License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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|
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
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|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H
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|
|
|
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#define _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H
|
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|
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|
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|
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#include <linux/if_vlan.h>
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
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#include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
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|
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|
#include <uapi/linux/udp.h>
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h>
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|
|
|
2021-12-20 22:49:01 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline bool virtio_net_hdr_match_proto(__be16 protocol, __u8 gso_type)
|
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|
|
|
{
|
|
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|
switch (gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
|
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|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
|
|
|
|
|
return protocol == cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IP);
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
|
|
|
|
|
return protocol == cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IPV6);
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
|
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|
return protocol == cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IP) ||
|
|
|
|
|
protocol == cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IPV6);
|
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|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
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|
|
|
2018-09-29 23:41:27 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
|
|
|
const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-12-20 22:50:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->protocol)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-29 23:41:27 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
|
|
|
|
|
skb->protocol = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IP);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
|
|
|
|
|
skb->protocol = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IPV6);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
|
|
|
const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr,
|
|
|
|
|
bool little_endian)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet
Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type
VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively.
Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD
to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other
packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels
do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all
features that the source host does.
Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677.
This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification.
It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP
insertion and software UFO segmentation.
It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload
(NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception
of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap.
To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate
logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD
by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes
CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1
("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO").
(*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id,
ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is
assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted
at the end of the enum to minimize code churn.
Tested
Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this
patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is
enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel.
A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device:
host:
nc -l -p -u 8000 &
tcpdump -n -i tap0
guest:
dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000
nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt
Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds,
packets arriving fragmented:
./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1
(from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests)
Changes
v1 -> v2
- simplified set_offload change (review comment)
- documented test procedure
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com>
Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.")
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 23:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int gso_type = 0;
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int thlen = 0;
|
2020-05-26 03:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int p_off = 0;
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int ip_proto;
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
|
switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
|
|
|
|
|
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
|
thlen = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
|
|
|
|
|
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
|
thlen = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet
Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type
VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively.
Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD
to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other
packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels
do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all
features that the source host does.
Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677.
This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification.
It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP
insertion and software UFO segmentation.
It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload
(NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception
of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap.
To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate
logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD
by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes
CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1
("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO").
(*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id,
ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is
assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted
at the end of the enum to minimize code churn.
Tested
Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this
patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is
enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel.
A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device:
host:
nc -l -p -u 8000 &
tcpdump -n -i tap0
guest:
dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000
nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt
Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds,
packets arriving fragmented:
./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1
(from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests)
Changes
v1 -> v2
- simplified set_offload change (review comment)
- documented test procedure
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com>
Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.")
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 23:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
|
|
|
|
|
gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
ip_proto = IPPROTO_UDP;
|
|
|
|
|
thlen = sizeof(struct udphdr);
|
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet
Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type
VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively.
Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD
to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other
packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels
do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all
features that the source host does.
Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677.
This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification.
It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP
insertion and software UFO segmentation.
It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload
(NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception
of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap.
To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate
logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD
by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes
CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1
("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO").
(*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id,
ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is
assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted
at the end of the enum to minimize code churn.
Tested
Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this
patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is
enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel.
A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device:
host:
nc -l -p -u 8000 &
tcpdump -n -i tap0
guest:
dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000
nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt
Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds,
packets arriving fragmented:
./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1
(from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests)
Changes
v1 -> v2
- simplified set_offload change (review comment)
- documented test procedure
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com>
Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.")
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 23:22:25 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->gso_type & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN)
|
|
|
|
|
gso_type |= SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->gso_size == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-31 07:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hdr->flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) {
|
2021-04-02 21:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
u32 start = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_start);
|
|
|
|
|
u32 off = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_offset);
|
|
|
|
|
u32 needed = start + max_t(u32, thlen, off + sizeof(__sum16));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-26 03:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
p_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen;
|
2021-04-02 21:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off))
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-02-16 01:15:47 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
/* gso packets without NEEDS_CSUM do not set transport_offset.
|
|
|
|
|
* probe and drop if does not match one of the above types.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-19 12:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if (gso_type && skb->network_header) {
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
struct flow_keys_basic keys;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-09 19:31:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!skb->protocol) {
|
|
|
|
|
__be16 protocol = dev_parse_header_protocol(skb);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-12-20 22:49:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!protocol)
|
|
|
|
|
virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, hdr);
|
|
|
|
|
else if (!virtio_net_hdr_match_proto(protocol, hdr->gso_type))
|
2021-03-09 19:31:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2021-12-20 22:49:01 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
skb->protocol = protocol;
|
2021-03-09 19:31:00 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-02-19 12:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic(NULL, skb, &keys,
|
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
0)) {
|
2019-02-19 12:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* UFO does not specify ipv4 or 6: try both */
|
|
|
|
|
if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP &&
|
|
|
|
|
skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
|
|
|
|
|
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
|
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-02-16 01:15:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-02-19 12:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-26 03:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
p_off = keys.control.thoff + thlen;
|
2021-04-02 21:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off) ||
|
2020-05-05 00:48:54 +08:00
|
|
|
keys.basic.ip_proto != ip_proto)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff);
|
2020-05-26 03:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (gso_type) {
|
|
|
|
|
p_off = thlen;
|
2021-04-02 21:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off))
|
2020-05-26 03:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-02-16 01:15:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
|
u16 gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size);
|
net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb does not set the skb's gso_size and gso_type
correctly for UFO packets received via virtio-net that are a little over
the GSO size. This can lead to problems elsewhere in the networking
stack, e.g. ovs_vport_send dropping over-sized packets if gso_size is
not set.
This is due to the comparison
if (skb->len - p_off > gso_size)
not properly accounting for the transport layer header.
p_off includes the size of the transport layer header (thlen), so
skb->len - p_off is the size of the TCP/UDP payload.
gso_size is read from the virtio-net header. For UFO, fragmentation
happens at the IP level so does not need to include the UDP header.
Hence the calculation could be comparing a TCP/UDP payload length with
an IP payload length, causing legitimate virtio-net packets to have
lack gso_type/gso_size information.
Example: a UDP packet with payload size 1473 has IP payload size 1481.
If the guest used UFO, it is not fragmented and the virtio-net header's
flags indicate that it is a GSO frame (VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP), with
gso_size = 1480 for an MTU of 1500. skb->len will be 1515 and p_off
will be 42, so skb->len - p_off = 1473. Hence the comparison fails, and
shinfo->gso_size and gso_type are not set as they should be.
Instead, add the UDP header length before comparing to gso_size when
using UFO. In this way, it is the size of the IP payload that is
compared to gso_size.
Fixes: 6dd912f82680 ("net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-11-17 01:42:42 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int nh_off = p_off;
|
2020-05-29 05:57:47 +08:00
|
|
|
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
|
net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb does not set the skb's gso_size and gso_type
correctly for UFO packets received via virtio-net that are a little over
the GSO size. This can lead to problems elsewhere in the networking
stack, e.g. ovs_vport_send dropping over-sized packets if gso_size is
not set.
This is due to the comparison
if (skb->len - p_off > gso_size)
not properly accounting for the transport layer header.
p_off includes the size of the transport layer header (thlen), so
skb->len - p_off is the size of the TCP/UDP payload.
gso_size is read from the virtio-net header. For UFO, fragmentation
happens at the IP level so does not need to include the UDP header.
Hence the calculation could be comparing a TCP/UDP payload length with
an IP payload length, causing legitimate virtio-net packets to have
lack gso_type/gso_size information.
Example: a UDP packet with payload size 1473 has IP payload size 1481.
If the guest used UFO, it is not fragmented and the virtio-net header's
flags indicate that it is a GSO frame (VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP), with
gso_size = 1480 for an MTU of 1500. skb->len will be 1515 and p_off
will be 42, so skb->len - p_off = 1473. Hence the comparison fails, and
shinfo->gso_size and gso_type are not set as they should be.
Instead, add the UDP header length before comparing to gso_size when
using UFO. In this way, it is the size of the IP payload that is
compared to gso_size.
Fixes: 6dd912f82680 ("net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-11-17 01:42:42 +08:00
|
|
|
/* UFO may not include transport header in gso_size. */
|
|
|
|
|
if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
|
|
|
|
|
nh_off -= thlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-29 05:57:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Too small packets are not really GSO ones. */
|
net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb does not set the skb's gso_size and gso_type
correctly for UFO packets received via virtio-net that are a little over
the GSO size. This can lead to problems elsewhere in the networking
stack, e.g. ovs_vport_send dropping over-sized packets if gso_size is
not set.
This is due to the comparison
if (skb->len - p_off > gso_size)
not properly accounting for the transport layer header.
p_off includes the size of the transport layer header (thlen), so
skb->len - p_off is the size of the TCP/UDP payload.
gso_size is read from the virtio-net header. For UFO, fragmentation
happens at the IP level so does not need to include the UDP header.
Hence the calculation could be comparing a TCP/UDP payload length with
an IP payload length, causing legitimate virtio-net packets to have
lack gso_type/gso_size information.
Example: a UDP packet with payload size 1473 has IP payload size 1481.
If the guest used UFO, it is not fragmented and the virtio-net header's
flags indicate that it is a GSO frame (VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP), with
gso_size = 1480 for an MTU of 1500. skb->len will be 1515 and p_off
will be 42, so skb->len - p_off = 1473. Hence the comparison fails, and
shinfo->gso_size and gso_type are not set as they should be.
Instead, add the UDP header length before comparing to gso_size when
using UFO. In this way, it is the size of the IP payload that is
compared to gso_size.
Fixes: 6dd912f82680 ("net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-11-17 01:42:42 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len - nh_off > gso_size) {
|
2020-05-29 05:57:47 +08:00
|
|
|
shinfo->gso_size = gso_size;
|
|
|
|
|
shinfo->gso_type = gso_type;
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-29 05:57:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs computed. */
|
|
|
|
|
shinfo->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
|
|
|
|
|
shinfo->gso_segs = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
|
|
|
struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr,
|
2017-01-20 14:32:42 +08:00
|
|
|
bool little_endian,
|
2018-06-06 23:23:01 +08:00
|
|
|
bool has_data_valid,
|
|
|
|
|
int vlan_hlen)
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-11-19 07:40:40 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(*hdr)); /* no info leak */
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->hdr_len = __cpu_to_virtio16(little_endian,
|
|
|
|
|
skb_headlen(skb));
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->gso_size = __cpu_to_virtio16(little_endian,
|
|
|
|
|
sinfo->gso_size);
|
|
|
|
|
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
|
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
|
2018-06-06 23:23:01 +08:00
|
|
|
hdr->csum_start = __cpu_to_virtio16(little_endian,
|
|
|
|
|
skb_checksum_start_offset(skb) + vlan_hlen);
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
hdr->csum_offset = __cpu_to_virtio16(little_endian,
|
|
|
|
|
skb->csum_offset);
|
2017-01-20 14:32:42 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (has_data_valid &&
|
|
|
|
|
skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) {
|
|
|
|
|
hdr->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID;
|
2016-06-08 21:09:18 +08:00
|
|
|
} /* else everything is zero */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-19 07:40:39 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H */
|