OpenCloudOS-Kernel/drivers/thunderbolt/tb.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Thunderbolt Cactus Ridge driver - bus logic (NHI independent)
*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
treewide: Consolidate Apple DMI checks We're about to amend ACPI bus scan with DMI checks whether we're running on a Mac to support Apple device properties in AML. The DMI checks are performed for every single device, adding overhead for everything x86 that isn't Apple, which is the majority. Rafael and Andy therefore request to perform the DMI match only once and cache the result. Outside of ACPI various other Apple DMI checks exist and it seems reasonable to use the cached value there as well. Rafael, Andy and Darren suggest performing the DMI check in arch code and making it available with a header in include/linux/platform_data/x86/. To this end, add early_platform_quirks() to arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c to perform the DMI check and invoke it from setup_arch(). Switch over all existing Apple DMI checks, thereby fixing two deficiencies: * They are now #defined to false on non-x86 arches and can thus be optimized away if they're located in cross-arch code. * Some of them only match "Apple Inc." but not "Apple Computer, Inc.", which is used by BIOSes released between January 2006 (when the first x86 Macs started shipping) and January 2007 (when the company name changed upon introduction of the iPhone). Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Suggested-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2017-08-01 20:10:41 +08:00
#include <linux/platform_data/x86/apple.h>
#include "tb.h"
#include "tb_regs.h"
#include "tunnel_pci.h"
/**
* struct tb_cm - Simple Thunderbolt connection manager
* @tunnel_list: List of active tunnels
* @hotplug_active: tb_handle_hotplug will stop progressing plug
* events and exit if this is not set (it needs to
* acquire the lock one more time). Used to drain wq
* after cfg has been paused.
*/
struct tb_cm {
struct list_head tunnel_list;
bool hotplug_active;
};
/* enumeration & hot plug handling */
static void tb_scan_port(struct tb_port *port);
/**
* tb_scan_switch() - scan for and initialize downstream switches
*/
static void tb_scan_switch(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i <= sw->config.max_port_number; i++)
tb_scan_port(&sw->ports[i]);
}
/**
* tb_scan_port() - check for and initialize switches below port
*/
static void tb_scan_port(struct tb_port *port)
{
struct tb_switch *sw;
if (tb_is_upstream_port(port))
return;
if (port->config.type != TB_TYPE_PORT)
return;
if (port->dual_link_port && port->link_nr)
return; /*
* Downstream switch is reachable through two ports.
* Only scan on the primary port (link_nr == 0).
*/
if (tb_wait_for_port(port, false) <= 0)
return;
if (port->remote) {
tb_port_WARN(port, "port already has a remote!\n");
return;
}
sw = tb_switch_alloc(port->sw->tb, &port->sw->dev,
tb_downstream_route(port));
if (!sw)
return;
if (tb_switch_configure(sw)) {
tb_switch_put(sw);
return;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
sw->authorized = true;
if (tb_switch_add(sw)) {
tb_switch_put(sw);
return;
}
port->remote = tb_upstream_port(sw);
tb_upstream_port(sw)->remote = port;
tb_scan_switch(sw);
}
/**
* tb_free_invalid_tunnels() - destroy tunnels of devices that have gone away
*/
static void tb_free_invalid_tunnels(struct tb *tb)
{
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
struct tb_pci_tunnel *tunnel;
struct tb_pci_tunnel *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(tunnel, n, &tcm->tunnel_list, list) {
if (tb_pci_is_invalid(tunnel)) {
tb_pci_deactivate(tunnel);
list_del(&tunnel->list);
tb_pci_free(tunnel);
}
}
}
/**
* tb_free_unplugged_children() - traverse hierarchy and free unplugged switches
*/
static void tb_free_unplugged_children(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i <= sw->config.max_port_number; i++) {
struct tb_port *port = &sw->ports[i];
if (tb_is_upstream_port(port))
continue;
if (!port->remote)
continue;
if (port->remote->sw->is_unplugged) {
tb_switch_remove(port->remote->sw);
port->remote = NULL;
} else {
tb_free_unplugged_children(port->remote->sw);
}
}
}
/**
* find_pci_up_port() - return the first PCIe up port on @sw or NULL
*/
static struct tb_port *tb_find_pci_up_port(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i <= sw->config.max_port_number; i++)
if (sw->ports[i].config.type == TB_TYPE_PCIE_UP)
return &sw->ports[i];
return NULL;
}
/**
* find_unused_down_port() - return the first inactive PCIe down port on @sw
*/
static struct tb_port *tb_find_unused_down_port(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
int i;
int cap;
int res;
int data;
for (i = 1; i <= sw->config.max_port_number; i++) {
if (tb_is_upstream_port(&sw->ports[i]))
continue;
if (sw->ports[i].config.type != TB_TYPE_PCIE_DOWN)
continue;
cap = tb_port_find_cap(&sw->ports[i], TB_PORT_CAP_ADAP);
if (cap < 0)
continue;
res = tb_port_read(&sw->ports[i], &data, TB_CFG_PORT, cap, 1);
if (res < 0)
continue;
if (data & 0x80000000)
continue;
return &sw->ports[i];
}
return NULL;
}
/**
* tb_activate_pcie_devices() - scan for and activate PCIe devices
*
* This method is somewhat ad hoc. For now it only supports one device
* per port and only devices at depth 1.
*/
static void tb_activate_pcie_devices(struct tb *tb)
{
int i;
int cap;
u32 data;
struct tb_switch *sw;
struct tb_port *up_port;
struct tb_port *down_port;
struct tb_pci_tunnel *tunnel;
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
/* scan for pcie devices at depth 1*/
for (i = 1; i <= tb->root_switch->config.max_port_number; i++) {
if (tb_is_upstream_port(&tb->root_switch->ports[i]))
continue;
if (tb->root_switch->ports[i].config.type != TB_TYPE_PORT)
continue;
if (!tb->root_switch->ports[i].remote)
continue;
sw = tb->root_switch->ports[i].remote->sw;
up_port = tb_find_pci_up_port(sw);
if (!up_port) {
tb_sw_info(sw, "no PCIe devices found, aborting\n");
continue;
}
/* check whether port is already activated */
cap = tb_port_find_cap(up_port, TB_PORT_CAP_ADAP);
if (cap < 0)
continue;
if (tb_port_read(up_port, &data, TB_CFG_PORT, cap, 1))
continue;
if (data & 0x80000000) {
tb_port_info(up_port,
"PCIe port already activated, aborting\n");
continue;
}
down_port = tb_find_unused_down_port(tb->root_switch);
if (!down_port) {
tb_port_info(up_port,
"All PCIe down ports are occupied, aborting\n");
continue;
}
tunnel = tb_pci_alloc(tb, up_port, down_port);
if (!tunnel) {
tb_port_info(up_port,
"PCIe tunnel allocation failed, aborting\n");
continue;
}
if (tb_pci_activate(tunnel)) {
tb_port_info(up_port,
"PCIe tunnel activation failed, aborting\n");
tb_pci_free(tunnel);
continue;
}
list_add(&tunnel->list, &tcm->tunnel_list);
}
}
/* hotplug handling */
struct tb_hotplug_event {
struct work_struct work;
struct tb *tb;
u64 route;
u8 port;
bool unplug;
};
/**
* tb_handle_hotplug() - handle hotplug event
*
* Executes on tb->wq.
*/
static void tb_handle_hotplug(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tb_hotplug_event *ev = container_of(work, typeof(*ev), work);
struct tb *tb = ev->tb;
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
struct tb_switch *sw;
struct tb_port *port;
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
if (!tcm->hotplug_active)
goto out; /* during init, suspend or shutdown */
sw = get_switch_at_route(tb->root_switch, ev->route);
if (!sw) {
tb_warn(tb,
"hotplug event from non existent switch %llx:%x (unplug: %d)\n",
ev->route, ev->port, ev->unplug);
goto out;
}
if (ev->port > sw->config.max_port_number) {
tb_warn(tb,
"hotplug event from non existent port %llx:%x (unplug: %d)\n",
ev->route, ev->port, ev->unplug);
goto out;
}
port = &sw->ports[ev->port];
if (tb_is_upstream_port(port)) {
tb_warn(tb,
"hotplug event for upstream port %llx:%x (unplug: %d)\n",
ev->route, ev->port, ev->unplug);
goto out;
}
if (ev->unplug) {
if (port->remote) {
tb_port_info(port, "unplugged\n");
tb_sw_set_unplugged(port->remote->sw);
tb_free_invalid_tunnels(tb);
tb_switch_remove(port->remote->sw);
port->remote = NULL;
} else {
tb_port_info(port,
"got unplug event for disconnected port, ignoring\n");
}
} else if (port->remote) {
tb_port_info(port,
"got plug event for connected port, ignoring\n");
} else {
tb_port_info(port, "hotplug: scanning\n");
tb_scan_port(port);
if (!port->remote) {
tb_port_info(port, "hotplug: no switch found\n");
} else if (port->remote->sw->config.depth > 1) {
tb_sw_warn(port->remote->sw,
"hotplug: chaining not supported\n");
} else {
tb_sw_info(port->remote->sw,
"hotplug: activating pcie devices\n");
tb_activate_pcie_devices(tb);
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
kfree(ev);
}
/**
* tb_schedule_hotplug_handler() - callback function for the control channel
*
* Delegates to tb_handle_hotplug.
*/
static void tb_handle_event(struct tb *tb, enum tb_cfg_pkg_type type,
const void *buf, size_t size)
{
const struct cfg_event_pkg *pkg = buf;
struct tb_hotplug_event *ev;
u64 route;
if (type != TB_CFG_PKG_EVENT) {
tb_warn(tb, "unexpected event %#x, ignoring\n", type);
return;
}
route = tb_cfg_get_route(&pkg->header);
if (tb_cfg_error(tb->ctl, route, pkg->port,
TB_CFG_ERROR_ACK_PLUG_EVENT)) {
tb_warn(tb, "could not ack plug event on %llx:%x\n", route,
pkg->port);
}
ev = kmalloc(sizeof(*ev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ev)
return;
INIT_WORK(&ev->work, tb_handle_hotplug);
ev->tb = tb;
ev->route = route;
ev->port = pkg->port;
ev->unplug = pkg->unplug;
queue_work(tb->wq, &ev->work);
}
static void tb_stop(struct tb *tb)
{
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
struct tb_pci_tunnel *tunnel;
struct tb_pci_tunnel *n;
/* tunnels are only present after everything has been initialized */
list_for_each_entry_safe(tunnel, n, &tcm->tunnel_list, list) {
tb_pci_deactivate(tunnel);
tb_pci_free(tunnel);
}
tb_switch_remove(tb->root_switch);
tcm->hotplug_active = false; /* signal tb_handle_hotplug to quit */
}
static int tb_start(struct tb *tb)
{
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
int ret;
tb->root_switch = tb_switch_alloc(tb, &tb->dev, 0);
if (!tb->root_switch)
return -ENOMEM;
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:17 +08:00
/*
* ICM firmware upgrade needs running firmware and in native
* mode that is not available so disable firmware upgrade of the
* root switch.
*/
tb->root_switch->no_nvm_upgrade = true;
ret = tb_switch_configure(tb->root_switch);
if (ret) {
tb_switch_put(tb->root_switch);
return ret;
}
/* Announce the switch to the world */
ret = tb_switch_add(tb->root_switch);
if (ret) {
tb_switch_put(tb->root_switch);
return ret;
}
/* Full scan to discover devices added before the driver was loaded. */
tb_scan_switch(tb->root_switch);
tb_activate_pcie_devices(tb);
/* Allow tb_handle_hotplug to progress events */
tcm->hotplug_active = true;
return 0;
}
static int tb_suspend_noirq(struct tb *tb)
{
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
tb_dbg(tb, "suspending...\n");
tb_switch_suspend(tb->root_switch);
tcm->hotplug_active = false; /* signal tb_handle_hotplug to quit */
tb_dbg(tb, "suspend finished\n");
return 0;
}
static int tb_resume_noirq(struct tb *tb)
{
struct tb_cm *tcm = tb_priv(tb);
struct tb_pci_tunnel *tunnel, *n;
tb_dbg(tb, "resuming...\n");
/* remove any pci devices the firmware might have setup */
tb_switch_reset(tb, 0);
tb_switch_resume(tb->root_switch);
tb_free_invalid_tunnels(tb);
tb_free_unplugged_children(tb->root_switch);
list_for_each_entry_safe(tunnel, n, &tcm->tunnel_list, list)
tb_pci_restart(tunnel);
if (!list_empty(&tcm->tunnel_list)) {
/*
* the pcie links need some time to get going.
* 100ms works for me...
*/
tb_dbg(tb, "tunnels restarted, sleeping for 100ms\n");
msleep(100);
}
/* Allow tb_handle_hotplug to progress events */
tcm->hotplug_active = true;
tb_dbg(tb, "resume finished\n");
return 0;
}
static const struct tb_cm_ops tb_cm_ops = {
.start = tb_start,
.stop = tb_stop,
.suspend_noirq = tb_suspend_noirq,
.resume_noirq = tb_resume_noirq,
.handle_event = tb_handle_event,
};
struct tb *tb_probe(struct tb_nhi *nhi)
{
struct tb_cm *tcm;
struct tb *tb;
treewide: Consolidate Apple DMI checks We're about to amend ACPI bus scan with DMI checks whether we're running on a Mac to support Apple device properties in AML. The DMI checks are performed for every single device, adding overhead for everything x86 that isn't Apple, which is the majority. Rafael and Andy therefore request to perform the DMI match only once and cache the result. Outside of ACPI various other Apple DMI checks exist and it seems reasonable to use the cached value there as well. Rafael, Andy and Darren suggest performing the DMI check in arch code and making it available with a header in include/linux/platform_data/x86/. To this end, add early_platform_quirks() to arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c to perform the DMI check and invoke it from setup_arch(). Switch over all existing Apple DMI checks, thereby fixing two deficiencies: * They are now #defined to false on non-x86 arches and can thus be optimized away if they're located in cross-arch code. * Some of them only match "Apple Inc." but not "Apple Computer, Inc.", which is used by BIOSes released between January 2006 (when the first x86 Macs started shipping) and January 2007 (when the company name changed upon introduction of the iPhone). Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Suggested-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2017-08-01 20:10:41 +08:00
if (!x86_apple_machine)
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
return NULL;
tb = tb_domain_alloc(nhi, sizeof(*tcm));
if (!tb)
return NULL;
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 20:25:16 +08:00
tb->security_level = TB_SECURITY_NONE;
tb->cm_ops = &tb_cm_ops;
tcm = tb_priv(tb);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcm->tunnel_list);
return tb;
}