OpenCloudOS-Kernel/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) += latent_entropy_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) \
+= -DLATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
gcc-plugins: Undefine LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN when plugin disabled for a file Commit 36d4b36b6959 ("lib/nodemask: inline next_node_in() and node_random()") refactored some code by moving node_random() from lib/nodemask.c to include/linux/nodemask.h, thus requiring nodemask.h to include random.h, which conditionally defines add_latent_entropy() depending on whether the macro LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN is defined. This broke the build on powerpc, where nodemask.h is indirectly included in arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c, part of the early boot machinery that is excluded from the latent entropy plugin using DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN. It turns out that while we add a gcc flag to disable the actual plugin, we don't undefine LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN. This leads to the following: CC arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.o In file included from ./include/linux/nodemask.h:97, from ./include/linux/mmzone.h:17, from ./include/linux/gfp.h:7, from ./include/linux/xarray.h:15, from ./include/linux/radix-tree.h:21, from ./include/linux/idr.h:15, from ./include/linux/kernfs.h:12, from ./include/linux/sysfs.h:16, from ./include/linux/kobject.h:20, from ./include/linux/pci.h:35, from arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c:24: ./include/linux/random.h: In function 'add_latent_entropy': ./include/linux/random.h:25:46: error: 'latent_entropy' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'add_latent_entropy'? 25 | add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | add_latent_entropy ./include/linux/random.h:25:46: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:249: arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.o] Fehler 1 make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:465: arch/powerpc/kernel] Fehler 2 make: *** [Makefile:1855: arch/powerpc] Error 2 Change the DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN flags to undefine LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN for files where the plugin is disabled. Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216367 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2208152006320.289321@ramsan.of.borg/ Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816051720.44108-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2022-08-16 13:17:20 +08:00
DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-latent_entropy_plugin-disable -ULATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
endif
export DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK) += structleak_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE) \
+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-verbose
gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types This adjusts structleak to also work with non-struct types when they are passed by reference, since those variables may leak just like anything else. This is exposed via an improved set of Kconfig options. (This does mean structleak is slightly misnamed now.) Building with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL should give the kernel complete initialization coverage of all stack variables passed by reference, including padding (see lib/test_stackinit.c). Using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE to count added initializations under defconfig: ..._BYREF: 5945 added initializations ..._BYREF_ALL: 16606 added initializations There is virtually no change to text+data size (both have less than 0.05% growth): text data bss dec hex filename 19502103 5051456 1917000 26470559 193e89f vmlinux.stock 19513412 5051456 1908808 26473676 193f4cc vmlinux.byref 19516974 5047360 1900616 26464950 193d2b6 vmlinux.byref_all The measured performance difference is in the noise for hackbench and kernel build benchmarks: Stock: 5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000 Mean: 10.649s Std Dev: 0.339 5x kernel build (4-way parallel) Mean: 261.98s Std Dev: 1.53 CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF: 5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000 Mean: 10.540s Std Dev: 0.233 5x kernel build (4-way parallel) Mean: 260.52s Std Dev: 1.31 CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL: 5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000 Mean: 10.320 Std Dev: 0.413 5x kernel build (4-way parallel) Mean: 260.10 Std Dev: 0.86 This does not yet solve missing padding initialization for structures on the stack that are never passed by reference (which should be a tiny minority). Hopefully this will be more easily addressed by upstream compiler fixes after clarifying the C11 padding initialization specification. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
2019-01-24 07:19:29 +08:00
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF) \
+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-byref
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL) \
+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-byref-all
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
DISABLE_STRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-disable
endif
export DISABLE_STRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK) \
+= -DSTRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \
+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \
+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
gcc-plugins/stackleak: Use asm instrumentation to avoid useless register saving The kernel code instrumentation in stackleak gcc plugin works in two stages. At first, stack tracking is added to GIMPLE representation of every function (except some special cases). And later, when stack frame size info is available, stack tracking is removed from the RTL representation of the functions with small stack frame. There is an unwanted side-effect for these functions: some of them do useless work with caller-saved registers. As an example of such case, proc_sys_write without() instrumentation: 55 push %rbp 41 b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%r8d 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp e8 11 ff ff ff callq ffffffff81284610 <proc_sys_call_handler> 5d pop %rbp c3 retq 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 00 00 00 proc_sys_write() with instrumentation: 55 push %rbp 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp 41 56 push %r14 41 55 push %r13 41 54 push %r12 53 push %rbx 49 89 f4 mov %rsi,%r12 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx 49 89 d5 mov %rdx,%r13 49 89 ce mov %rcx,%r14 4c 89 f1 mov %r14,%rcx 4c 89 ea mov %r13,%rdx 4c 89 e6 mov %r12,%rsi 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi 41 b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%r8d e8 f2 fe ff ff callq ffffffff81298e80 <proc_sys_call_handler> 5b pop %rbx 41 5c pop %r12 41 5d pop %r13 41 5e pop %r14 5d pop %rbp c3 retq 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 00 00 Let's improve the instrumentation to avoid this: 1. Make stackleak_track_stack() save all register that it works with. Use no_caller_saved_registers attribute for that function. This attribute is available for x86_64 and i386 starting from gcc-7. 2. Insert calling stackleak_track_stack() in asm: asm volatile("call stackleak_track_stack" :: "r" (current_stack_pointer)) Here we use ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT trick from arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h. The input constraint is taken into account during gcc shrink-wrapping optimization. It is needed to be sure that stackleak_track_stack() call is inserted after the prologue of the containing function, when the stack frame is prepared. This work is a deep reengineering of the idea described on grsecurity blog https://grsecurity.net/resolving_an_unfortunate_stackleak_interaction Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200624123330.83226-5-alex.popov@linux.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-24 20:33:29 +08:00
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \
+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-arch=$(SRCARCH)
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE) \
+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-verbose
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
endif
export DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK) += arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.so
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK
DISABLE_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-arm_ssp_per_task_plugin-disable
endif
export DISABLE_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK_PLUGIN
# All the plugin CFLAGS are collected here in case a build target needs to
# filter them out of the KBUILD_CFLAGS.
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
export GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS
# Add the flags to the build!
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
# Some plugins are enabled outside of this Makefile, but they still need to
# be included in GCC_PLUGIN so they can get built.
gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV) \
+= sancov_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) \
+= randomize_layout_plugin.so
# All enabled GCC plugins are collected here for building in
# scripts/gcc-scripts/Makefile.
GCC_PLUGIN := $(gcc-plugin-y) $(gcc-plugin-external-y)
export GCC_PLUGIN