License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* NFS server file handle treatment.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de>
|
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (C) 1999 G. Allen Morris III <gam3@acm.org>
|
|
|
|
* Extensive rewrite by Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> Southern-Spring 1999
|
|
|
|
* ... and again Southern-Winter 2001 to support export_operations
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2007-07-17 19:04:28 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2007-07-17 19:04:48 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
|
2009-12-04 02:30:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "nfsd.h"
|
2009-11-05 07:12:35 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "vfs.h"
|
2007-11-16 06:05:43 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "auth.h"
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define NFSDDBG_FACILITY NFSDDBG_FH
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* our acceptability function.
|
|
|
|
* if NOSUBTREECHECK, accept anything
|
|
|
|
* if not, require that we can walk up to exp->ex_dentry
|
|
|
|
* doing some checks on the 'x' bits
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int nfsd_acceptable(void *expv, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct svc_export *exp = expv;
|
|
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *tdentry;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *parent;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tdentry = dget(dentry);
|
2008-02-15 11:38:39 +08:00
|
|
|
while (tdentry != exp->ex_path.dentry && !IS_ROOT(tdentry)) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* make sure parents give x permission to user */
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
parent = dget_parent(tdentry);
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
err = inode_permission(d_inode(parent), MAY_EXEC);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
|
|
|
dput(parent);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dput(tdentry);
|
|
|
|
tdentry = parent;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-15 11:38:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (tdentry != exp->ex_path.dentry)
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
dprintk("nfsd_acceptable failed at %p %pd\n", tdentry, tdentry);
|
2008-02-15 11:38:39 +08:00
|
|
|
rv = (tdentry == exp->ex_path.dentry);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
dput(tdentry);
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Type check. The correct error return for type mismatches does not seem to be
|
|
|
|
* generally agreed upon. SunOS seems to use EISDIR if file isn't S_IFREG; a
|
|
|
|
* comment in the NFSv3 spec says this is incorrect (implementation notes for
|
|
|
|
* the write call).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-10-20 14:28:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline __be32
|
2016-07-20 05:33:04 +08:00
|
|
|
nfsd_mode_check(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
umode_t requested)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-20 05:33:04 +08:00
|
|
|
umode_t mode = d_inode(dentry)->i_mode & S_IFMT;
|
2011-08-16 05:04:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (requested == 0) /* the caller doesn't care */
|
|
|
|
return nfs_ok;
|
2016-07-20 05:33:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (mode == requested) {
|
|
|
|
if (mode == S_IFDIR && !d_can_lookup(dentry)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_notdir;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-16 05:04:19 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfs_ok;
|
2016-07-20 05:33:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-16 05:04:19 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* v4 has an error more specific than err_notdir which we should
|
|
|
|
* return in preference to err_notdir:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_vers == 4 && mode == S_IFLNK)
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_symlink;
|
|
|
|
if (requested == S_IFDIR)
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_notdir;
|
|
|
|
if (mode == S_IFDIR)
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_isdir;
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_inval;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-09 04:49:48 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool nfsd_originating_port_ok(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (flags & NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
/* We don't require gss requests to use low ports: */
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor >= RPC_AUTH_GSS)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
return test_bit(RQ_SECURE, &rqstp->rq_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-13 05:05:03 +08:00
|
|
|
static __be32 nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
|
|
|
|
struct svc_export *exp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-12-09 07:15:52 +08:00
|
|
|
int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-13 05:05:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check if the request originated from a secure port. */
|
2018-03-09 04:49:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!nfsd_originating_port_ok(rqstp, flags)) {
|
2008-02-21 15:57:45 +08:00
|
|
|
RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);
|
2014-05-29 12:18:52 +08:00
|
|
|
dprintk("nfsd: request from insecure port %s!\n",
|
|
|
|
svc_print_addr(rqstp, buf, sizeof(buf)));
|
2007-11-13 05:05:03 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfserr_perm;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set user creds for this exportpoint */
|
|
|
|
return nfserrno(nfsd_setuser(rqstp, exp));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-10 03:06:05 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline __be32 check_pseudo_root(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry, struct svc_export *exp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_V4ROOT))
|
|
|
|
return nfs_ok;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* v2/v3 clients have no need for the V4ROOT export--they use
|
|
|
|
* the mount protocl instead; also, further V4ROOT checks may be
|
|
|
|
* in v4-specific code, in which case v2/v3 clients could bypass
|
|
|
|
* them.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!nfsd_v4client(rqstp))
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_stale;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We're exposing only the directories and symlinks that have to be
|
|
|
|
* traversed on the way to real exports:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry)
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-29 20:02:35 +08:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!d_is_dir(dentry) &&
|
|
|
|
!d_is_symlink(dentry)))
|
2009-09-10 03:06:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfserr_stale;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A pseudoroot export gives permission to access only one
|
|
|
|
* single directory; the kernel has to make another upcall
|
|
|
|
* before granting access to anything else under it:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(dentry != exp->ex_path.dentry))
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_stale;
|
|
|
|
return nfs_ok;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Use the given filehandle to look up the corresponding export and
|
|
|
|
* dentry. On success, the results are used to set fh_export and
|
|
|
|
* fh_dentry.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct knfsd_fh *fh = &fhp->fh_handle;
|
|
|
|
struct fid *fid = NULL, sfid;
|
|
|
|
struct svc_export *exp;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
|
|
|
int fileid_type;
|
|
|
|
int data_left = fh->fh_size/4;
|
|
|
|
__be32 error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = nfserr_stale;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_vers > 2)
|
|
|
|
error = nfserr_badhandle;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_vers == 4 && fh->fh_size == 0)
|
|
|
|
return nfserr_nofilehandle;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fh->fh_version == 1) {
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (--data_left < 0)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
if (fh->fh_auth_type != 0)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
len = key_len(fh->fh_fsid_type) / 4;
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
if (fh->fh_fsid_type == FSID_MAJOR_MINOR) {
|
|
|
|
/* deprecated, convert to type 3 */
|
|
|
|
len = key_len(FSID_ENCODE_DEV)/4;
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_fsid_type = FSID_ENCODE_DEV;
|
2014-06-17 19:44:14 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* struct knfsd_fh uses host-endian fields, which are
|
|
|
|
* sometimes used to hold net-endian values. This
|
|
|
|
* confuses sparse, so we must use __force here to
|
|
|
|
* keep it from complaining.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_fsid[0] = new_encode_dev(MKDEV(ntohl((__force __be32)fh->fh_fsid[0]),
|
|
|
|
ntohl((__force __be32)fh->fh_fsid[1])));
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
fh->fh_fsid[1] = fh->fh_fsid[2];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data_left -= len;
|
|
|
|
if (data_left < 0)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2014-05-07 19:49:44 +08:00
|
|
|
exp = rqst_exp_find(rqstp, fh->fh_fsid_type, fh->fh_fsid);
|
|
|
|
fid = (struct fid *)(fh->fh_fsid + len);
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
__u32 tfh[2];
|
|
|
|
dev_t xdev;
|
|
|
|
ino_t xino;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fh->fh_size != NFS_FHSIZE)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
/* assume old filehandle format */
|
|
|
|
xdev = old_decode_dev(fh->ofh_xdev);
|
|
|
|
xino = u32_to_ino_t(fh->ofh_xino);
|
|
|
|
mk_fsid(FSID_DEV, tfh, xdev, xino, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
exp = rqst_exp_find(rqstp, FSID_DEV, tfh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = nfserr_stale;
|
|
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(exp) == -ENOENT)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(exp))
|
|
|
|
return nfserrno(PTR_ERR(exp));
|
|
|
|
|
2008-05-08 11:03:09 +08:00
|
|
|
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK) {
|
|
|
|
/* Elevate privileges so that the lack of 'r' or 'x'
|
|
|
|
* permission on some parent directory will
|
|
|
|
* not stop exportfs_decode_fh from being able
|
|
|
|
* to reconnect a directory into the dentry cache.
|
|
|
|
* The same problem can affect "SUBTREECHECK" exports,
|
|
|
|
* but as nfsd_acceptable depends on correct
|
|
|
|
* access control settings being in effect, we cannot
|
|
|
|
* fix that case easily.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
|
2014-09-02 22:15:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!new) {
|
|
|
|
error = nfserrno(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
new->cap_effective =
|
|
|
|
cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
|
|
|
|
new->cap_permitted);
|
|
|
|
put_cred(override_creds(new));
|
|
|
|
put_cred(new);
|
2008-05-08 11:03:09 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Look up the dentry using the NFS file handle.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
error = nfserr_stale;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_vers > 2)
|
|
|
|
error = nfserr_badhandle;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fh->fh_version != 1) {
|
|
|
|
sfid.i32.ino = fh->ofh_ino;
|
|
|
|
sfid.i32.gen = fh->ofh_generation;
|
|
|
|
sfid.i32.parent_ino = fh->ofh_dirino;
|
|
|
|
fid = &sfid;
|
|
|
|
data_left = 3;
|
|
|
|
if (fh->ofh_dirino == 0)
|
|
|
|
fileid_type = FILEID_INO32_GEN;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
fileid_type = FILEID_INO32_GEN_PARENT;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
fileid_type = fh->fh_fileid_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fileid_type == FILEID_ROOT)
|
|
|
|
dentry = dget(exp->ex_path.dentry);
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
dentry = exportfs_decode_fh(exp->ex_path.mnt, fid,
|
|
|
|
data_left, fileid_type,
|
|
|
|
nfsd_acceptable, exp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dentry == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
|
|
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(dentry) != -EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
error = nfserrno(PTR_ERR(dentry));
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry)
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-29 20:02:35 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d_is_dir(dentry) &&
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED)) {
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
printk("nfsd: find_fh_dentry returned a DISCONNECTED directory: %pd2\n",
|
|
|
|
dentry);
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_dentry = dentry;
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_export = exp;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
exp_put(exp);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-21 01:01:59 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* fh_verify - filehandle lookup and access checking
|
|
|
|
* @rqstp: pointer to current rpc request
|
|
|
|
* @fhp: filehandle to be verified
|
|
|
|
* @type: expected type of object pointed to by filehandle
|
|
|
|
* @access: type of access needed to object
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Look up a dentry from the on-the-wire filehandle, check the client's
|
|
|
|
* access to the export, and set the current task's credentials.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Regardless of success or failure of fh_verify(), fh_put() should be
|
|
|
|
* called on @fhp when the caller is finished with the filehandle.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* fh_verify() may be called multiple times on a given filehandle, for
|
|
|
|
* example, when processing an NFSv4 compound. The first call will look
|
|
|
|
* up a dentry using the on-the-wire filehandle. Subsequent calls will
|
|
|
|
* skip the lookup and just perform the other checks and possibly change
|
|
|
|
* the current task's credentials.
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2008-10-21 01:01:59 +08:00
|
|
|
* @type specifies the type of object expected using one of the S_IF*
|
|
|
|
* constants defined in include/linux/stat.h. The caller may use zero
|
|
|
|
* to indicate that it doesn't care, or a negative integer to indicate
|
|
|
|
* that it expects something not of the given type.
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
2008-10-21 01:01:59 +08:00
|
|
|
* @access is formed from the NFSD_MAY_* constants defined in
|
2016-07-08 09:49:38 +08:00
|
|
|
* fs/nfsd/vfs.h.
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-10-20 14:28:55 +08:00
|
|
|
__be32
|
2011-07-26 15:30:54 +08:00
|
|
|
fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, int access)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct svc_export *exp;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__be32 error;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dprintk("nfsd: fh_verify(%s)\n", SVCFH_fmt(fhp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!fhp->fh_dentry) {
|
2008-03-15 05:51:12 +08:00
|
|
|
error = nfsd_set_fh_dentry(rqstp, fhp);
|
2006-07-30 18:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-26 06:42:05 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
|
|
|
|
exp = fhp->fh_export;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We still have to do all these permission checks, even when
|
|
|
|
* fh_dentry is already set:
|
|
|
|
* - fh_verify may be called multiple times with different
|
|
|
|
* "access" arguments (e.g. nfsd_proc_create calls
|
|
|
|
* fh_verify(...,NFSD_MAY_EXEC) first, then later (in
|
|
|
|
* nfsd_create) calls fh_verify(...,NFSD_MAY_CREATE).
|
|
|
|
* - in the NFSv4 case, the filehandle may have been filled
|
|
|
|
* in by fh_compose, and given a dentry, but further
|
|
|
|
* compound operations performed with that filehandle
|
|
|
|
* still need permissions checks. In the worst case, a
|
|
|
|
* mountpoint crossing may have changed the export
|
|
|
|
* options, and we may now need to use a different uid
|
|
|
|
* (for example, if different id-squashing options are in
|
|
|
|
* effect on the new filesystem).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-10 03:06:05 +08:00
|
|
|
error = check_pseudo_root(rqstp, dentry, exp);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-26 06:42:05 +08:00
|
|
|
error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd: call nfsd_setuser() on fh_compose(), fix nfsd4 permissions problem
In the typical v2/v3 case the only new filehandles used as arguments to
operations are filehandles taken directly off the wire, which don't get
dentries until fh_verify() is called.
But in v4 the filehandles that are arguments to operations were often created
by previous operations (putrootfh, lookup, etc.) using fh_compose, which sets
the dentry in the filehandle without calling nfsd_setuser().
This also means that, for example, if filesystem B is mounted on filesystem A,
and filesystem A is exported without root-squashing, then a client can bypass
the rootsquashing on B using a compound that starts at a filehandle in A,
crosses into B using lookups, and then does stuff in B.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-30 16:56:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-20 05:33:04 +08:00
|
|
|
error = nfsd_mode_check(rqstp, dentry, type);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-08 01:00:20 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM,
|
|
|
|
* which clients virtually always use auth_sys for,
|
|
|
|
* even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-04-09 04:32:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (access & NFSD_MAY_LOCK || access & NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS)
|
2008-08-08 01:00:20 +08:00
|
|
|
goto skip_pseudoflavor_check;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Clients may expect to be able to use auth_sys during mount,
|
|
|
|
* even if they use gss for everything else; see section 2.3.2
|
|
|
|
* of rfc 2623.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (access & NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS_ON_ROOT
|
|
|
|
&& exp->ex_path.dentry == dentry)
|
|
|
|
goto skip_pseudoflavor_check;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = check_nfsd_access(exp, rqstp);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2007-07-17 19:04:48 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-08-08 01:00:20 +08:00
|
|
|
skip_pseudoflavor_check:
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Finally, check access permissions. */
|
2007-07-17 19:04:48 +08:00
|
|
|
error = nfsd_permission(rqstp, exp, dentry, access);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
dprintk("fh_verify: %pd2 permission failure, "
|
2007-01-30 05:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
"acc=%x, error=%d\n",
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry,
|
2007-02-01 21:52:43 +08:00
|
|
|
access, ntohl(error));
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (error == nfserr_stale)
|
|
|
|
nfsdstats.fh_stale++;
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compose a file handle for an NFS reply.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note that when first composed, the dentry may not yet have
|
|
|
|
* an inode. In this case a call to fh_update should be made
|
|
|
|
* before the fh goes out on the wire ...
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
static void _fh_update(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct svc_export *exp,
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-15 11:38:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (dentry != exp->ex_path.dentry) {
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)
|
2014-05-07 19:49:44 +08:00
|
|
|
(fhp->fh_handle.fh_fsid + fhp->fh_handle.fh_size/4 - 1);
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
int maxsize = (fhp->fh_maxsize - fhp->fh_handle.fh_size)/4;
|
|
|
|
int subtreecheck = !(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_fileid_type =
|
|
|
|
exportfs_encode_fh(dentry, fid, &maxsize, subtreecheck);
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size += maxsize * 4;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_fileid_type = FILEID_ROOT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* for composing old style file handles
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void _fh_update_old(struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
struct svc_export *exp,
|
|
|
|
struct knfsd_fh *fh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
fh->ofh_ino = ino_t_to_u32(d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
|
|
|
|
fh->ofh_generation = d_inode(dentry)->i_generation;
|
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry)
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-29 20:02:35 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d_is_dir(dentry) ||
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
(exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK))
|
|
|
|
fh->ofh_dirino = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool is_root_export(struct svc_export *exp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return exp->ex_path.dentry == exp->ex_path.dentry->d_sb->s_root;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct super_block *exp_sb(struct svc_export *exp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-04-10 13:33:30 +08:00
|
|
|
return exp->ex_path.dentry->d_sb;
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool fsid_type_ok_for_exp(u8 fsid_type, struct svc_export *exp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (fsid_type) {
|
|
|
|
case FSID_DEV:
|
|
|
|
if (!old_valid_dev(exp_sb(exp)->s_dev))
|
2018-08-02 08:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* FALL THROUGH */
|
|
|
|
case FSID_MAJOR_MINOR:
|
|
|
|
case FSID_ENCODE_DEV:
|
|
|
|
return exp_sb(exp)->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
|
|
|
|
case FSID_NUM:
|
|
|
|
return exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_FSID;
|
|
|
|
case FSID_UUID8:
|
|
|
|
case FSID_UUID16:
|
|
|
|
if (!is_root_export(exp))
|
2018-08-02 08:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* fall through */
|
|
|
|
case FSID_UUID4_INUM:
|
|
|
|
case FSID_UUID16_INUM:
|
|
|
|
return exp->ex_uuid != NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-02 08:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
static void set_version_and_fsid_type(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_fh *ref_fh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2007-05-09 17:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 version;
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 fsid_type;
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
2007-05-09 17:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
version = 1;
|
2006-06-30 16:56:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ref_fh && ref_fh->fh_export == exp) {
|
2007-02-14 16:33:11 +08:00
|
|
|
version = ref_fh->fh_handle.fh_version;
|
2007-05-09 17:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
fsid_type = ref_fh->fh_handle.fh_fsid_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ref_fh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (version) {
|
|
|
|
case 0xca:
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_DEV;
|
2007-05-09 17:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* As the fsid -> filesystem mapping was guided by
|
|
|
|
* user-space, there is no guarantee that the filesystem
|
|
|
|
* actually supports that fsid type. If it doesn't we
|
|
|
|
* loop around again without ref_fh set.
|
2007-02-14 16:33:11 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!fsid_type_ok_for_exp(fsid_type, exp))
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2009-01-08 05:54:30 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_FSID) {
|
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_NUM;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (exp->ex_uuid) {
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_maxsize >= 64) {
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (is_root_export(exp))
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_UUID16;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_UUID16_INUM;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (is_root_export(exp))
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_UUID8;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_UUID4_INUM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (!old_valid_dev(exp_sb(exp)->s_dev))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* for newer device numbers, we must use a newer fsid format */
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_ENCODE_DEV;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:11 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
fsid_type = FSID_DEV;
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_version = version;
|
|
|
|
if (version)
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_fsid_type = fsid_type;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__be32
|
|
|
|
fh_compose(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct svc_export *exp, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
|
|
struct svc_fh *ref_fh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* ref_fh is a reference file handle.
|
|
|
|
* if it is non-null and for the same filesystem, then we should compose
|
|
|
|
* a filehandle which is of the same version, where possible.
|
|
|
|
* Currently, that means that if ref_fh->fh_handle.fh_version == 0xca
|
|
|
|
* Then create a 32byte filehandle using nfs_fhbase_old
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode * inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
dev_t ex_dev = exp_sb(exp)->s_dev;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
dprintk("nfsd: fh_compose(exp %02x:%02x/%ld %pd2, ino=%ld)\n",
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
MAJOR(ex_dev), MINOR(ex_dev),
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
(long) d_inode(exp->ex_path.dentry)->i_ino,
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry,
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
(inode ? inode->i_ino : 0));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Choose filehandle version and fsid type based on
|
|
|
|
* the reference filehandle (if it is in the same export)
|
|
|
|
* or the export options.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-07-02 14:24:32 +08:00
|
|
|
set_version_and_fsid_type(fhp, exp, ref_fh);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ref_fh == fhp)
|
|
|
|
fh_put(ref_fh);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_locked || fhp->fh_dentry) {
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "fh_compose: fh %pd2 not initialized!\n",
|
|
|
|
dentry);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_maxsize < NFS_FHSIZE)
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "fh_compose: called with maxsize %d! %pd2\n",
|
2007-02-14 16:33:11 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_maxsize,
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
dentry);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_dentry = dget(dentry); /* our internal copy */
|
2014-06-10 22:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_export = exp_get(exp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-03 07:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_version == 0xca) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* old style filehandle please */
|
|
|
|
memset(&fhp->fh_handle.fh_base, 0, NFS_FHSIZE);
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size = NFS_FHSIZE;
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.ofh_dcookie = 0xfeebbaca;
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.ofh_dev = old_encode_dev(ex_dev);
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.ofh_xdev = fhp->fh_handle.ofh_dev;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:11 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.ofh_xino =
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
ino_t_to_u32(d_inode(exp->ex_path.dentry)->i_ino);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.ofh_dirino = ino_t_to_u32(parent_ino(dentry));
|
|
|
|
if (inode)
|
|
|
|
_fh_update_old(dentry, exp, &fhp->fh_handle);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-05-07 19:49:44 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size =
|
|
|
|
key_len(fhp->fh_handle.fh_fsid_type) + 4;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_auth_type = 0;
|
2014-05-07 19:49:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mk_fsid(fhp->fh_handle.fh_fsid_type,
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_handle.fh_fsid,
|
|
|
|
ex_dev,
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
d_inode(exp->ex_path.dentry)->i_ino,
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
exp->ex_fsid, exp->ex_uuid);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inode)
|
|
|
|
_fh_update(fhp, exp, dentry);
|
2012-08-29 22:10:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_fileid_type == FILEID_INVALID) {
|
2009-09-04 23:59:32 +08:00
|
|
|
fh_put(fhp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfserr_opnotsupp;
|
2009-09-04 23:59:32 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Update file handle information after changing a dentry.
|
|
|
|
* This is only called by nfsd_create, nfsd_create_v3 and nfsd_proc_create
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-10-20 14:28:55 +08:00
|
|
|
__be32
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
fh_update(struct svc_fh *fhp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!fhp->fh_dentry)
|
|
|
|
goto out_bad;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
|
2015-03-18 06:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
if (d_really_is_negative(dentry))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_negative;
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_version != 1) {
|
|
|
|
_fh_update_old(dentry, fhp->fh_export, &fhp->fh_handle);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_fileid_type != FILEID_ROOT)
|
2013-09-12 21:31:39 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-10-22 07:42:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_fh_update(fhp, fhp->fh_export, dentry);
|
2012-08-29 22:10:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_fileid_type == FILEID_INVALID)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfserr_opnotsupp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out_bad:
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "fh_update: fh not verified!\n");
|
2013-09-12 21:31:39 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfserr_serverfault;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
out_negative:
|
2013-09-16 22:57:01 +08:00
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "fh_update: %pd2 still negative!\n",
|
|
|
|
dentry);
|
2013-09-12 21:31:39 +08:00
|
|
|
return nfserr_serverfault;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Release a file handle.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
fh_put(struct svc_fh *fhp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dentry * dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
|
|
|
|
struct svc_export * exp = fhp->fh_export;
|
|
|
|
if (dentry) {
|
|
|
|
fh_unlock(fhp);
|
|
|
|
fhp->fh_dentry = NULL;
|
|
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
2015-09-17 20:28:39 +08:00
|
|
|
fh_clear_wcc(fhp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-12 22:20:33 +08:00
|
|
|
fh_drop_write(fhp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (exp) {
|
2012-03-28 23:09:22 +08:00
|
|
|
exp_put(exp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
fhp->fh_export = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Shorthand for dprintk()'s
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char * SVCFH_fmt(struct svc_fh *fhp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct knfsd_fh *fh = &fhp->fh_handle;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char buf[80];
|
|
|
|
sprintf(buf, "%d: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x",
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_size,
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_base.fh_pad[0],
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_base.fh_pad[1],
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_base.fh_pad[2],
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_base.fh_pad[3],
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_base.fh_pad[4],
|
|
|
|
fh->fh_base.fh_pad[5]);
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum fsid_source fsid_source(struct svc_fh *fhp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_version != 1)
|
|
|
|
return FSIDSOURCE_DEV;
|
|
|
|
switch(fhp->fh_handle.fh_fsid_type) {
|
|
|
|
case FSID_DEV:
|
|
|
|
case FSID_ENCODE_DEV:
|
|
|
|
case FSID_MAJOR_MINOR:
|
2009-09-03 07:31:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (exp_sb(fhp->fh_export)->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)
|
2007-09-06 05:22:13 +08:00
|
|
|
return FSIDSOURCE_DEV;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
case FSID_NUM:
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_export->ex_flags & NFSEXP_FSID)
|
|
|
|
return FSIDSOURCE_FSID;
|
2007-09-06 05:22:13 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-06 05:22:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/* either a UUID type filehandle, or the filehandle doesn't
|
|
|
|
* match the export.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_export->ex_flags & NFSEXP_FSID)
|
|
|
|
return FSIDSOURCE_FSID;
|
|
|
|
if (fhp->fh_export->ex_uuid)
|
|
|
|
return FSIDSOURCE_UUID;
|
|
|
|
return FSIDSOURCE_DEV;
|
2007-02-14 16:33:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|