fail */
fuse_make_bad(inode);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
iput(inode);
goto retry;
}
fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&fi->lock);
fi->nlookup++;
spin_unlock(&fi->lock);
fuse_change_attributes(inode, attr, attr_valid, attr_version);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return inode;
}
int fuse_reverse_inval_inode(struct super_block *sb, u64 nodeid,
loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
struct fuse_inode *fi;
struct inode *inode;
pgoff_t pg_start;
pgoff_t pg_end;
inode = ilookup5(sb, nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, &nodeid);
if (!inode)
return -ENOENT;
fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&fi->lock);
fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version);
spin_unlock(&fi->lock);
fuse_invalidate_attr(inode);
forget_all_cached_acls(inode);
if (offset >= 0) {
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 20:29:47 +08:00
pg_start = offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (len <= 0)
pg_end = -1;
else
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 20:29:47 +08:00
pg_end = (offset + len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
invalidate_inode_pages2_range(inode->i_mapping,
pg_start, pg_end);
}
iput(inode);
return 0;
}
bool fuse_lock_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
bool locked = false;
if (!get_fuse_conn(inode)->parallel_dirops) {
mutex_lock(&get_fuse_inode(inode)->mutex);
locked = true;
}
return locked;
}
void fuse_unlock_inode(struct inode *inode, bool locked)
{
if (locked)
mutex_unlock(&get_fuse_inode(inode)->mutex);
}
static void fuse_umount_begin(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
if (!fc->no_force_umount)
fuse_abort_conn(fc);
}
static void fuse_send_destroy(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
if (fc->conn_init) {
FUSE_ARGS(args);
args.opcode = FUSE_DESTROY;
args.force = true;
args.nocreds = true;
fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
}
}
static void fuse_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
mutex_lock(&fuse_mutex);
list_del(&fc->entry);
fuse_ctl_remove_conn(fc);
mutex_unlock(&fuse_mutex);
fuse_conn_put(fc);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static void convert_fuse_statfs(struct kstatfs *stbuf, struct fuse_kstatfs *attr)
{
stbuf->f_type = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC;
stbuf->f_bsize = attr->bsize;
stbuf->f_frsize = attr->frsize;
stbuf->f_blocks = attr->blocks;
stbuf->f_bfree = attr->bfree;
stbuf->f_bavail = attr->bavail;
stbuf->f_files = attr->files;
stbuf->f_ffree = attr->ffree;
stbuf->f_namelen = attr->namelen;
/* fsid is left zero */
}
static int fuse_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
FUSE_ARGS(args);
struct fuse_statfs_out outarg;
int err;
if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) {
buf->f_type = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC;
return 0;
}
memset(&outarg, 0, sizeof(outarg));
args.in_numargs = 0;
args.opcode = FUSE_STATFS;
args.nodeid = get_node_id(d_inode(dentry));
args.out_numargs = 1;
args.out_args[0].size = sizeof(outarg);
args.out_args[0].value = &outarg;
err = fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
if (!err)
convert_fuse_statfs(buf, &outarg.st);
return err;
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
enum {
OPT_SOURCE,
OPT_SUBTYPE,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
OPT_FD,
OPT_ROOTMODE,
OPT_USER_ID,
OPT_GROUP_ID,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
OPT_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,
OPT_ALLOW_OTHER,
OPT_MAX_READ,
OPT_BLKSIZE,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
OPT_ERR
};
static const struct fs_parameter_spec fuse_param_specs[] = {
fsparam_string ("source", OPT_SOURCE),
fsparam_u32 ("fd", OPT_FD),
fsparam_u32oct ("rootmode", OPT_ROOTMODE),
fsparam_u32 ("user_id", OPT_USER_ID),
fsparam_u32 ("group_id", OPT_GROUP_ID),
fsparam_flag ("default_permissions", OPT_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS),
fsparam_flag ("allow_other", OPT_ALLOW_OTHER),
fsparam_u32 ("max_read", OPT_MAX_READ),
fsparam_u32 ("blksize", OPT_BLKSIZE),
fsparam_string ("subtype", OPT_SUBTYPE),
{}
};
static const struct fs_parameter_description fuse_fs_parameters = {
.name = "fuse",
.specs = fuse_param_specs,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
};
static int fuse_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{
struct fs_parse_result result;
struct fuse_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
int opt;
/*
* Ignore options coming from mount(MS_REMOUNT) for backward
* compatibility.
*/
if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE)
return 0;
opt = fs_parse(fc, &fuse_fs_parameters, param, &result);
if (opt < 0)
return opt;
switch (opt) {
case OPT_SOURCE:
if (fc->source)
return invalf(fc, "fuse: Multiple sources specified");
fc->source = param->string;
param->string = NULL;
break;
case OPT_SUBTYPE:
if (ctx->subtype)
return invalf(fc, "fuse: Multiple subtypes specified");
ctx->subtype = param->string;
param->string = NULL;
return 0;
case OPT_FD:
ctx->fd = result.uint_32;
ctx->fd_present = 1;
break;
case OPT_ROOTMODE:
if (!fuse_valid_type(result.uint_32))
return invalf(fc, "fuse: Invalid rootmode");
ctx->rootmode = result.uint_32;
ctx->rootmode_present = 1;
break;
case OPT_USER_ID:
ctx->user_id = make_kuid(fc->user_ns, result.uint_32);
if (!uid_valid(ctx->user_id))
return invalf(fc, "fuse: Invalid user_id");
ctx->user_id_present = 1;
break;
case OPT_GROUP_ID:
ctx->group_id = make_kgid(fc->user_ns, result.uint_32);
if (!gid_valid(ctx->group_id))
return invalf(fc, "fuse: Invalid group_id");
ctx->group_id_present = 1;
break;
case OPT_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS:
ctx->default_permissions = 1;
break;
case OPT_ALLOW_OTHER:
ctx->allow_other = 1;
break;
case OPT_MAX_READ:
ctx->max_read = result.uint_32;
break;
case OPT_BLKSIZE:
if (!ctx->is_bdev)
return invalf(fc, "fuse: blksize only supported for fuseblk");
ctx->blksize = result.uint_32;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static void fuse_free_fc(struct fs_context *fc)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
if (ctx) {
kfree(ctx->subtype);
kfree(ctx);
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static int fuse_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
if (fc->no_mount_options)
return 0;
fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns In order to support mounts from namespaces other than init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace from which /dev/fuse is opened. - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to rely on the checks in setattr_prepare for ownership changes. Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. For cuse the userns used is the opener of /dev/cuse. Semantically the cuse support does not appear safe for unprivileged users. Practically the permissions on /dev/cuse only make it accessible to the global root user. If something slips through the cracks in a user namespace the only users who will be able to use the cuse device are those users mapped into the user namespace. Translation in the posix acl is updated to use the uuser namespace of the filesystem. Avoiding cases which might bypass this translation is handled in a following change. This change is stronlgy based on a similar change from Seth Forshee and Dongsu Park. Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-22 01:18:07 +08:00
seq_printf(m, ",user_id=%u", from_kuid_munged(fc->user_ns, fc->user_id));
seq_printf(m, ",group_id=%u", from_kgid_munged(fc->user_ns, fc->group_id));
if (fc->default_permissions)
seq_puts(m, ",default_permissions");
if (fc->allow_other)
seq_puts(m, ",allow_other");
if (fc->max_read != ~0)
seq_printf(m, ",max_read=%u", fc->max_read);
if (sb->s_bdev && sb->s_blocksize != FUSE_DEFAULT_BLKSIZE)
seq_printf(m, ",blksize=%lu", sb->s_blocksize);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return 0;
}
static void fuse_iqueue_init(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq,
const struct fuse_iqueue_ops *ops,
void *priv)
{
memset(fiq, 0, sizeof(struct fuse_iqueue));
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-09 11:15:18 +08:00
spin_lock_init(&fiq->lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&fiq->waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fiq->pending);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fiq->interrupts);
fiq->forget_list_tail = &fiq->forget_list_head;
fiq->connected = 1;
fiq->ops = ops;
fiq->priv = priv;
}
static void fuse_pqueue_init(struct fuse_pqueue *fpq)
{
unsigned int i;
spin_lock_init(&fpq->lock);
for (i = 0; i < FUSE_PQ_HASH_SIZE; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fpq->processing[i]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fpq->io);
fpq->connected = 1;
}
void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
const struct fuse_iqueue_ops *fiq_ops, void *fiq_priv)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
memset(fc, 0, sizeof(*fc));
spin_lock_init(&fc->lock);
spin_lock_init(&fc->bg_lock);
init_rwsem(&fc->killsb);
refcount_set(&fc->count, 1);
atomic_set(&fc->dev_count, 1);
init_waitqueue_head(&fc->blocked_waitq);
fuse_iqueue_init(&fc->iq, fiq_ops, fiq_priv);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fc->bg_queue);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fc->entry);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fc->devices);
atomic_set(&fc->num_waiting, 0);
fc->max_background = FUSE_DEFAULT_MAX_BACKGROUND;
fc->congestion_threshold = FUSE_DEFAULT_CONGESTION_THRESHOLD;
atomic64_set(&fc->khctr, 0);
fc->polled_files = RB_ROOT;
fc->blocked = 0;
fc->initialized = 0;
fc->connected = 1;
atomic64_set(&fc->attr_version, 1);
get_random_bytes(&fc->scramble_key, sizeof(fc->scramble_key));
fc->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns In order to support mounts from namespaces other than init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace from which /dev/fuse is opened. - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to rely on the checks in setattr_prepare for ownership changes. Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. For cuse the userns used is the opener of /dev/cuse. Semantically the cuse support does not appear safe for unprivileged users. Practically the permissions on /dev/cuse only make it accessible to the global root user. If something slips through the cracks in a user namespace the only users who will be able to use the cuse device are those users mapped into the user namespace. Translation in the posix acl is updated to use the uuser namespace of the filesystem. Avoiding cases which might bypass this translation is handled in a following change. This change is stronlgy based on a similar change from Seth Forshee and Dongsu Park. Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-22 01:18:07 +08:00
fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
fc->max_pages = FUSE_DEFAULT_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_init);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&fc->count)) {
virtio-fs: add virtiofs filesystem Add a basic file system module for virtio-fs. This does not yet contain shared data support between host and guest or metadata coherency speedups. However it is already significantly faster than virtio-9p. Design Overview =============== With the goal of designing something with better performance and local file system semantics, a bunch of ideas were proposed. - Use fuse protocol (instead of 9p) for communication between guest and host. Guest kernel will be fuse client and a fuse server will run on host to serve the requests. - For data access inside guest, mmap portion of file in QEMU address space and guest accesses this memory using dax. That way guest page cache is bypassed and there is only one copy of data (on host). This will also enable mmap(MAP_SHARED) between guests. - For metadata coherency, there is a shared memory region which contains version number associated with metadata and any guest changing metadata updates version number and other guests refresh metadata on next access. This is yet to be implemented. How virtio-fs differs from existing approaches ============================================== The unique idea behind virtio-fs is to take advantage of the co-location of the virtual machine and hypervisor to avoid communication (vmexits). DAX allows file contents to be accessed without communication with the hypervisor. The shared memory region for metadata avoids communication in the common case where metadata is unchanged. By replacing expensive communication with cheaper shared memory accesses, we expect to achieve better performance than approaches based on network file system protocols. In addition, this also makes it easier to achieve local file system semantics (coherency). These techniques are not applicable to network file system protocols since the communications channel is bypassed by taking advantage of shared memory on a local machine. This is why we decided to build virtio-fs rather than focus on 9P or NFS. Caching Modes ============= Like virtio-9p, different caching modes are supported which determine the coherency level as well. The “cache=FOO” and “writeback” options control the level of coherence between the guest and host filesystems. - cache=none metadata, data and pathname lookup are not cached in guest. They are always fetched from host and any changes are immediately pushed to host. - cache=always metadata, data and pathname lookup are cached in guest and never expire. - cache=auto metadata and pathname lookup cache expires after a configured amount of time (default is 1 second). Data is cached while the file is open (close to open consistency). - writeback/no_writeback These options control the writeback strategy. If writeback is disabled, then normal writes will immediately be synchronized with the host fs. If writeback is enabled, then writes may be cached in the guest until the file is closed or an fsync(2) performed. This option has no effect on mmap-ed writes or writes going through the DAX mechanism. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-06-12 16:41:17 +08:00
struct fuse_iqueue *fiq = &fc->iq;
if (fiq->ops->release)
fiq->ops->release(fiq);
put_pid_ns(fc->pid_ns);
fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns In order to support mounts from namespaces other than init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace from which /dev/fuse is opened. - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to rely on the checks in setattr_prepare for ownership changes. Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. For cuse the userns used is the opener of /dev/cuse. Semantically the cuse support does not appear safe for unprivileged users. Practically the permissions on /dev/cuse only make it accessible to the global root user. If something slips through the cracks in a user namespace the only users who will be able to use the cuse device are those users mapped into the user namespace. Translation in the posix acl is updated to use the uuser namespace of the filesystem. Avoiding cases which might bypass this translation is handled in a following change. This change is stronlgy based on a similar change from Seth Forshee and Dongsu Park. Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-22 01:18:07 +08:00
put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
fc->release(fc);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_put);
struct fuse_conn *fuse_conn_get(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
refcount_inc(&fc->count);
return fc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_get);
static struct inode *fuse_get_root_inode(struct super_block *sb, unsigned mode)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_attr attr;
memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr));
attr.mode = mode;
attr.ino = FUSE_ROOT_ID;
attr.nlink = 1;
return fuse_iget(sb, 1, 0, &attr, 0, 0);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
struct fuse_inode_handle {
u64 nodeid;
u32 generation;
};
static struct dentry *fuse_get_dentry(struct super_block *sb,
struct fuse_inode_handle *handle)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *entry;
int err = -ESTALE;
if (handle->nodeid == 0)
goto out_err;
inode = ilookup5(sb, handle->nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, &handle->nodeid);
if (!inode) {
struct fuse_entry_out outarg;
const struct qstr name = QSTR_INIT(".", 1);
if (!fc->export_support)
goto out_err;
err = fuse_lookup_name(sb, handle->nodeid, &name, &outarg,
&inode);
if (err && err != -ENOENT)
goto out_err;
if (err || !inode) {
err = -ESTALE;
goto out_err;
}
err = -EIO;
if (get_node_id(inode) != handle->nodeid)
goto out_iput;
}
err = -ESTALE;
if (inode->i_generation != handle->generation)
goto out_iput;
entry = d_obtain_alias(inode);
if (!IS_ERR(entry) && get_node_id(inode) != FUSE_ROOT_ID)
fuse_invalidate_entry_cache(entry);
return entry;
out_iput:
iput(inode);
out_err:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static int fuse_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, u32 *fh, int *max_len,
struct inode *parent)
{
int len = parent ? 6 : 3;
u64 nodeid;
u32 generation;
if (*max_len < len) {
*max_len = len;
return FILEID_INVALID;
}
nodeid = get_fuse_inode(inode)->nodeid;
generation = inode->i_generation;
fh[0] = (u32)(nodeid >> 32);
fh[1] = (u32)(nodeid & 0xffffffff);
fh[2] = generation;
if (parent) {
nodeid = get_fuse_inode(parent)->nodeid;
generation = parent->i_generation;
fh[3] = (u32)(nodeid >> 32);
fh[4] = (u32)(nodeid & 0xffffffff);
fh[5] = generation;
}
*max_len = len;
return parent ? 0x82 : 0x81;
}
static struct dentry *fuse_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb,
struct fid *fid, int fh_len, int fh_type)
{
struct fuse_inode_handle handle;
if ((fh_type != 0x81 && fh_type != 0x82) || fh_len < 3)
return NULL;
handle.nodeid = (u64) fid->raw[0] << 32;
handle.nodeid |= (u64) fid->raw[1];
handle.generation = fid->raw[2];
return fuse_get_dentry(sb, &handle);
}
static struct dentry *fuse_fh_to_parent(struct super_block *sb,
struct fid *fid, int fh_len, int fh_type)
{
struct fuse_inode_handle parent;
if (fh_type != 0x82 || fh_len < 6)
return NULL;
parent.nodeid = (u64) fid->raw[3] << 32;
parent.nodeid |= (u64) fid->raw[4];
parent.generation = fid->raw[5];
return fuse_get_dentry(sb, &parent);
}
static struct dentry *fuse_get_parent(struct dentry *child)
{
struct inode *child_inode = d_inode(child);
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(child_inode);
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *parent;
struct fuse_entry_out outarg;
const struct qstr name = QSTR_INIT("..", 2);
int err;
if (!fc->export_support)
return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
err = fuse_lookup_name(child_inode->i_sb, get_node_id(child_inode),
&name, &outarg, &inode);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOENT)
return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
parent = d_obtain_alias(inode);
if (!IS_ERR(parent) && get_node_id(inode) != FUSE_ROOT_ID)
fuse_invalidate_entry_cache(parent);
return parent;
}
static const struct export_operations fuse_export_operations = {
.fh_to_dentry = fuse_fh_to_dentry,
.fh_to_parent = fuse_fh_to_parent,
.encode_fh = fuse_encode_fh,
.get_parent = fuse_get_parent,
};
static const struct super_operations fuse_super_operations = {
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
.alloc_inode = fuse_alloc_inode,
.free_inode = fuse_free_inode,
.evict_inode = fuse_evict_inode,
.write_inode = fuse_write_inode,
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
.put_super = fuse_put_super,
.umount_begin = fuse_umount_begin,
.statfs = fuse_statfs,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
.show_options = fuse_show_options,
};
static void sanitize_global_limit(unsigned *limit)
{
/*
* The default maximum number of async requests is calculated to consume
* 1/2^13 of the total memory, assuming 392 bytes per request.
*/
if (*limit == 0)
*limit = ((totalram_pages() << PAGE_SHIFT) >> 13) / 392;
if (*limit >= 1 << 16)
*limit = (1 << 16) - 1;
}
static int set_global_limit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int rv;
rv = param_set_uint(val, kp);
if (rv)
return rv;
sanitize_global_limit((unsigned *)kp->arg);
return 0;
}
static void process_init_limits(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_init_out *arg)
{
int cap_sys_admin = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
if (arg->minor < 13)
return;
sanitize_global_limit(&max_user_bgreq);
sanitize_global_limit(&max_user_congthresh);
spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock);
if (arg->max_background) {
fc->max_background = arg->max_background;
if (!cap_sys_admin && fc->max_background > max_user_bgreq)
fc->max_background = max_user_bgreq;
}
if (arg->congestion_threshold) {
fc->congestion_threshold = arg->congestion_threshold;
if (!cap_sys_admin &&
fc->congestion_threshold > max_user_congthresh)
fc->congestion_threshold = max_user_congthresh;
}
spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock);
}
struct fuse_init_args {
struct fuse_args args;
struct fuse_init_in in;
struct fuse_init_out out;
};
static void process_init_reply(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_args *args,
int error)
{
struct fuse_init_args *ia = container_of(args, typeof(*ia), args);
struct fuse_init_out *arg = &ia->out;
if (error || arg->major != FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION)
fc->conn_error = 1;
else {
unsigned long ra_pages;
process_init_limits(fc, arg);
if (arg->minor >= 6) {
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 20:29:47 +08:00
ra_pages = arg->max_readahead / PAGE_SIZE;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_ASYNC_READ)
fc->async_read = 1;
if (!(arg->flags & FUSE_POSIX_LOCKS))
fc->no_lock = 1;
if (arg->minor >= 17) {
if (!(arg->flags & FUSE_FLOCK_LOCKS))
fc->no_flock = 1;
} else {
if (!(arg->flags & FUSE_POSIX_LOCKS))
fc->no_flock = 1;
}
if (arg->flags & FUSE_ATOMIC_O_TRUNC)
fc->atomic_o_trunc = 1;
if (arg->minor >= 9) {
/* LOOKUP has dependency on proto version */
if (arg->flags & FUSE_EXPORT_SUPPORT)
fc->export_support = 1;
}
if (arg->flags & FUSE_BIG_WRITES)
fc->big_writes = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_DONT_MASK)
fc->dont_mask = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA)
fc->auto_inval_data = 1;
fuse: allow filesystems to have precise control over data cache On networked filesystems file data can be changed externally. FUSE provides notification messages for filesystem to inform kernel that metadata or data region of a file needs to be invalidated in local page cache. That provides the basis for filesystem implementations to invalidate kernel cache explicitly based on observed filesystem-specific events. FUSE has also "automatic" invalidation mode(*) when the kernel automatically invalidates data cache of a file if it sees mtime change. It also automatically invalidates whole data cache of a file if it sees file size being changed. The automatic mode has corresponding capability - FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA. However, due to probably historical reason, that capability controls only whether mtime change should be resulting in automatic invalidation or not. A change in file size always results in invalidating whole data cache of a file irregardless of whether FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA was negotiated(+). The filesystem I write[1] represents data arrays stored in networked database as local files suitable for mmap. It is read-only filesystem - changes to data are committed externally via database interfaces and the filesystem only glues data into contiguous file streams suitable for mmap and traditional array processing. The files are big - starting from hundreds gigabytes and more. The files change regularly, and frequently by data being appended to their end. The size of files thus changes frequently. If a file was accessed locally and some part of its data got into page cache, we want that data to stay cached unless there is memory pressure, or unless corresponding part of the file was actually changed. However current FUSE behaviour - when it sees file size change - is to invalidate the whole file. The data cache of the file is thus completely lost even on small size change, and despite that the filesystem server is careful to accurately translate database changes into FUSE invalidation messages to kernel. Let's fix it: if a filesystem, through new FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA capability, indicates to kernel that it is fully responsible for data cache invalidation, then the kernel won't invalidate files data cache on size change and only truncate that cache to new size in case the size decreased. (*) see 72d0d248ca "fuse: add FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA init flag", eed2179efe "fuse: invalidate inode mapping if mtime changes" (+) in writeback mode the kernel does not invalidate data cache on file size change, but neither it allows the filesystem to set the size due to external event (see 8373200b12 "fuse: Trust kernel i_size only") [1] https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/a50f1d9f/wcfs/wcfs.go#L20 Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-03-27 19:14:15 +08:00
else if (arg->flags & FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA)
fc->explicit_inval_data = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_DO_READDIRPLUS) {
fc->do_readdirplus = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_READDIRPLUS_AUTO)
fc->readdirplus_auto = 1;
}
if (arg->flags & FUSE_ASYNC_DIO)
fc->async_dio = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_WRITEBACK_CACHE)
fc->writeback_cache = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_PARALLEL_DIROPS)
fc->parallel_dirops = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV)
fc->handle_killpriv = 1;
if (arg->time_gran && arg->time_gran <= 1000000000)
fc->sb->s_time_gran = arg->time_gran;
if ((arg->flags & FUSE_POSIX_ACL)) {
fc->default_permissions = 1;
fc->posix_acl = 1;
fc->sb->s_xattr = fuse_acl_xattr_handlers;
}
if (arg->flags & FUSE_CACHE_SYMLINKS)
fc->cache_symlinks = 1;
if (arg->flags & FUSE_ABORT_ERROR)
fc->abort_err = 1;
fuse: add max_pages to init_out Replace FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ with the configurable parameter max_pages to improve performance. Old RFC with detailed description of the problem and many fixes by Mitsuo Hayasaka (mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com): - https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/7/5/136 We've encountered performance degradation and fixed it on a big and complex virtual environment. Environment to reproduce degradation and improvement: 1. Add lag to user mode FUSE Add nanosleep(&(struct timespec){ 0, 1000 }, NULL); to xmp_write_buf in passthrough_fh.c 2. patch UM fuse with configurable max_pages parameter. The patch will be provided latter. 3. run test script and perform test on tmpfs fuse_test() { cd /tmp mkdir -p fusemnt passthrough_fh -o max_pages=$1 /tmp/fusemnt grep fuse /proc/self/mounts dd conv=fdatasync oflag=dsync if=/dev/zero of=fusemnt/tmp/tmp \ count=1K bs=1M 2>&1 | grep -v records rm fusemnt/tmp/tmp killall passthrough_fh } Test results: passthrough_fh /tmp/fusemnt fuse.passthrough_fh \ rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0 0 0 1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 1.73867 s, 618 MB/s passthrough_fh /tmp/fusemnt fuse.passthrough_fh \ rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0,max_pages=256 0 0 1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 1.15643 s, 928 MB/s Obviously with bigger lag the difference between 'before' and 'after' will be more significant. Mitsuo Hayasaka, in 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/7/5/136), observed improvement from 400-550 to 520-740. Signed-off-by: Constantine Shulyupin <const@MakeLinux.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-09-06 20:37:06 +08:00
if (arg->flags & FUSE_MAX_PAGES) {
fc->max_pages =
min_t(unsigned int, FUSE_MAX_MAX_PAGES,
max_t(unsigned int, arg->max_pages, 1));
}
} else {
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 20:29:47 +08:00
ra_pages = fc->max_read / PAGE_SIZE;
fc->no_lock = 1;
fc->no_flock = 1;
}
fc->sb->s_bdi->ra_pages =
min(fc->sb->s_bdi->ra_pages, ra_pages);
fc->minor = arg->minor;
fc->max_write = arg->minor < 5 ? 4096 : arg->max_write;
fc->max_write = max_t(unsigned, 4096, fc->max_write);
fc->conn_init = 1;
}
kfree(ia);
fuse_set_initialized(fc);
wake_up_all(&fc->blocked_waitq);
}
void fuse_send_init(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
struct fuse_init_args *ia;
ia = kzalloc(sizeof(*ia), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
ia->in.major = FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION;
ia->in.minor = FUSE_KERNEL_MINOR_VERSION;
ia->in.max_readahead = fc->sb->s_bdi->ra_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
ia->in.flags |=
FUSE_ASYNC_READ | FUSE_POSIX_LOCKS | FUSE_ATOMIC_O_TRUNC |
FUSE_EXPORT_SUPPORT | FUSE_BIG_WRITES | FUSE_DONT_MASK |
FUSE_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_SPLICE_MOVE | FUSE_SPLICE_READ |
FUSE_FLOCK_LOCKS | FUSE_HAS_IOCTL_DIR | FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA |
FUSE_DO_READDIRPLUS | FUSE_READDIRPLUS_AUTO | FUSE_ASYNC_DIO |
FUSE_WRITEBACK_CACHE | FUSE_NO_OPEN_SUPPORT |
FUSE_PARALLEL_DIROPS | FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV | FUSE_POSIX_ACL |
FUSE_ABORT_ERROR | FUSE_MAX_PAGES | FUSE_CACHE_SYMLINKS |
fuse: allow filesystems to have precise control over data cache On networked filesystems file data can be changed externally. FUSE provides notification messages for filesystem to inform kernel that metadata or data region of a file needs to be invalidated in local page cache. That provides the basis for filesystem implementations to invalidate kernel cache explicitly based on observed filesystem-specific events. FUSE has also "automatic" invalidation mode(*) when the kernel automatically invalidates data cache of a file if it sees mtime change. It also automatically invalidates whole data cache of a file if it sees file size being changed. The automatic mode has corresponding capability - FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA. However, due to probably historical reason, that capability controls only whether mtime change should be resulting in automatic invalidation or not. A change in file size always results in invalidating whole data cache of a file irregardless of whether FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA was negotiated(+). The filesystem I write[1] represents data arrays stored in networked database as local files suitable for mmap. It is read-only filesystem - changes to data are committed externally via database interfaces and the filesystem only glues data into contiguous file streams suitable for mmap and traditional array processing. The files are big - starting from hundreds gigabytes and more. The files change regularly, and frequently by data being appended to their end. The size of files thus changes frequently. If a file was accessed locally and some part of its data got into page cache, we want that data to stay cached unless there is memory pressure, or unless corresponding part of the file was actually changed. However current FUSE behaviour - when it sees file size change - is to invalidate the whole file. The data cache of the file is thus completely lost even on small size change, and despite that the filesystem server is careful to accurately translate database changes into FUSE invalidation messages to kernel. Let's fix it: if a filesystem, through new FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA capability, indicates to kernel that it is fully responsible for data cache invalidation, then the kernel won't invalidate files data cache on size change and only truncate that cache to new size in case the size decreased. (*) see 72d0d248ca "fuse: add FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA init flag", eed2179efe "fuse: invalidate inode mapping if mtime changes" (+) in writeback mode the kernel does not invalidate data cache on file size change, but neither it allows the filesystem to set the size due to external event (see 8373200b12 "fuse: Trust kernel i_size only") [1] https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/a50f1d9f/wcfs/wcfs.go#L20 Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-03-27 19:14:15 +08:00
FUSE_NO_OPENDIR_SUPPORT | FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA;
ia->args.opcode = FUSE_INIT;
ia->args.in_numargs = 1;
ia->args.in_args[0].size = sizeof(ia->in);
ia->args.in_args[0].value = &ia->in;
ia->args.out_numargs = 1;
/* Variable length argument used for backward compatibility
with interface version < 7.5. Rest of init_out is zeroed
by do_get_request(), so a short reply is not a problem */
ia->args.out_argvar = 1;
ia->args.out_args[0].size = sizeof(ia->out);
ia->args.out_args[0].value = &ia->out;
ia->args.force = true;
ia->args.nocreds = true;
ia->args.end = process_init_reply;
if (fuse_simple_background(fc, &ia->args, GFP_KERNEL) != 0)
process_init_reply(fc, &ia->args, -ENOTCONN);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_send_init);
void fuse_free_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fc->devices));
kfree_rcu(fc, rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_free_conn);
static int fuse_bdi_init(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct super_block *sb)
{
int err;
char *suffix = "";
if (sb->s_bdev) {
suffix = "-fuseblk";
/*
* sb->s_bdi points to blkdev's bdi however we want to redirect
* it to our private bdi...
*/
bdi_put(sb->s_bdi);
sb->s_bdi = &noop_backing_dev_info;
}
err = super_setup_bdi_name(sb, "%u:%u%s", MAJOR(fc->dev),
MINOR(fc->dev), suffix);
if (err)
return err;
sb->s_bdi->ra_pages = VM_READAHEAD_PAGES;
/* fuse does it's own writeback accounting */
sb->s_bdi->capabilities = BDI_CAP_NO_ACCT_WB | BDI_CAP_STRICTLIMIT;
/*
* For a single fuse filesystem use max 1% of dirty +
* writeback threshold.
*
* This gives about 1M of write buffer for memory maps on a
* machine with 1G and 10% dirty_ratio, which should be more
* than enough.
*
* Privileged users can raise it by writing to
*
* /sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio
*/
bdi_set_max_ratio(sb->s_bdi, 1);
return 0;
}
struct fuse_dev *fuse_dev_alloc(void)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud;
struct list_head *pq;
fud = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fuse_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fud)
return NULL;
pq = kcalloc(FUSE_PQ_HASH_SIZE, sizeof(struct list_head), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pq) {
kfree(fud);
return NULL;
}
fud->pq.processing = pq;
fuse_pqueue_init(&fud->pq);
return fud;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_dev_alloc);
void fuse_dev_install(struct fuse_dev *fud, struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
fud->fc = fuse_conn_get(fc);
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
list_add_tail(&fud->entry, &fc->devices);
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_dev_install);
struct fuse_dev *fuse_dev_alloc_install(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud;
fud = fuse_dev_alloc();
if (!fud)
return NULL;
fuse_dev_install(fud, fc);
return fud;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_dev_alloc_install);
void fuse_dev_free(struct fuse_dev *fud)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = fud->fc;
if (fc) {
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
list_del(&fud->entry);
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
fuse_conn_put(fc);
}
kfree(fud->pq.processing);
kfree(fud);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_dev_free);
int fuse_fill_super_common(struct super_block *sb, struct fuse_fs_context *ctx)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_dev *fud;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
struct inode *root;
struct dentry *root_dentry;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
int err;
err = -EINVAL;
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-28 05:05:09 +08:00
if (sb->s_flags & SB_MANDLOCK)
goto err;
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-28 05:05:09 +08:00
sb->s_flags &= ~(SB_NOSEC | SB_I_VERSION);
if (ctx->is_bdev) {
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
err = -EINVAL;
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, ctx->blksize))
goto err;
#endif
} else {
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 20:29:47 +08:00
sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_SIZE;
sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_SHIFT;
}
sb->s_subtype = ctx->subtype;
ctx->subtype = NULL;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
sb->s_magic = FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &fuse_super_operations;
sb->s_xattr = fuse_xattr_handlers;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
sb->s_export_op = &fuse_export_operations;
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE;
if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
/*
* If we are not in the initial user namespace posix
* acls must be translated.
*/
if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
sb->s_xattr = fuse_no_acl_xattr_handlers;
fud = fuse_dev_alloc_install(fc);
if (!fud)
goto err;
fc->dev = sb->s_dev;
fc->sb = sb;
err = fuse_bdi_init(fc, sb);
if (err)
goto err_dev_free;
/* Handle umasking inside the fuse code */
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-28 05:05:09 +08:00
if (sb->s_flags & SB_POSIXACL)
fc->dont_mask = 1;
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-28 05:05:09 +08:00
sb->s_flags |= SB_POSIXACL;
fc->default_permissions = ctx->default_permissions;
fc->allow_other = ctx->allow_other;
fc->user_id = ctx->user_id;
fc->group_id = ctx->group_id;
fc->max_read = max_t(unsigned, 4096, ctx->max_read);
fc->destroy = ctx->destroy;
fc->no_control = ctx->no_control;
fc->no_force_umount = ctx->no_force_umount;
fc->no_mount_options = ctx->no_mount_options;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
err = -ENOMEM;
root = fuse_get_root_inode(sb, ctx->rootmode);
sb->s_d_op = &fuse_root_dentry_operations;
root_dentry = d_make_root(root);
if (!root_dentry)
goto err_dev_free;
/* Root dentry doesn't have .d_revalidate */
sb->s_d_op = &fuse_dentry_operations;
mutex_lock(&fuse_mutex);
err = -EINVAL;
if (*ctx->fudptr)
goto err_unlock;
err = fuse_ctl_add_conn(fc);
if (err)
goto err_unlock;
list_add_tail(&fc->entry, &fuse_conn_list);
sb->s_root = root_dentry;
*ctx->fudptr = fud;
mutex_unlock(&fuse_mutex);
return 0;
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&fuse_mutex);
dput(root_dentry);
err_dev_free:
fuse_dev_free(fud);
err:
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_fill_super_common);
static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fsc)
{
struct fuse_fs_context *ctx = fsc->fs_private;
struct file *file;
int err;
struct fuse_conn *fc;
err = -EINVAL;
file = fget(ctx->fd);
if (!file)
goto err;
/*
* Require mount to happen from the same user namespace which
* opened /dev/fuse to prevent potential attacks.
*/
if ((file->f_op != &fuse_dev_operations) ||
(file->f_cred->user_ns != sb->s_user_ns))
goto err_fput;
ctx->fudptr = &file->private_data;
fc = kmalloc(sizeof(*fc), GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!fc)
goto err_fput;
fuse_conn_init(fc, sb->s_user_ns, &fuse_dev_fiq_ops, NULL);
fc->release = fuse_free_conn;
sb->s_fs_info = fc;
err = fuse_fill_super_common(sb, ctx);
if (err)
goto err_put_conn;
/*
* atomic_dec_and_test() in fput() provides the necessary
* memory barrier for file->private_data to be visible on all
* CPUs after this
*/
fput(file);
fuse_send_init(get_fuse_conn_super(sb));
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return 0;
err_put_conn:
fuse_conn_put(fc);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
err_fput:
fput(file);
err:
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return err;
}
static int fuse_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct fuse_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
if (!ctx->fd_present || !ctx->rootmode_present ||
!ctx->user_id_present || !ctx->group_id_present)
return -EINVAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (ctx->is_bdev)
return get_tree_bdev(fc, fuse_fill_super);
#endif
return get_tree_nodev(fc, fuse_fill_super);
}
static const struct fs_context_operations fuse_context_ops = {
.free = fuse_free_fc,
.parse_param = fuse_parse_param,
.reconfigure = fuse_reconfigure,
.get_tree = fuse_get_tree,
};
/*
* Set up the filesystem mount context.
*/
static int fuse_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct fuse_fs_context *ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fuse_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->max_read = ~0;
ctx->blksize = FUSE_DEFAULT_BLKSIZE;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (fc->fs_type == &fuseblk_fs_type) {
ctx->is_bdev = true;
ctx->destroy = true;
}
#endif
fc->fs_private = ctx;
fc->ops = &fuse_context_ops;
return 0;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static void fuse_sb_destroy(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
if (fc) {
if (fc->destroy)
fuse_send_destroy(fc);
fuse_abort_conn(fc);
fuse_wait_aborted(fc);
down_write(&fc->killsb);
fc->sb = NULL;
up_write(&fc->killsb);
}
}
void fuse_kill_sb_anon(struct super_block *sb)
{
fuse_sb_destroy(sb);
kill_anon_super(sb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_kill_sb_anon);
static struct file_system_type fuse_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "fuse",
.fs_flags = FS_HAS_SUBTYPE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
.init_fs_context = fuse_init_fs_context,
.parameters = &fuse_fs_parameters,
.kill_sb = fuse_kill_sb_anon,
};
fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-" and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules to match. A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel. Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially making things safer with no real cost. Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe, well understood work-arounds to known problematic software. This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module autofs4. This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module. After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module() without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep. Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which most filesystems do not set today. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-03 11:39:14 +08:00
MODULE_ALIAS_FS("fuse");
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
static void fuse_kill_sb_blk(struct super_block *sb)
{
fuse_sb_destroy(sb);
kill_block_super(sb);
}
static struct file_system_type fuseblk_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "fuseblk",
.init_fs_context = fuse_init_fs_context,
.parameters = &fuse_fs_parameters,
.kill_sb = fuse_kill_sb_blk,
.fs_flags = FS_REQUIRES_DEV | FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
};
fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-" and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules to match. A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel. Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially making things safer with no real cost. Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe, well understood work-arounds to known problematic software. This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module autofs4. This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module. After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module() without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep. Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which most filesystems do not set today. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-03 11:39:14 +08:00
MODULE_ALIAS_FS("fuseblk");
static inline int register_fuseblk(void)
{
return register_filesystem(&fuseblk_fs_type);
}
static inline void unregister_fuseblk(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&fuseblk_fs_type);
}
#else
static inline int register_fuseblk(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void unregister_fuseblk(void)
{
}
#endif
static void fuse_inode_init_once(void *foo)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
{
struct inode *inode = foo;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
inode_init_once(inode);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
static int __init fuse_fs_init(void)
{
int err;
fuse_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("fuse_inode",
sizeof(struct fuse_inode), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_ACCOUNT|SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT,
fuse_inode_init_once);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!fuse_inode_cachep)
goto out;
err = register_fuseblk();
if (err)
goto out2;
err = register_filesystem(&fuse_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out3;
return 0;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
out3:
unregister_fuseblk();
out2:
kmem_cache_destroy(fuse_inode_cachep);
out:
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return err;
}
static void fuse_fs_cleanup(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&fuse_fs_type);
unregister_fuseblk();
/*
* Make sure all delayed rcu free inodes are flushed before we
* destroy cache.
*/
rcu_barrier();
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
kmem_cache_destroy(fuse_inode_cachep);
}
static struct kobject *fuse_kobj;
static int fuse_sysfs_init(void)
{
int err;
fuse_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("fuse", fs_kobj);
if (!fuse_kobj) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fuse_kobj, "connections");
if (err)
goto out_fuse_unregister;
return 0;
out_fuse_unregister:
kobject_put(fuse_kobj);
out_err:
return err;
}
static void fuse_sysfs_cleanup(void)
{
sysfs_remove_mount_point(fuse_kobj, "connections");
kobject_put(fuse_kobj);
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
static int __init fuse_init(void)
{
int res;
pr_info("init (API version %i.%i)\n",
FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION, FUSE_KERNEL_MINOR_VERSION);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fuse_conn_list);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
res = fuse_fs_init();
if (res)
goto err;
res = fuse_dev_init();
if (res)
goto err_fs_cleanup;
res = fuse_sysfs_init();
if (res)
goto err_dev_cleanup;
res = fuse_ctl_init();
if (res)
goto err_sysfs_cleanup;
sanitize_global_limit(&max_user_bgreq);
sanitize_global_limit(&max_user_congthresh);
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
return 0;
err_sysfs_cleanup:
fuse_sysfs_cleanup();
err_dev_cleanup:
fuse_dev_cleanup();
err_fs_cleanup:
fuse_fs_cleanup();
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
err:
return res;
}
static void __exit fuse_exit(void)
{
pr_debug("exit\n");
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
fuse_ctl_cleanup();
fuse_sysfs_cleanup();
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
fuse_fs_cleanup();
fuse_dev_cleanup();
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-10 04:10:26 +08:00
}
module_init(fuse_init);
module_exit(fuse_exit);