OpenCloudOS-Kernel/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
/*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_ssse3(struct blake2s_state *state,
const u8 *block, const size_t nblocks,
const u32 inc);
asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_avx512(struct blake2s_state *state,
const u8 *block, const size_t nblocks,
const u32 inc);
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_ssse3);
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_avx512);
void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
const u8 *block, size_t nblocks,
const u32 inc)
{
/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks The initial Zinc patchset, after some mailing list discussion, contained code to ensure that kernel_fpu_enable would not be kept on for more than a 4k chunk, since it disables preemption. The choice of 4k isn't totally scientific, but it's not a bad guess either, and it's what's used in both the x86 poly1305, blake2s, and nhpoly1305 code already (in the form of PAGE_SIZE, which this commit corrects to be explicitly 4k for the former two). Ard did some back of the envelope calculations and found that at 5 cycles/byte (overestimate) on a 1ghz processor (pretty slow), 4k means we have a maximum preemption disabling of 20us, which Sebastian confirmed was probably a good limit. Unfortunately the chunking appears to have been left out of the final patchset that added the glue code. So, this commit adds it back in. Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: a44a3430d71b ("crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: d7d7b8535662 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernel") Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: ed0356eda153 ("crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation") Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-23 07:18:53 +08:00
BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
if (!static_branch_likely(&blake2s_use_ssse3) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
blake2s_compress_generic(state, block, nblocks, inc);
return;
}
crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks The initial Zinc patchset, after some mailing list discussion, contained code to ensure that kernel_fpu_enable would not be kept on for more than a 4k chunk, since it disables preemption. The choice of 4k isn't totally scientific, but it's not a bad guess either, and it's what's used in both the x86 poly1305, blake2s, and nhpoly1305 code already (in the form of PAGE_SIZE, which this commit corrects to be explicitly 4k for the former two). Ard did some back of the envelope calculations and found that at 5 cycles/byte (overestimate) on a 1ghz processor (pretty slow), 4k means we have a maximum preemption disabling of 20us, which Sebastian confirmed was probably a good limit. Unfortunately the chunking appears to have been left out of the final patchset that added the glue code. So, this commit adds it back in. Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: a44a3430d71b ("crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: d7d7b8535662 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernel") Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: ed0356eda153 ("crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation") Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-23 07:18:53 +08:00
do {
const size_t blocks = min_t(size_t, nblocks,
crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks The initial Zinc patchset, after some mailing list discussion, contained code to ensure that kernel_fpu_enable would not be kept on for more than a 4k chunk, since it disables preemption. The choice of 4k isn't totally scientific, but it's not a bad guess either, and it's what's used in both the x86 poly1305, blake2s, and nhpoly1305 code already (in the form of PAGE_SIZE, which this commit corrects to be explicitly 4k for the former two). Ard did some back of the envelope calculations and found that at 5 cycles/byte (overestimate) on a 1ghz processor (pretty slow), 4k means we have a maximum preemption disabling of 20us, which Sebastian confirmed was probably a good limit. Unfortunately the chunking appears to have been left out of the final patchset that added the glue code. So, this commit adds it back in. Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: a44a3430d71b ("crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: d7d7b8535662 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernel") Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: ed0356eda153 ("crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation") Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-23 07:18:53 +08:00
SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
kernel_fpu_begin();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
static_branch_likely(&blake2s_use_avx512))
blake2s_compress_avx512(state, block, blocks, inc);
else
blake2s_compress_ssse3(state, block, blocks, inc);
kernel_fpu_end();
nblocks -= blocks;
block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks The initial Zinc patchset, after some mailing list discussion, contained code to ensure that kernel_fpu_enable would not be kept on for more than a 4k chunk, since it disables preemption. The choice of 4k isn't totally scientific, but it's not a bad guess either, and it's what's used in both the x86 poly1305, blake2s, and nhpoly1305 code already (in the form of PAGE_SIZE, which this commit corrects to be explicitly 4k for the former two). Ard did some back of the envelope calculations and found that at 5 cycles/byte (overestimate) on a 1ghz processor (pretty slow), 4k means we have a maximum preemption disabling of 20us, which Sebastian confirmed was probably a good limit. Unfortunately the chunking appears to have been left out of the final patchset that added the glue code. So, this commit adds it back in. Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: a44a3430d71b ("crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library function") Fixes: d7d7b8535662 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernel") Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation") Fixes: ed0356eda153 ("crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation") Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-23 07:18:53 +08:00
} while (nblocks);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless. Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key. Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309, rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/. Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths. So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs. -EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys". That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test. So just remove this flag. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-12-31 11:19:36 +08:00
if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
tctx->keylen = keylen;
return 0;
}
static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
if (tctx->keylen)
blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
else
blake2s_init(state, outlen);
return 0;
}
static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
unsigned int inlen)
{
struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
if (unlikely(!inlen))
return 0;
if (inlen > fill) {
memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
state->buflen = 0;
in += fill;
inlen -= fill;
}
if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
blake2s_compress_arch(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
}
memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
state->buflen += inlen;
return 0;
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
return 0;
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
.base.cra_name = "blake2s-128",
.base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-128-x86",
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
.base.cra_priority = 200,
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.digestsize = BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
.init = crypto_blake2s_init,
.update = crypto_blake2s_update,
.final = crypto_blake2s_final,
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
}, {
.base.cra_name = "blake2s-160",
.base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-160-x86",
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
.base.cra_priority = 200,
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.digestsize = BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
.init = crypto_blake2s_init,
.update = crypto_blake2s_update,
.final = crypto_blake2s_final,
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
}, {
.base.cra_name = "blake2s-224",
.base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-224-x86",
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
.base.cra_priority = 200,
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.digestsize = BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
.init = crypto_blake2s_init,
.update = crypto_blake2s_update,
.final = crypto_blake2s_final,
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
}, {
.base.cra_name = "blake2s-256",
.base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-256-x86",
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
.base.cra_priority = 200,
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.digestsize = BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
.init = crypto_blake2s_init,
.update = crypto_blake2s_update,
.final = crypto_blake2s_final,
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
}};
static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
return 0;
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512F) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL) &&
cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM |
XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
}
module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");