OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H
#define _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
struct task_struct; /* one of the stranger aspects of C forward declarations */
struct task_struct *__switch_to_asm(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next);
__visible struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next);
x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y) This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks by setting HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y - which enables the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y high level Kconfig option. There are a couple of interesting bits: First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc area. This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die. To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms. Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to detect and handle stack overflow. I didn't enable it on x86_32. We'd need to rework the double-fault code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual addresses under some workloads. This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes above the bottom of the stack. Specifically, we'll get #PF and make it to no_context and them oops without reliably triggering a double-fault, and no_context doesn't know about stack overflows. The next patch will improve that case. Thank you to Nadav and Brian for helping me pay enough attention to the SDM to hopefully get this right. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c88f3e2920b18e6cc621d772a04a62c06869037e.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org [ Minor edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-11 17:35:23 +08:00
/* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */
static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *next)
x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y) This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks by setting HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y - which enables the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y high level Kconfig option. There are a couple of interesting bits: First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc area. This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die. To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms. Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to detect and handle stack overflow. I didn't enable it on x86_32. We'd need to rework the double-fault code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual addresses under some workloads. This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes above the bottom of the stack. Specifically, we'll get #PF and make it to no_context and them oops without reliably triggering a double-fault, and no_context doesn't know about stack overflows. The next patch will improve that case. Thank you to Nadav and Brian for helping me pay enough attention to the SDM to hopefully get this right. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c88f3e2920b18e6cc621d772a04a62c06869037e.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org [ Minor edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-11 17:35:23 +08:00
{
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
/*
* If we switch to a stack that has a top-level paging entry
* that is not present in the current mm, the resulting #PF will
* will be promoted to a double-fault and we'll panic. Probe
* the new stack now so that vmalloc_fault can fix up the page
* tables if needed. This can only happen if we use a stack
* in vmap space.
*
* We assume that the stack is aligned so that it never spans
* more than one top-level paging entry.
*
* To minimize cache pollution, just follow the stack pointer.
*/
READ_ONCE(*(unsigned char *)next->thread.sp);
#endif
}
asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void);
/*
* This is the structure pointed to by thread.sp for an inactive task. The
* order of the fields must match the code in __switch_to_asm().
*/
struct inactive_task_frame {
unsigned long flags;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long r15;
unsigned long r14;
unsigned long r13;
unsigned long r12;
#else
unsigned long si;
unsigned long di;
#endif
unsigned long bx;
/*
* These two fields must be together. They form a stack frame header,
* needed by get_frame_pointer().
*/
unsigned long bp;
unsigned long ret_addr;
};
struct fork_frame {
struct inactive_task_frame frame;
struct pt_regs regs;
};
#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \
do { \
prepare_switch_to(next); \
x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y) This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks by setting HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y - which enables the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y high level Kconfig option. There are a couple of interesting bits: First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc area. This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die. To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms. Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to detect and handle stack overflow. I didn't enable it on x86_32. We'd need to rework the double-fault code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual addresses under some workloads. This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes above the bottom of the stack. Specifically, we'll get #PF and make it to no_context and them oops without reliably triggering a double-fault, and no_context doesn't know about stack overflows. The next patch will improve that case. Thank you to Nadav and Brian for helping me pay enough attention to the SDM to hopefully get this right. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c88f3e2920b18e6cc621d772a04a62c06869037e.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org [ Minor edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-08-11 17:35:23 +08:00
\
((last) = __switch_to_asm((prev), (next))); \
} while (0)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
static inline void refresh_sysenter_cs(struct thread_struct *thread)
{
/* Only happens when SEP is enabled, no need to test "SEP"arately: */
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-04 22:07:29 +08:00
if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ss1) == thread->sysenter_cs))
return;
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-04 22:07:29 +08:00
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ss1, thread->sysenter_cs);
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, thread->sysenter_cs, 0);
}
#endif
/* This is used when switching tasks or entering/exiting vm86 mode. */
static inline void update_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
{
/* sp0 always points to the entry trampoline stack, which is constant: */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
load_sp0(task->thread.sp0);
else
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp1, task->thread.sp0);
#else
/*
* x86-64 updates x86_tss.sp1 via cpu_current_top_of_stack. That
* doesn't work on x86-32 because sp1 and
* cpu_current_top_of_stack have different values (because of
* the non-zero stack-padding on 32bit).
*/
x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly to the running task's kernel stack. Rearrange it so that we enter on a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack. This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance to run some code before we touch the kernel stack. The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring it can wait. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-04 22:07:23 +08:00
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
load_sp0(task_top_of_stack(task));
#endif
}
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H */