OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* common.c - C code for kernel entry and exit
* Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Lutomirski
*
* Based on asm and ptrace code by many authors. The code here originated
* in ptrace.c and signal.c.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/entry-common.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace Defer loading of FPU state until return to userspace. This gives the kernel the potential to skip loading FPU state for tasks that stay in kernel mode, or for tasks that end up with repeated invocations of kernel_fpu_begin() & kernel_fpu_end(). The fpregs_lock/unlock() section ensures that the registers remain unchanged. Otherwise a context switch or a bottom half could save the registers to its FPU context and the processor's FPU registers would became random if modified at the same time. KVM swaps the host/guest registers on entry/exit path. This flow has been kept as is. First it ensures that the registers are loaded and then saves the current (host) state before it loads the guest's registers. The swap is done at the very end with disabled interrupts so it should not change anymore before theg guest is entered. The read/save version seems to be cheaper compared to memcpy() in a micro benchmark. Each thread gets TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD set as part of fork() / fpu__copy(). For kernel threads, this flag gets never cleared which avoids saving / restoring the FPU state for kernel threads and during in-kernel usage of the FPU registers. [ bp: Correct and update commit message and fix checkpatch warnings. s/register/registers/ where it is used in plural. minor comment corrections. remove unused trace_x86_fpu_activate_state() TP. ] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com> Cc: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403164156.19645-24-bigeasy@linutronix.de
2019-04-04 00:41:52 +08:00
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
#include <xen/xen-ops.h>
#include <xen/events.h>
#endif
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/vdso.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace Defer loading of FPU state until return to userspace. This gives the kernel the potential to skip loading FPU state for tasks that stay in kernel mode, or for tasks that end up with repeated invocations of kernel_fpu_begin() & kernel_fpu_end(). The fpregs_lock/unlock() section ensures that the registers remain unchanged. Otherwise a context switch or a bottom half could save the registers to its FPU context and the processor's FPU registers would became random if modified at the same time. KVM swaps the host/guest registers on entry/exit path. This flow has been kept as is. First it ensures that the registers are loaded and then saves the current (host) state before it loads the guest's registers. The swap is done at the very end with disabled interrupts so it should not change anymore before theg guest is entered. The read/save version seems to be cheaper compared to memcpy() in a micro benchmark. Each thread gets TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD set as part of fork() / fpu__copy(). For kernel threads, this flag gets never cleared which avoids saving / restoring the FPU state for kernel threads and during in-kernel usage of the FPU registers. [ bp: Correct and update commit message and fix checkpatch warnings. s/register/registers/ where it is used in plural. minor comment corrections. remove unused trace_x86_fpu_activate_state() TP. ] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com> Cc: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403164156.19645-24-bigeasy@linutronix.de
2019-04-04 00:41:52 +08:00
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <asm/irq_stack.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
__visible noinstr void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
add_random_kstack_offset();
nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr);
instrumentation_begin();
if (likely(nr < NR_syscalls)) {
nr = array_index_nospec(nr, NR_syscalls);
syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling convention for 64-bit syscalls Let's make use of ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER=y on pure 64-bit x86-64 systems: Each syscall defines a stub which takes struct pt_regs as its only argument. It decodes just those parameters it needs, e.g: asmlinkage long sys_xyzzy(const struct pt_regs *regs) { return SyS_xyzzy(regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx); } This approach avoids leaking random user-provided register content down the call chain. For example, for sys_recv() which is a 4-parameter syscall, the assembly now is (in slightly reordered fashion): <sys_recv>: callq <__fentry__> /* decode regs->di, ->si, ->dx and ->r10 */ mov 0x70(%rdi),%rdi mov 0x68(%rdi),%rsi mov 0x60(%rdi),%rdx mov 0x38(%rdi),%rcx [ SyS_recv() is automatically inlined by the compiler, as it is not [yet] used anywhere else ] /* clear %r9 and %r8, the 5th and 6th args */ xor %r9d,%r9d xor %r8d,%r8d /* do the actual work */ callq __sys_recvfrom /* cleanup and return */ cltq retq The only valid place in an x86-64 kernel which rightfully calls a syscall function on its own -- vsyscall -- needs to be modified to pass struct pt_regs onwards as well. To keep the syscall table generation working independent of SYSCALL_PTREGS being enabled, the stubs are named the same as the "original" syscall stubs, i.e. sys_*(). This patch is based on an original proof-of-concept | From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> and was split up and heavily modified by me, in particular to base it on ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER, to limit it to 64-bit-only for the time being, and to update the vsyscall to the new calling convention. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180405095307.3730-4-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-05 17:53:02 +08:00
regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr](regs);
x86/syscalls: Split the x32 syscalls into their own table For unfortunate historical reasons, the x32 syscalls and the x86_64 syscalls are not all numbered the same. As an example, ioctl() is nr 16 on x86_64 but 514 on x32. This has potentially nasty consequences, since it means that there are two valid RAX values to do ioctl(2) and two invalid RAX values. The valid values are 16 (i.e. ioctl(2) using the x86_64 ABI) and (514 | 0x40000000) (i.e. ioctl(2) using the x32 ABI). The invalid values are 514 and (16 | 0x40000000). 514 will enter the "COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, ...)" entry point with in_compat_syscall() and in_x32_syscall() returning false, whereas (16 | 0x40000000) will enter the native entry point with in_compat_syscall() and in_x32_syscall() returning true. Both are bogus, and both will exercise code paths in the kernel and in any running seccomp filters that really ought to be unreachable. Splitting out the x32 syscalls into their own tables, allows both bogus invocations to return -ENOSYS. I've checked glibc, musl, and Bionic, and all of them appear to call syscalls with their correct numbers, so this change should have no effect on them. There is an added benefit going forward: new syscalls that need special handling on x32 can share the same number on x32 and x86_64. This means that the special syscall range 512-547 can be treated as a legacy wart instead of something that may need to be extended in the future. Also add a selftest to verify the new behavior. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/208024256b764312598f014ebfb0a42472c19354.1562185330.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-07-04 04:34:04 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
} else if (likely((nr & __X32_SYSCALL_BIT) &&
(nr & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) < X32_NR_syscalls)) {
nr = array_index_nospec(nr & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT,
X32_NR_syscalls);
regs->ax = x32_sys_call_table[nr](regs);
#endif
}
instrumentation_end();
syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
static __always_inline unsigned int syscall_32_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION))
current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT;
return (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax;
}
/*
* Invoke a 32-bit syscall. Called with IRQs on in CONTEXT_KERNEL.
*/
static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned int nr)
{
if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls);
syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling for IA32_EMULATION and x32 Extend ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER for i386 emulation and for x32 on 64-bit x86. For x32, all we need to do is to create an additional stub for each compat syscall which decodes the parameters in x86-64 ordering, e.g.: asmlinkage long __compat_sys_x32_xyzzy(struct pt_regs *regs) { return c_SyS_xyzzy(regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx); } For i386 emulation, we need to teach compat_sys_*() to take struct pt_regs as its only argument, e.g.: asmlinkage long __compat_sys_ia32_xyzzy(struct pt_regs *regs) { return c_SyS_xyzzy(regs->bx, regs->cx, regs->dx); } In addition, we need to create additional stubs for common syscalls (that is, for syscalls which have the same parameters on 32-bit and 64-bit), e.g.: asmlinkage long __sys_ia32_xyzzy(struct pt_regs *regs) { return c_sys_xyzzy(regs->bx, regs->cx, regs->dx); } This approach avoids leaking random user-provided register content down the call chain. This patch is based on an original proof-of-concept | From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> and was split up and heavily modified by me, in particular to base it on ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180405095307.3730-6-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-05 17:53:04 +08:00
regs->ax = ia32_sys_call_table[nr](regs);
}
}
/* Handles int $0x80 */
__visible noinstr void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs);
add_random_kstack_offset();
/*
* Subtlety here: if ptrace pokes something larger than 2^32-1 into
* orig_ax, the unsigned int return value truncates it. This may
* or may not be necessary, but it matches the old asm behavior.
*/
nr = (unsigned int)syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr);
instrumentation_begin();
do_syscall_32_irqs_on(regs, nr);
instrumentation_end();
syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
}
static noinstr bool __do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs);
int res;
add_random_kstack_offset();
/*
* This cannot use syscall_enter_from_user_mode() as it has to
* fetch EBP before invoking any of the syscall entry work
* functions.
*/
syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare(regs);
instrumentation_begin();
/* Fetch EBP from where the vDSO stashed it. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
/*
* Micro-optimization: the pointer we're following is
* explicitly 32 bits, so it can't be out of range.
*/
res = __get_user(*(u32 *)&regs->bp,
(u32 __user __force *)(unsigned long)(u32)regs->sp);
} else {
res = get_user(*(u32 *)&regs->bp,
(u32 __user __force *)(unsigned long)(u32)regs->sp);
}
if (res) {
/* User code screwed up. */
regs->ax = -EFAULT;
instrumentation_end();
local_irq_disable();
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
return false;
}
/* The case truncates any ptrace induced syscall nr > 2^32 -1 */
nr = (unsigned int)syscall_enter_from_user_mode_work(regs, nr);
/* Now this is just like a normal syscall. */
do_syscall_32_irqs_on(regs, nr);
instrumentation_end();
syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
return true;
}
/* Returns 0 to return using IRET or 1 to return using SYSEXIT/SYSRETL. */
__visible noinstr long do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* Called using the internal vDSO SYSENTER/SYSCALL32 calling
* convention. Adjust regs so it looks like we entered using int80.
*/
unsigned long landing_pad = (unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso +
vdso_image_32.sym_int80_landing_pad;
/*
* SYSENTER loses EIP, and even SYSCALL32 needs us to skip forward
* so that 'regs->ip -= 2' lands back on an int $0x80 instruction.
* Fix it up.
*/
regs->ip = landing_pad;
/* Invoke the syscall. If it failed, keep it simple: use IRET. */
if (!__do_fast_syscall_32(regs))
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Opportunistic SYSRETL: if possible, try to return using SYSRETL.
* SYSRETL is available on all 64-bit CPUs, so we don't need to
* bother with SYSEXIT.
*
* Unlike 64-bit opportunistic SYSRET, we can't check that CX == IP,
* because the ECX fixup above will ensure that this is essentially
* never the case.
*/
return regs->cs == __USER32_CS && regs->ss == __USER_DS &&
regs->ip == landing_pad &&
(regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_RF | X86_EFLAGS_TF)) == 0;
#else
/*
* Opportunistic SYSEXIT: if possible, try to return using SYSEXIT.
*
* Unlike 64-bit opportunistic SYSRET, we can't check that CX == IP,
* because the ECX fixup above will ensure that this is essentially
* never the case.
*
* We don't allow syscalls at all from VM86 mode, but we still
* need to check VM, because we might be returning from sys_vm86.
*/
return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP) &&
regs->cs == __USER_CS && regs->ss == __USER_DS &&
regs->ip == landing_pad &&
(regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_RF | X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_VM)) == 0;
#endif
}
/* Returns 0 to return using IRET or 1 to return using SYSEXIT/SYSRETL. */
__visible noinstr long do_SYSENTER_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* SYSENTER loses RSP, but the vDSO saved it in RBP. */
regs->sp = regs->bp;
/* SYSENTER clobbers EFLAGS.IF. Assume it was set in usermode. */
regs->flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
return do_fast_syscall_32(regs);
}
#endif
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(ni_syscall)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
/*
* Some hypercalls issued by the toolstack can take many 10s of
* seconds. Allow tasks running hypercalls via the privcmd driver to
* be voluntarily preempted even if full kernel preemption is
* disabled.
*
* Such preemptible hypercalls are bracketed by
* xen_preemptible_hcall_begin() and xen_preemptible_hcall_end()
* calls.
*/
DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, xen_in_preemptible_hcall);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_in_preemptible_hcall);
/*
* In case of scheduling the flag must be cleared and restored after
* returning from schedule as the task might move to a different CPU.
*/
static __always_inline bool get_and_clear_inhcall(void)
{
bool inhcall = __this_cpu_read(xen_in_preemptible_hcall);
__this_cpu_write(xen_in_preemptible_hcall, false);
return inhcall;
}
static __always_inline void restore_inhcall(bool inhcall)
{
__this_cpu_write(xen_in_preemptible_hcall, inhcall);
}
#else
static __always_inline bool get_and_clear_inhcall(void) { return false; }
static __always_inline void restore_inhcall(bool inhcall) { }
#endif
static void __xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct pt_regs *old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
inc_irq_stat(irq_hv_callback_count);
xen_hvm_evtchn_do_upcall();
set_irq_regs(old_regs);
}
__visible noinstr void xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
bool inhcall;
run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(__xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall, regs);
inhcall = get_and_clear_inhcall();
if (inhcall && !WARN_ON_ONCE(state.exit_rcu)) {
instrumentation_begin();
irqentry_exit_cond_resched();
instrumentation_end();
restore_inhcall(inhcall);
} else {
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_PV */