License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
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#include <linux/regset.h>
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2013-01-22 04:25:54 +08:00
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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2019-06-26 12:50:30 +08:00
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2016-12-25 03:46:01 +08:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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#include <asm/ldt.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/proto.h>
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2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
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#include "tls.h"
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* sys_alloc_thread_area: get a yet unused TLS descriptor index.
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*/
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static int get_free_idx(void)
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{
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struct thread_struct *t = ¤t->thread;
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int idx;
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for (idx = 0; idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES; idx++)
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2008-01-30 20:30:46 +08:00
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if (desc_empty(&t->tls_array[idx]))
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return idx + GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
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return -ESRCH;
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}
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2014-12-05 08:48:16 +08:00
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static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
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{
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x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as "no segment"
The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index:
struct user_desc u_info;
bzero(&u_info, sizeof(u_info));
u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1;
syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &u_info);
Strictly speaking, this code was never correct. It should have set
read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted
to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should
have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate
a TLS entry for real. The actual effect of this code was to
allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix.
The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing
set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game.
This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find
a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game
expects but should be close enough to keep it working. In
particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will
allocate the same segment both times.
According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2.
If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate
a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me.
Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-01-23 03:27:59 +08:00
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/*
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* For historical reasons (i.e. no one ever documented how any
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* of the segmentation APIs work), user programs can and do
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* assume that a struct user_desc that's all zeros except for
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* entry_number means "no segment at all". This never actually
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* worked. In fact, up to Linux 3.19, a struct user_desc like
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* this would create a 16-bit read-write segment with base and
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* limit both equal to zero.
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*
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* That was close enough to "no segment at all" until we
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* hardened this function to disallow 16-bit TLS segments. Fix
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* it up by interpreting these zeroed segments the way that they
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* were almost certainly intended to be interpreted.
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*
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* The correct way to ask for "no segment at all" is to specify
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* a user_desc that satisfies LDT_empty. To keep everything
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* working, we accept both.
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*
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* Note that there's a similar kludge in modify_ldt -- look at
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* the distinction between modes 1 and 0x11.
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*/
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if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
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2014-12-05 08:48:16 +08:00
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return true;
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/*
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* espfix is required for 16-bit data segments, but espfix
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* only works for LDT segments.
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*/
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if (!info->seg_32bit)
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return false;
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2014-12-05 08:48:17 +08:00
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/* Only allow data segments in the TLS array. */
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if (info->contents > 1)
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return false;
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/*
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* Non-present segments with DPL 3 present an interesting attack
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* surface. The kernel should handle such segments correctly,
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* but TLS is very difficult to protect in a sandbox, so prevent
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* such segments from being created.
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*
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* If userspace needs to remove a TLS entry, it can still delete
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* it outright.
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*/
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if (info->seg_not_present)
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return false;
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2014-12-05 08:48:16 +08:00
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return true;
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}
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|
2008-01-30 20:31:51 +08:00
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static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
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2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
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const struct user_desc *info, int n)
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2008-01-30 20:31:51 +08:00
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{
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struct thread_struct *t = &p->thread;
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struct desc_struct *desc = &t->tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN];
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int cpu;
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/*
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* We must not get preempted while modifying the TLS.
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*/
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cpu = get_cpu();
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2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
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while (n-- > 0) {
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2017-12-16 03:35:11 +08:00
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if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
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2017-08-28 14:47:40 +08:00
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memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
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2017-12-16 03:35:11 +08:00
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else
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2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
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fill_ldt(desc, info);
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++info;
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++desc;
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}
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2008-01-30 20:31:51 +08:00
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if (t == ¤t->thread)
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load_TLS(t, cpu);
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put_cpu();
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}
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* Set a given TLS descriptor:
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*/
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2008-01-30 20:30:46 +08:00
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int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
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struct user_desc __user *u_info,
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int can_allocate)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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struct user_desc info;
|
x86/tls: Synchronize segment registers in set_thread_area()
The current behavior of set_thread_area() when it modifies a segment that is
currently loaded is a bit confused.
If CS [1] or SS is modified, the change will take effect on return
to userspace because CS and SS are fundamentally always reloaded on
return to userspace.
Similarly, on 32-bit kernels, if DS, ES, FS, or (depending on
configuration) GS refers to a modified segment, the change will take
effect immediately on return to user mode because the entry code
reloads these registers.
If set_thread_area() modifies DS, ES [2], FS, or GS on 64-bit kernels or
GS on 32-bit lazy-GS [3] kernels, however, the segment registers
will be left alone until something (most likely a context switch)
causes them to be reloaded. This means that behavior visible to
user space is inconsistent.
If set_thread_area() is implicitly called via CLONE_SETTLS, then all
segment registers will be reloaded before the thread starts because
CLONE_SETTLS happens before the initial context switch into the
newly created thread.
Empirically, glibc requires the immediate reload on CLONE_SETTLS --
32-bit glibc on my system does *not* manually reload GS when
creating a new thread.
Before enabling FSGSBASE, we need to figure out what the behavior
will be, as FSGSBASE requires that we reconsider our behavior when,
e.g., GS and GSBASE are out of sync in user mode. Given that we
must preserve the existing behavior of CLONE_SETTLS, it makes sense
to me that we simply extend similar behavior to all invocations
of set_thread_area().
This patch explicitly updates any segment register referring to a
segment that is targetted by set_thread_area(). If set_thread_area()
deletes the segment, then the segment register will be nulled out.
[1] This can't actually happen since 0e58af4e1d21 ("x86/tls:
Disallow unusual TLS segments") but, if it did, this is how it
would behave.
[2] I strongly doubt that any existing non-malicious program loads a
TLS segment into DS or ES on a 64-bit kernel because the context
switch code was badly broken until recently, but that's not an
excuse to leave the current code alone.
[3] One way or another, that config option should to go away. Yuck!
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/27d119b0d396e9b82009e40dff8333a249038225.1461698311.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-04-27 03:23:30 +08:00
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unsigned short __maybe_unused sel, modified_sel;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
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return -EFAULT;
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|
2014-12-05 08:48:16 +08:00
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if (!tls_desc_okay(&info))
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return -EINVAL;
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2008-01-30 20:30:46 +08:00
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if (idx == -1)
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idx = info.entry_number;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
|
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* index -1 means the kernel should try to find and
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* allocate an empty descriptor:
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*/
|
2008-01-30 20:30:46 +08:00
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if (idx == -1 && can_allocate) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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idx = get_free_idx();
|
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if (idx < 0)
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return idx;
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|
if (put_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
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return -EFAULT;
|
|
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}
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if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
|
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return -EINVAL;
|
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|
2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
|
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set_tls_desc(p, idx, &info, 1);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
x86/tls: Synchronize segment registers in set_thread_area()
The current behavior of set_thread_area() when it modifies a segment that is
currently loaded is a bit confused.
If CS [1] or SS is modified, the change will take effect on return
to userspace because CS and SS are fundamentally always reloaded on
return to userspace.
Similarly, on 32-bit kernels, if DS, ES, FS, or (depending on
configuration) GS refers to a modified segment, the change will take
effect immediately on return to user mode because the entry code
reloads these registers.
If set_thread_area() modifies DS, ES [2], FS, or GS on 64-bit kernels or
GS on 32-bit lazy-GS [3] kernels, however, the segment registers
will be left alone until something (most likely a context switch)
causes them to be reloaded. This means that behavior visible to
user space is inconsistent.
If set_thread_area() is implicitly called via CLONE_SETTLS, then all
segment registers will be reloaded before the thread starts because
CLONE_SETTLS happens before the initial context switch into the
newly created thread.
Empirically, glibc requires the immediate reload on CLONE_SETTLS --
32-bit glibc on my system does *not* manually reload GS when
creating a new thread.
Before enabling FSGSBASE, we need to figure out what the behavior
will be, as FSGSBASE requires that we reconsider our behavior when,
e.g., GS and GSBASE are out of sync in user mode. Given that we
must preserve the existing behavior of CLONE_SETTLS, it makes sense
to me that we simply extend similar behavior to all invocations
of set_thread_area().
This patch explicitly updates any segment register referring to a
segment that is targetted by set_thread_area(). If set_thread_area()
deletes the segment, then the segment register will be nulled out.
[1] This can't actually happen since 0e58af4e1d21 ("x86/tls:
Disallow unusual TLS segments") but, if it did, this is how it
would behave.
[2] I strongly doubt that any existing non-malicious program loads a
TLS segment into DS or ES on a 64-bit kernel because the context
switch code was badly broken until recently, but that's not an
excuse to leave the current code alone.
[3] One way or another, that config option should to go away. Yuck!
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/27d119b0d396e9b82009e40dff8333a249038225.1461698311.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-04-27 03:23:30 +08:00
|
|
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/*
|
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* If DS, ES, FS, or GS points to the modified segment, forcibly
|
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|
* refresh it. Only needed on x86_64 because x86_32 reloads them
|
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* on return to user mode.
|
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*/
|
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modified_sel = (idx << 3) | 3;
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if (p == current) {
|
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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savesegment(ds, sel);
|
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if (sel == modified_sel)
|
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loadsegment(ds, sel);
|
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savesegment(es, sel);
|
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if (sel == modified_sel)
|
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loadsegment(es, sel);
|
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|
|
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savesegment(fs, sel);
|
|
|
|
if (sel == modified_sel)
|
|
|
|
loadsegment(fs, sel);
|
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|
|
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savesegment(gs, sel);
|
|
|
|
if (sel == modified_sel)
|
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|
|
load_gs_index(sel);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
|
|
|
|
savesegment(gs, sel);
|
|
|
|
if (sel == modified_sel)
|
|
|
|
loadsegment(gs, sel);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
|
|
if (p->thread.fsindex == modified_sel)
|
|
|
|
p->thread.fsbase = info.base_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->thread.gsindex == modified_sel)
|
|
|
|
p->thread.gsbase = info.base_addr;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-22 04:25:54 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(set_thread_area, struct user_desc __user *, u_info)
|
2008-01-30 20:30:45 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-22 04:25:54 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_set_thread_area(current, -1, u_info, 1);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get the current Thread-Local Storage area:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:31:51 +08:00
|
|
|
static void fill_user_desc(struct user_desc *info, int idx,
|
|
|
|
const struct desc_struct *desc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
|
|
|
|
info->entry_number = idx;
|
|
|
|
info->base_addr = get_desc_base(desc);
|
|
|
|
info->limit = get_desc_limit(desc);
|
|
|
|
info->seg_32bit = desc->d;
|
|
|
|
info->contents = desc->type >> 2;
|
|
|
|
info->read_exec_only = !(desc->type & 2);
|
|
|
|
info->limit_in_pages = desc->g;
|
|
|
|
info->seg_not_present = !desc->p;
|
|
|
|
info->useable = desc->avl;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
|
|
info->lm = desc->l;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
|
|
|
|
struct user_desc __user *u_info)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct user_desc info;
|
2019-06-26 12:50:30 +08:00
|
|
|
int index;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:46 +08:00
|
|
|
if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2008-01-30 20:31:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-26 12:50:30 +08:00
|
|
|
index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
|
|
|
|
index = array_index_nospec(index,
|
|
|
|
GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-22 04:25:54 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(get_thread_area, struct user_desc __user *, u_info)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-22 04:25:54 +08:00
|
|
|
return do_get_thread_area(current, -1, u_info);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int regset_tls_active(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct thread_struct *t = &target->thread;
|
|
|
|
int n = GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES;
|
|
|
|
while (n > 0 && desc_empty(&t->tls_array[n - 1]))
|
|
|
|
--n;
|
|
|
|
return n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int regset_tls_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct desc_struct *tls;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-24 15:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
|
2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
|
|
|
(pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(count % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos /= sizeof(struct user_desc);
|
|
|
|
count /= sizeof(struct user_desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tls = &target->thread.tls_array[pos];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kbuf) {
|
|
|
|
struct user_desc *info = kbuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count-- > 0)
|
|
|
|
fill_user_desc(info++, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + pos++,
|
|
|
|
tls++);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
struct user_desc __user *u_info = ubuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count-- > 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct user_desc info;
|
|
|
|
fill_user_desc(&info, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + pos++, tls++);
|
|
|
|
if (__copy_to_user(u_info++, &info, sizeof(info)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
|
|
|
|
const struct user_desc *info;
|
2014-12-05 08:48:16 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-03-24 15:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
|
2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
|
|
|
(pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(count % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kbuf)
|
|
|
|
info = kbuf;
|
|
|
|
else if (__copy_from_user(infobuf, ubuf, count))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
info = infobuf;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-05 08:48:16 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < count / sizeof(struct user_desc); i++)
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_desc_okay(info + i))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:31:52 +08:00
|
|
|
set_tls_desc(target,
|
|
|
|
GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
|
|
|
|
info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|