kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
* This file contains common generic and tag-based KASAN error reporting code.
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
|
2015-08-15 06:35:13 +08:00
|
|
|
* Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2015-11-06 10:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
* Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
|
2018-02-07 07:36:41 +08:00
|
|
|
* Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
|
|
|
|
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-01 06:12:04 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/bitops.h>
|
2017-02-04 05:13:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
|
2017-04-01 06:12:04 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/init.h>
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/kernel.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/mm.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/printk.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/slab.h>
|
2016-03-26 05:22:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/string.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/types.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/kasan.h>
|
2015-11-06 10:50:46 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-14 06:40:17 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <asm/sections.h>
|
|
|
|
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "kasan.h"
|
2015-02-14 06:39:42 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "../slab.h"
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Shadow layout customization. */
|
|
|
|
#define SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1
|
|
|
|
#define SHADOW_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16
|
|
|
|
#define SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW (SHADOW_BLOCKS_PER_ROW * SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK)
|
|
|
|
#define SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static unsigned long kasan_flags;
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
#define KASAN_BIT_REPORTED 0
|
|
|
|
#define KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT 1
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void)
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
return test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_save_enable_multi_shot);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled)
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!enabled)
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_restore_multi_shot);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init kasan_set_multi_shot(char *str)
|
2017-05-04 05:56:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2017-05-04 05:56:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
__setup("kasan_multi_shot", kasan_set_multi_shot);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info,
|
|
|
|
const char *bug_type)
|
2017-05-04 05:56:25 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-04 05:56:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n",
|
|
|
|
bug_type, (void *)info->ip);
|
2017-11-01 12:32:22 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
|
2017-05-04 05:56:28 +08:00
|
|
|
info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size,
|
2017-05-04 05:56:38 +08:00
|
|
|
info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-03 05:02:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static void start_report(unsigned long *flags)
|
2016-08-03 05:02:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make sure we don't end up in loop.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
kasan_disable_current();
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags);
|
|
|
|
pr_err("==================================================================\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
|
2016-08-03 05:02:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pr_err("==================================================================\n");
|
|
|
|
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
|
2016-12-13 08:44:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (panic_on_warn)
|
|
|
|
panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
|
2016-08-03 05:02:55 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_enable_current();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static void print_track(struct kasan_track *track, const char *prefix)
|
2016-03-26 05:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-04 05:56:31 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("%s by task %u:\n", prefix, track->pid);
|
2016-03-26 05:22:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (track->stack) {
|
|
|
|
struct stack_trace trace;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
depot_fetch_stack(track->stack, &trace);
|
|
|
|
print_stack_trace(&trace, 0);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("(stack is not available)\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-26 05:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct page *addr_to_page(const void *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((addr >= (void *)PAGE_OFFSET) &&
|
|
|
|
(addr < high_memory))
|
|
|
|
return virt_to_head_page(addr);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static void describe_object_addr(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
|
|
|
|
const void *addr)
|
2016-03-26 05:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long access_addr = (unsigned long)addr;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long object_addr = (unsigned long)object;
|
|
|
|
const char *rel_type;
|
|
|
|
int rel_bytes;
|
2016-03-26 05:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-01 12:32:22 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the object at %px\n"
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
" which belongs to the cache %s of size %d\n",
|
|
|
|
object, cache->name, cache->object_size);
|
2016-08-03 05:02:49 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!addr)
|
2016-03-26 05:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2016-08-03 05:02:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (access_addr < object_addr) {
|
|
|
|
rel_type = "to the left";
|
|
|
|
rel_bytes = object_addr - access_addr;
|
|
|
|
} else if (access_addr >= object_addr + cache->object_size) {
|
|
|
|
rel_type = "to the right";
|
|
|
|
rel_bytes = access_addr - (object_addr + cache->object_size);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
rel_type = "inside";
|
|
|
|
rel_bytes = access_addr - object_addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_err("The buggy address is located %d bytes %s of\n"
|
2017-11-01 12:32:22 +08:00
|
|
|
" %d-byte region [%px, %px)\n",
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
rel_bytes, rel_type, cache->object_size, (void *)object_addr,
|
|
|
|
(void *)(object_addr + cache->object_size));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void describe_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
|
|
|
|
const void *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
|
|
|
|
print_track(&alloc_info->alloc_track, "Allocated");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
print_track(&alloc_info->free_track, "Freed");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
describe_object_addr(cache, object, addr);
|
2016-03-26 05:21:59 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline bool kernel_or_module_addr(const void *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (addr >= (void *)_stext && addr < (void *)_end)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
if (is_module_address((unsigned long)addr))
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool init_task_stack_addr(const void *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return addr >= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack &&
|
|
|
|
(addr <= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack +
|
|
|
|
sizeof(init_thread_union.stack));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:47 +08:00
|
|
|
static void print_address_description(void *addr)
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-04 05:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
struct page *page = addr_to_page(addr);
|
2015-02-14 06:39:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
dump_stack();
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (page && PageSlab(page)) {
|
|
|
|
struct kmem_cache *cache = page->slab_cache;
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
void *object = nearest_obj(cache, page, addr);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:41 +08:00
|
|
|
describe_object(cache, object, addr);
|
2015-02-14 06:39:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-04 05:56:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (kernel_or_module_addr(addr) && !init_task_stack_addr(addr)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n");
|
|
|
|
pr_err(" %pS\n", addr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (page) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the page:\n");
|
|
|
|
dump_page(page, "kasan: bad access detected");
|
2015-02-14 06:40:17 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool row_is_guilty(const void *row, const void *guilty)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (row <= guilty) && (guilty < row + SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int shadow_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *shadow)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* The length of ">ff00ff00ff00ff00: " is
|
|
|
|
* 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG/8)*2 chars.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG/8)*2 + (shadow - row)*2 +
|
|
|
|
(shadow - row) / SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
const void *shadow = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
|
|
|
|
const void *shadow_row;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shadow_row = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)shadow,
|
|
|
|
SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW)
|
|
|
|
- SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR * SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_err("Memory state around the buggy address:\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = -SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i <= SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i++) {
|
|
|
|
const void *kaddr = kasan_shadow_to_mem(shadow_row);
|
|
|
|
char buffer[4 + (BITS_PER_LONG/8)*2];
|
2015-11-06 10:50:48 +08:00
|
|
|
char shadow_buf[SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW];
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
|
2017-11-01 12:32:22 +08:00
|
|
|
(i == 0) ? ">%px: " : " %px: ", kaddr);
|
2015-11-06 10:50:48 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We should not pass a shadow pointer to generic
|
|
|
|
* function, because generic functions may try to
|
|
|
|
* access kasan mapping for the passed address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memcpy(shadow_buf, shadow_row, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW);
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, buffer,
|
|
|
|
DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW, 1,
|
2015-11-06 10:50:48 +08:00
|
|
|
shadow_buf, SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW, 0);
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (row_is_guilty(shadow_row, shadow))
|
|
|
|
pr_err("%*c\n",
|
|
|
|
shadow_pointer_offset(shadow_row, shadow),
|
|
|
|
'^');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
shadow_row += SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool report_enabled(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (current->kasan_depth)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
return !test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_REPORTED, &kasan_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-07 07:36:27 +08:00
|
|
|
void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip)
|
2017-05-04 05:56:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
start_report(&flags);
|
2018-02-07 07:36:27 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in %pS\n", (void *)ip);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:47 +08:00
|
|
|
print_address_description(object);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:47 +08:00
|
|
|
print_shadow_for_address(object);
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
end_report(&flags);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-06 10:50:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info)
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
start_report(&flags);
|
2016-08-03 05:02:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
print_error_description(info, get_bug_type(info));
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2017-05-04 05:56:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr)) {
|
2015-11-06 10:50:55 +08:00
|
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-05-04 05:56:47 +08:00
|
|
|
print_address_description((void *)info->access_addr);
|
2017-05-04 05:56:50 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_err("\n");
|
2015-11-06 10:50:55 +08:00
|
|
|
print_shadow_for_address(info->first_bad_addr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-03 05:02:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
end_report(&flags);
|
2017-04-01 06:12:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
|
|
|
|
bool is_write, unsigned long ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct kasan_access_info info;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 16:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (likely(!report_enabled()))
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-04 05:13:12 +08:00
|
|
|
disable_trace_on_warning();
|
|
|
|
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
info.access_addr = (void *)addr;
|
2017-08-03 04:31:58 +08:00
|
|
|
info.first_bad_addr = (void *)addr;
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
|
|
|
info.access_size = size;
|
|
|
|
info.is_write = is_write;
|
|
|
|
info.ip = ip;
|
2015-11-06 10:50:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14 06:39:17 +08:00
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kasan_report_error(&info);
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}
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