OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S

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/*
* Copyright 2008 Vitaly Mayatskikh <vmayatsk@redhat.com>
* Copyright 2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
* Subject to the GNU Public License v2.
*
* Functions to copy from and to user space.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
/* Standard copy_to_user with segment limit checking */
ENTRY(_copy_to_user)
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rax)
movq %rdi,%rcx
addq %rdx,%rcx
jc bad_to_user
cmpq TI_addr_limit(%rax),%rcx
x86, 64-bit: Fix copy_[to/from]_user() checks for the userspace address limit As reported in BZ #30352: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30352 there's a kernel bug related to reading the last allowed page on x86_64. The _copy_to_user() and _copy_from_user() functions use the following check for address limit: if (buf + size >= limit) fail(); while it should be more permissive: if (buf + size > limit) fail(); That's because the size represents the number of bytes being read/write from/to buf address AND including the buf address. So the copy function will actually never touch the limit address even if "buf + size == limit". Following program fails to use the last page as buffer due to the wrong limit check: #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <assert.h> #define PAGE_SIZE (4096) #define LAST_PAGE ((void*)(0x7fffffffe000)) int main() { int fds[2], err; void * ptr = mmap(LAST_PAGE, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); assert(ptr == LAST_PAGE); err = socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds); assert(err == 0); err = send(fds[0], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, 0); perror("send"); assert(err == PAGE_SIZE); err = recv(fds[1], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, MSG_WAITALL); perror("recv"); assert(err == PAGE_SIZE); return 0; } The other place checking the addr limit is the access_ok() function, which is working properly. There's just a misleading comment for the __range_not_ok() macro - which this patch fixes as well. The last page of the user-space address range is a guard page and Brian Gerst observed that the guard page itself due to an erratum on K8 cpus (#121 Sequential Execution Across Non-Canonical Boundary Causes Processor Hang). However, the test code is using the last valid page before the guard page. The bug is that the last byte before the guard page can't be read because of the off-by-one error. The guard page is left in place. This bug would normally not show up because the last page is part of the process stack and never accessed via syscalls. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Acked-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305210630-7136-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-05-12 22:30:30 +08:00
ja bad_to_user
ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp copy_user_generic_unrolled", \
"jmp copy_user_generic_string", \
X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, \
"jmp copy_user_enhanced_fast_string", \
X86_FEATURE_ERMS
ENDPROC(_copy_to_user)
/* Standard copy_from_user with segment limit checking */
ENTRY(_copy_from_user)
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rax)
movq %rsi,%rcx
addq %rdx,%rcx
jc bad_from_user
cmpq TI_addr_limit(%rax),%rcx
x86, 64-bit: Fix copy_[to/from]_user() checks for the userspace address limit As reported in BZ #30352: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30352 there's a kernel bug related to reading the last allowed page on x86_64. The _copy_to_user() and _copy_from_user() functions use the following check for address limit: if (buf + size >= limit) fail(); while it should be more permissive: if (buf + size > limit) fail(); That's because the size represents the number of bytes being read/write from/to buf address AND including the buf address. So the copy function will actually never touch the limit address even if "buf + size == limit". Following program fails to use the last page as buffer due to the wrong limit check: #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <assert.h> #define PAGE_SIZE (4096) #define LAST_PAGE ((void*)(0x7fffffffe000)) int main() { int fds[2], err; void * ptr = mmap(LAST_PAGE, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); assert(ptr == LAST_PAGE); err = socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds); assert(err == 0); err = send(fds[0], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, 0); perror("send"); assert(err == PAGE_SIZE); err = recv(fds[1], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, MSG_WAITALL); perror("recv"); assert(err == PAGE_SIZE); return 0; } The other place checking the addr limit is the access_ok() function, which is working properly. There's just a misleading comment for the __range_not_ok() macro - which this patch fixes as well. The last page of the user-space address range is a guard page and Brian Gerst observed that the guard page itself due to an erratum on K8 cpus (#121 Sequential Execution Across Non-Canonical Boundary Causes Processor Hang). However, the test code is using the last valid page before the guard page. The bug is that the last byte before the guard page can't be read because of the off-by-one error. The guard page is left in place. This bug would normally not show up because the last page is part of the process stack and never accessed via syscalls. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Acked-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305210630-7136-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-05-12 22:30:30 +08:00
ja bad_from_user
ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp copy_user_generic_unrolled", \
"jmp copy_user_generic_string", \
X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, \
"jmp copy_user_enhanced_fast_string", \
X86_FEATURE_ERMS
ENDPROC(_copy_from_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
/* must zero dest */
ENTRY(bad_from_user)
bad_from_user:
movl %edx,%ecx
xorl %eax,%eax
rep
stosb
bad_to_user:
movl %edx,%eax
ret
ENDPROC(bad_from_user)
.previous
/*
* copy_user_generic_unrolled - memory copy with exception handling.
* This version is for CPUs like P4 that don't have efficient micro
* code for rep movsq
*
* Input:
* rdi destination
* rsi source
* rdx count
*
* Output:
* eax uncopied bytes or 0 if successful.
*/
ENTRY(copy_user_generic_unrolled)
ASM_STAC
cmpl $8,%edx
jb 20f /* less then 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */
ALIGN_DESTINATION
movl %edx,%ecx
andl $63,%edx
shrl $6,%ecx
jz 17f
1: movq (%rsi),%r8
2: movq 1*8(%rsi),%r9
3: movq 2*8(%rsi),%r10
4: movq 3*8(%rsi),%r11
5: movq %r8,(%rdi)
6: movq %r9,1*8(%rdi)
7: movq %r10,2*8(%rdi)
8: movq %r11,3*8(%rdi)
9: movq 4*8(%rsi),%r8
10: movq 5*8(%rsi),%r9
11: movq 6*8(%rsi),%r10
12: movq 7*8(%rsi),%r11
13: movq %r8,4*8(%rdi)
14: movq %r9,5*8(%rdi)
15: movq %r10,6*8(%rdi)
16: movq %r11,7*8(%rdi)
leaq 64(%rsi),%rsi
leaq 64(%rdi),%rdi
decl %ecx
jnz 1b
17: movl %edx,%ecx
andl $7,%edx
shrl $3,%ecx
jz 20f
18: movq (%rsi),%r8
19: movq %r8,(%rdi)
leaq 8(%rsi),%rsi
leaq 8(%rdi),%rdi
decl %ecx
jnz 18b
20: andl %edx,%edx
jz 23f
movl %edx,%ecx
21: movb (%rsi),%al
22: movb %al,(%rdi)
incq %rsi
incq %rdi
decl %ecx
jnz 21b
23: xor %eax,%eax
ASM_CLAC
ret
.section .fixup,"ax"
30: shll $6,%ecx
addl %ecx,%edx
jmp 60f
40: leal (%rdx,%rcx,8),%edx
jmp 60f
50: movl %ecx,%edx
60: jmp copy_user_handle_tail /* ecx is zerorest also */
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(4b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(5b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(6b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(7b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(8b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(9b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(10b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(11b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(12b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(13b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(14b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(15b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(16b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(18b,40b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(19b,40b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(21b,50b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(22b,50b)
ENDPROC(copy_user_generic_unrolled)
/* Some CPUs run faster using the string copy instructions.
* This is also a lot simpler. Use them when possible.
*
* Only 4GB of copy is supported. This shouldn't be a problem
* because the kernel normally only writes from/to page sized chunks
* even if user space passed a longer buffer.
* And more would be dangerous because both Intel and AMD have
* errata with rep movsq > 4GB. If someone feels the need to fix
* this please consider this.
*
* Input:
* rdi destination
* rsi source
* rdx count
*
* Output:
* eax uncopied bytes or 0 if successful.
*/
ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string)
ASM_STAC
cmpl $8,%edx
jb 2f /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */
ALIGN_DESTINATION
movl %edx,%ecx
shrl $3,%ecx
andl $7,%edx
1: rep
movsq
2: movl %edx,%ecx
3: rep
movsb
xorl %eax,%eax
ASM_CLAC
ret
.section .fixup,"ax"
11: leal (%rdx,%rcx,8),%ecx
12: movl %ecx,%edx /* ecx is zerorest also */
jmp copy_user_handle_tail
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,11b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b,12b)
ENDPROC(copy_user_generic_string)
/*
* Some CPUs are adding enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB instructions.
* It's recommended to use enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB if it's enabled.
*
* Input:
* rdi destination
* rsi source
* rdx count
*
* Output:
* eax uncopied bytes or 0 if successful.
*/
ENTRY(copy_user_enhanced_fast_string)
ASM_STAC
movl %edx,%ecx
1: rep
movsb
xorl %eax,%eax
ASM_CLAC
ret
.section .fixup,"ax"
12: movl %ecx,%edx /* ecx is zerorest also */
jmp copy_user_handle_tail
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,12b)
ENDPROC(copy_user_enhanced_fast_string)
/*
* copy_user_nocache - Uncached memory copy with exception handling
* This will force destination/source out of cache for more performance.
*/
ENTRY(__copy_user_nocache)
ASM_STAC
cmpl $8,%edx
jb 20f /* less then 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */
ALIGN_DESTINATION
movl %edx,%ecx
andl $63,%edx
shrl $6,%ecx
jz 17f
1: movq (%rsi),%r8
2: movq 1*8(%rsi),%r9
3: movq 2*8(%rsi),%r10
4: movq 3*8(%rsi),%r11
5: movnti %r8,(%rdi)
6: movnti %r9,1*8(%rdi)
7: movnti %r10,2*8(%rdi)
8: movnti %r11,3*8(%rdi)
9: movq 4*8(%rsi),%r8
10: movq 5*8(%rsi),%r9
11: movq 6*8(%rsi),%r10
12: movq 7*8(%rsi),%r11
13: movnti %r8,4*8(%rdi)
14: movnti %r9,5*8(%rdi)
15: movnti %r10,6*8(%rdi)
16: movnti %r11,7*8(%rdi)
leaq 64(%rsi),%rsi
leaq 64(%rdi),%rdi
decl %ecx
jnz 1b
17: movl %edx,%ecx
andl $7,%edx
shrl $3,%ecx
jz 20f
18: movq (%rsi),%r8
19: movnti %r8,(%rdi)
leaq 8(%rsi),%rsi
leaq 8(%rdi),%rdi
decl %ecx
jnz 18b
20: andl %edx,%edx
jz 23f
movl %edx,%ecx
21: movb (%rsi),%al
22: movb %al,(%rdi)
incq %rsi
incq %rdi
decl %ecx
jnz 21b
23: xorl %eax,%eax
ASM_CLAC
sfence
ret
.section .fixup,"ax"
30: shll $6,%ecx
addl %ecx,%edx
jmp 60f
40: lea (%rdx,%rcx,8),%rdx
jmp 60f
50: movl %ecx,%edx
60: sfence
jmp copy_user_handle_tail
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(4b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(5b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(6b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(7b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(8b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(9b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(10b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(11b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(12b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(13b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(14b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(15b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(16b,30b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(18b,40b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(19b,40b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(21b,50b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(22b,50b)
ENDPROC(__copy_user_nocache)